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PREFACE
The study of the formation of the Czechoslovak
State, following World War I, has proved most rewarding
No new Nation, arising out of the remnants of the oncegreat Habsburg Empire, achieved its independence in a
more interesting manner*
I wish to express my appreciation to Dr* A* Stan
ley Trickett, who patiently guided the study tp its
completion, and to my wife, Mary, for her great under
standing and assistance.
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CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND?

A NATION IS SUBMERGED

The history of the Czecho-Slovak nation is a proud
one.

During the long course of time it records how a nomad

ic Slav tribe developed into a modern-day nation of culture
and industry, and yet one which retains many characteristics
of a nation of another era.
Basically, the Czechs and Slovaks both spring from
the same racial and linguistic background, but they have
experienced a different history.

The Czechs (Bohemians and

Moravians) developed largely under their own leadership,
either Independently or-under the:Habsburg Crown; while the
Slovaks very early came under the domination of the Magyars
of Hungary and long were held in subjugation by that and
other groups of Asiatic background.
The rapid advance of the Turks into Europe early in
the Sixteenth Century, under the great Ottoman ruler,
Suleiman the Magnificent, caused consternation among the
Christian nations.

Much of Hungary was overrun, and with

the death, at the Battle of Mohacs on August 28, 1$ ;
26, of
King Louis Jagellon, who occupied both the Hungarian and
Bohemian thrones, the Estates of Austria, Hungary and
Bohemia united, in a free federation.
of

Ferdinand, Archduke

Austria and Louis® brother*In«law, was chosen to unite

the forces of the three embattled states and with them
resist the advance of the Moslems.

2
Under terms of the federation, each of the three in
dependent states, bound together solely through the person
of the monarch, was to retain its sovereignty unimpaired*
As the Moslem drive lost its vigor and Christian forces be
gan the long struggle to drive the Turks out of Europe,
however, the Bohemian State was even more closely linked
with Habsburg interests,

until, during Ferdinand II*s re

gime, unwilling to accept his religious aims regarding
Catholicism and centralization of power,

the Czechs rebel

led in 16X8, deposed the Habsburgs, and chose Frederick ofthe
Palatinate as King of Bohemia*
The Czech struggle for independence began when the
Bohemia nobles, defending their feudal rights and their
Protestant religion,

literally threw the royal officers out

of the windows of Hradcany Castle on May 23, 1618, in the
famous "defenestration of Prague*"

This event culminated

the efforts of Ferdinand, an ardent Catholic, to decrease
Bohemian rights earlier granted in the so-called Ma.lestatsbrief

(Letter of Majesty) issued by Rudolph II in 1609 to

assure freedom of religion to the Bohemian peoples*
Ferdinand did not delay long in accepting this chal
lenge to his royal absolutism and Catholicism*

Frederick

and his forces fought valiantly, but were defeated in the
humiliating Battle of White Mountain during November, 1620,
when the Imperial forces under Tilly were aided by Maximil
ian I of Bavaria.

Although the son-in-law of King James I

3
of Englan d, and fully expecting support in men and money from
the Island Kingdom, Fr ederick5s pleas for assistance were
ignored by James, with the result that the embattled Bohemian
ruler and his allies were decisively defeated in this first
major battle of the Thirty Y e a r s ” War.
Bohemian independence
r /
died at Bila Hora (White Mountain), not to be regained for
nearly three centuries.

Frederick's reign, thus, was brief,

and the often-used name,

"Winter King," is an indication of

the fact.
During the Thirty Y e a r s ” War, much of Bohemia was
laid waste, and the Protestant nobility was exiled and re
placed, as one author aptly states,
...with a carpetbagger, alien nobility, gathered from
the four corners of the far-flung Habsburg domains.
This new nobility became speedily “Bo hemian” but never
”C z e c h ” in sentiment.
In culture, it became German.1
S. Harrison Thomson sums up the unfortunate results of the
war for the Czech peoples i
It would be almost Impossible to overestimate the
significance of the Battle of the White Mountain in
the history of the relations between the Hapsburgs
s i c .nj and the Czech Kingdom.
Up until that fateful
ate T h e r e was always the possibility that a workable
modus vlvendl might be found under which the ruler and
the people, although of different nationality and, it
might be truly said, of different religious faith,
might work together in peace and contentment.
The.
shadow of the two years of struggle, 1618-1620, and

f

^Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Cen
tral E u r o p e . 191^- 1 9 1 8 1 A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and
Propaganda (Princeton?
Princeton University Press, 1 9 5 7 )s

the crushing humiliation the Czechs suffered at the end
of that time hovered over the whole course of Czech
history until 1918.2
From 1618 to 1918, Bohemia became closely associated
with Austria, although it never completely lost its identity
as it remained a distinct unit within the Habsburg Empire.
After the Peace of Westphalia (October 24, 164-8), which en
ded the Thirty T e a r s 1 War, a series of ruthlessly repres
sive measures was enacted by the vindictive Ferdinand in
Bohemia.

Forcible Germanization, oppressive taxation,

absentee land ownership, among other things, reduced the
Czechs, except for a few favored magnates, to a life of
degreadation and misery.
Emperor Ferdinand's saying gives the key to the
Counter-Reformation period of Czech history?
"Better
no population at all than a population of heretics."
At the beginning of the Thirty Tears* War, there were
3,000,000 people in Bohemia, nearly all Protestants.
At the end, there were only 800,000, all (nominally)
Roman Catholics...The towns were repopulated by Ger
man Immigrants belonging to the Church of Rome, and
the estates of the nobles were confiscated and given
to aliens...The Czech language ceased to be the of
ficial language...and eventually German became the
dominant language.3
The spirit of Bohemian independence, however, lived
on during the several centuries of Habsburg rule; and with

S. Harrison Thomson, Czechoslovakia in European His(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 4 4 59 p. 7 ;
^Joseph S. Roucek and Associates, Central-Eastern
,* Crucible of World Wars (New Tork: Prentice-Hall,
Inc •»
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the dawn of the Nineteenth Century, a rebirth of Czech
nationalism and interest in the Czech language came upon
the heels of the revolutionary era.

The Czech language was

brought back into general usage under pressures generated
by the growing demands for revival of the Czech Nation.
Under the enlightened leadership of Frantisek Palacky,
nationalist,

historian and political realist, the Czechs

began the long development toward national consciousness and
eventual recognition as a state.

Far from wishing the dis

solution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Palacky advocated
its reorganization into a federation of autonomous national
states, as a step towards the solution of a major European
problem.

A liberal in the best sense of the word,’ |Palacky

advocated national liberation through education and enlight
enment , rather than by the methods of revolution.

"One of

the earliest Austrlans to become aware both of the Russian
danger and of German predominant influence,

pPalackfJ pro

posed the establishment of a multinational federation."^
It was Palack/ who coined the famous phrases
"If
there were no Austria, it would be necessary to create
her."*..But, it was he too, who struck a more radical
note in that other phrases
"Before Austria was, we
were, and when Austria no longer is, we "still shall be.

^Robert J. Kann, The Habsburg Empir e. A Study in Integration and Disintegration (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 195 7 )s p. 1 3 1 . (Cited hereafter as Kann, The Habs
burg E m p i r e ).
5 r . W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (New York?
The Macmillan Company, 19^3)* P* o. felted hereafter as
Seton-Watson, Masaryk In Englan d).

Of the many subject peoples of the Dual Monarchy,

the

Czechs were the most advanced politically, and nationalism
developed most rapidly and fully within them*

Yet even in

Bohemia the most advanced leaders sought only autonomy under
the Habsburgs which would put the Czechs on a level with the
Magyars of Hungary*

"No one yet dreamed of complete, econo

mic, and customs separation from the other parts of the
realm,"^ Joseph Redlich, a former Austrian official has
written*
Unfortunately for the Czechs, however,

they were not

the only racial group at work within the Empire in the quest
for national recognition and self-determination*

Most im

portant among the others were the Magyars of Hungary, who

t

wielded a much greater influence than was warranted by their
numbers, and who proved more effective than the Czechs in
realizing their ambitions*

Czech aspirations of federation

on an equal footing with the German-Magyar elements of the
Empire,

suffered a severe blow in February,

186?, when the

famous Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich (Compromise) was con
cluded,

transforming the Empire into the Austro-Hungarian

("D u a l " ) Monarchy *
It was in effect an alliance between the Germans of
Austria and the Magyars of Hungary against the rest of
the nationalities, or more especially an alliance be-

^Joseph Redlich, Austrian War Government
Yale University Press, 1929), p. 69#

(New Havens
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tween the ruling classes of Austria and Hungary*
The
statement, "You take care of your Barbarians, and we
shall take care of ours," which von Beust is supposed
t o :have made to the Hungarian representative, Francis
Peak, is probably aprocryphal, but it expresses perfect
ly the purpose of the Ausgleich from the point of view
of the ruling classes of Austria and Hungary.?
A dozen years later, in 1879, Graf Eduard von Taaffe,
premier for a second time (the first, briefly in 1868-1869),
made limited concessions to the Czechs,

including a provi

sion that Czech delegates would be seated in the Reichsrat
(Parliament) in Vienna*

The immediate effect of the

A usg leich* however, was that many Czechs began to work for
full independence from the Habsburgs and the Dual Monarchy*
As Woodrow Wilson was to write in The State * Elements of
Historical and Practical Po litics:
No lapse of time, no defeat of hopes, seems suffi
cient to reconcile the Czechs of Bohemia to incorpora
tion with Austria*
Pride of race and the memories of
a notable and distinguished history keep them always
at odds with the Germans within their gates and with
the government set over their heads*
They desire at
least the same degree of autonomy that has been g r a n t 
ed to Hungary *°

^Mamatey, op* c i t *, p. 12*
^Woodrow Wilson, The S t a t e . Elements of Historical
and Practical Politics * Revised Edition, 1911, p* 7^0,
cited by Alel Hrdli&ka, "Bohemia and the Czechs*" The Na
tional Geographic Magazine * XXXI, No. 2 (February, 19lTT,
163 . An interesting account of how the Czechoslovak pub
licists In the United States used the first sentence of
Wilson*s statement, quoted above, as a rallying cry during
the World War is recounted in Charles Pergler1s America In
the Struggle for Czechoslovak Independence (Philadelphia:
Dorranee and Company, 1926), pp. 3 9-^0,
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Many Czech leaders realized that such a Slav partner
ship within the Monarchy would be of great benefit to their
people.

Mot the least of these was 'Thomas G. Masaryk, a Slo

vak of humble parentage, born in Moravia, who became a pro
fessor of philosophy in the Czech University of Prague.

As

he became interested in the political welfare of Bohemia, he
took an active part in the political affairs of the day and
was elected to parliament in 1907.

Outlining his beliefs,

he was to write, while a member of the governing b o d y :
We want a federal Austria.
We cannot be independent
outside of Austria next to a powerful Germany, having
Germans on our territory....Therefore we are going to
fight for the reorganization of the Austrian state so
that it may be useful to us nationally and politically.9
This study proposes to trace the steps followed in
the realization of the dream of the re-establishment of a
sovereign Czechoslovak State.

It will attempt to show how

a small band of Czechoslovak leaders, well supported by edu
cation and propaganda, planned and carried out their pro
gram.

In the achievement of the goal, these men employed

the Czechoslovak Legions which were formed as a result of
the Austro-Hungarian defeats during the great war of 191^1918, and were effectively employed on far-flung battle
fields in the Interests of the aspiring Republic of Czecho
slovakia *

^Mamatey, op. clt. . p. 18, citing Cas, May 18, 1909,
quoted in Evzen Stern, Nazory T. G. Masaryka (The Opinions
of T. G. Masa ryk ), P r a g u e , 1918, p. 66 i

CHAPTER II
THE WAR OFFERS A CHANCES

THE STEP IS TAKEN

Farseeing Austrian leaders did not fail to realize
the problems which the reviving Slav nationalism of the
Nineteenth Century created*

The baiting of Russia and Ser

bia, during the Bosnian Crisis

(1908-1909)* gave more rabid

Austrians the satisfaction which can result when opponents,
as the Slavs were now considered, are humiliated*

The suc

cessful annexation— brought off thanks to Germany® s support
of her ally— failed to resolve Aust ria 0s difficulties with
the Slavs, both within and without the Empire and, in fact,
merely postponed its solution for a short time*

The Serbs,

and other Balkan and Central European Slavs, turned after
1909, with ever greater frequency, to Russia for advice and
leadership,

"with whom**.they were bound by the two powerful

ties of Slav kinship and Orthodox religion."1
The Dual Monarchy won another diplomatic victory over
Serbia in 1913, when she forced the withdrawal of Serbian
troops from Albania.

Backed by Germany, as in 1908-1909,

the Austrians allowed the Serbs only eight days in which to
call back their military forces.

Belgrade, while reluctant,

•^R* W* Seton-Watson, Sarajevo (London: Constable and
Company, Limited, 1925), p* 16; Cf.T Sidney Bradshaw Fay,
The Origins of the World War (New Xorks The Macmillan Co.,
1932), pp. 3 8 3 1 399.

was forced to comply.2

Despite this second and sharp setback

the Serbs gained increased stature in the eyes of the world,
and those Slavs living inside the Dual Monarchy came, as a
result,

to look more and more toward Serbia as the potential
f

leader in the forming of a fully independent South Slav State
The growing threat of a "Slav Piedmont,” adjacent to
the borders of the Dual Monarchy,

in turn, led the non-Slavs

in the Habsburg domains— the Germans and Magyars— to believe
that Mthe Monarchy must either crush Serbia or be destroyed
by it*"-^

The rapid acceptance of this view, by both Aus

trians and Hungarians, must be considered a primary factor
behind the ultimatum and declaration of war against Serbia
in 1914.

Victor S. Mamatey expresses It In these words:

The declaration of war on Serbia in 1914 was also
motivated by an internal political consideration:
the
inability to solve the mounting Yugoslav problem at
home*
A little victorious war to wipe out Serbia, the
supposed source of Yugoslav agitation, was just the
medicine nee ded♦
The assassination at Sarajevo of the Archduke Franz
Ferdinand and his wife,

the Duchess of Hohenberg, which was

used by the Austrians as the reason for the 1914 declaration

2F a y , op. cit., pp* 474-75•
3Robert J. Kerner, (ed.), Yugoslavia (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1949), p.
51*
(Cited hereafter as Kerner, Yu goslavia).
^Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Cen
tral Europe, 1914- 1 918s A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and
Propaganda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957 )*
p. 19.
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of war on Serbia-was, therefore, looked upon as an event that
might ;serve to finally remove the South Slav threat.
sult was otherwise.

The re

MSerbla was intended to reassert the

position of Austria-Hungary as an independent Great Powerj
instead,

it ended both greatness and independence,"5 says

the English historian, A. J. P. Taylor.
The war was not popular with the Czechoslovak peoples
for two reasons*

The fact that they were forced to serve in

the Austro-Hungarian armies under other than their own offi
cers, and often under German rather than Austro-Hungarian
leadership,

caused resentment.

More important, however, was

the fact that they were forced to fight against other Slavs,
including the Serbians and Russians.

During the war, both

Czech and Slovak soldiers proved to be the most determined
and implacable foes of the Empire, manifesting this antagon
ism by wholesale desertion to the enemy*

In this they were

supported by a stubborn and growing resistance to the au
thorities on the part of the civil population.
At first many Czech patriots were encouraged by the
advances of the Russian forces on the Eastern Front*

Quick

ly they came to believe that it would soon be possible to
link themselves with their great Slav protector and,

thus,

secure for the Czech cause recognition as a step towards

^A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy. 1809-1 9 1 8 .
4 History of the Austrian Empire and Austria- Hungary. New
Edition (Londons Hamish Hamilton, 1955)? P* 233.
(Cited
hereafter as Taylor, Habsburg Mona rch y).

freedom from the Habsburgs•

They were,

therefore,

inclined

to be content to await the seemingly assured defeat of the
Austro-Hungarians by Czar Nich ola s’
1 forces, and limited them
selves to combatting the German-Magyar rule as well as they
could on the home front*

When, however,

the Russian armies

were driven back with terrible losses, and as the German
High Command took over complete control of the armed forces
of the Central Powers, and the tides of war seemed to set
in against the Russians, many Czechs became despondent,
fearing that the help upon which they had counted so strong
ly would not come*
But while the ultra-Russophils (all Czechs were Russophils up to a certain point) were depressed by the
terrible reverses which followed upon the, first vietoiries of the Tsarist armies, Masaryk never lost his
balance, and soon realized that the fate of his nation
was bound up with that of the Western democracies and
America, and also that a great educational and propa
gandist work would be required before the Western public
could be expected to understand the Czech problem in its
Austrian setting, and to accept the idea of active co
operation*^
Professor Thomas G. Masaryk was almost alone among
his countrymen, at the start of the war,
the;

in the belief that

ultimate fate of the Czechoslovak Nation was closely

linked with the attitude of the Western Powers, particular
ly America,

to their ambitions*

A few Czechs and Slovaks,

realizing that all avenues of help must be explored, looked
toward the other members of the Entente for assistance, but

^R. W # Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (New York?
The Macmillan Company, 19^3), p. o* "TCited hereafter as
Seton-Watson, Masaryk in En gla nd )*
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it was Masa r y k 5s special genius, at this time, to see across
the mists of the Atlantic the future importance of the United
States in Central European affairs*
Masa ryk .•.was one of the few great European intellec
tuals who appreciated America at a time when she was
still completely an unknown quantity in Europe.
In
looking from the beginning of the war to the Western
Allies for support and sympathy, not only was he soli
tary among the Czechs and Slovaks, but he also defied
conceptions generally held in the Dual Monarchy.
Prom
the vantage point of Prague, Vienna, and in Budapest
alike, Bussia was the principal Entente Power; France
was only very secondary, and Insular Britain hardly fig
ured at all.?
In his own words, Masaryk points out this divergence
of opinion among the Czechoslovak leadership— those awaiting
national redemption at the hands of Bussia, and those who
determined to seek assistance from other sources i
Therefore, I favored vigorous action abroad, not in
Bussia alone, but also in the other Allied countries,
so as to gain for us the good will and the help of all.
I insisted that, like me, Dr. Kram££ should get away,
so that we could share the work abroad; but he, I was
told (for I had no chance of approaching him personally)
was determined to stay at home since he expected that
the Bussians would themselves settle the Czechoslovak
question once for all.°
Immediately after the outbreak of the war, Masaryk
made three trips abroad to determine what the possibilities
were of securing Western aid for the Czechoslovak cause.

^Mamatey, o p . c l t .. p. 32.

8

Dr. Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a S t a t e .
Memories and Observations (New York; Frederick A. S t o k e s ,
Company, 1927)* P* 15•
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Early in August,
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he preceded to Holland, where he made

contact with his friends,
tor of The

Henry Wickham Steed, Foreign Edi

(London) T i m e s , and Dr*. S.* W* Seton-Watson, a

leading British student of Slav problems*

Both of these men

were very influential publicists in Great Britain, and both
promised to give him what support they could.

They proved

to be, throughout the long struggle for Czechoslovak inde
pendence,

true friends of the Czechs and Slovaks, and im

placable enemies of the Habsburgs.

Thus, Masaryk early in

*

the war demonstrated an a m a z i n g .ability to draw to him men
capable of great accomplishments and willing to make person
al sacrifices for the cause of Czechoslovak independence.
Seton-Watson was especially helpful to Masaryk through his
preparation of many of the latter5s papers for publication
in English.

In addition,

the Britisher wrote many articles

favorable to the Czechoslovak cause himself
Shortly after his return from this first wartime trip,
Masaryk called together a meeting of his friends in the Pro
gressive Party,

“...this meeting,

like several of those

which followed, was a focus from which later was formed what
was known as the '■Maffla'*"

io

Recalling the meeting, Masaryk

^S. Harrison Thomson, Czechoslovakia in European His
tory (Princetons Princeton University Press, 1 9 ® ) Y p. 2 ® ;
Masaryk, Making of a S t a t e , pp. 87-88.
lC>Dr. Eduard B e n e s , My War M e m oirs. (trans.), Paul
Selver (Boston and Mew Yorks Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928),
p. 2 6 .

later wrote:
We discussed the situation at home, as well as in
Austria and Germany and among the Allies, in a w o r d ,
everything that mattered*
We agreed upon our whole
p l a n o f campaign and also about our helpers at h o m e a n d
abroad.
As long as possible Bene¥ was to remain at home
and to organize communications with me after the fashion
of the Russian Secret Socie tie s... .So arose our secret
organization* the "Maffia," which was led at first by
B e n e & , Slimal and RaSin; and after the arrest of Ra^in
and the departure of BeneS, by SiSmal and o t h e r s . H
Eduard B e n e l , Czech scholar and ardent disciple of
Masaryk,

in his book, My; War M e m o i r s , points out the value

of the "Maffia" during the long and bitter struggle for
liberation:
1.
It enabled us to establish our first revolution
ary organization a b r o a d , while systematically keeping
in touch with the responsible politicians at home
throughout the war...
2.
At critical moments it enabled us either to send
our news home or to interpret authentically in the.
Allied countries, on the basis of news received from
our friends in Prague, the trend of events at home.
This gave us an opportunity of exerting a considerable
Influence upon the development of political affairs
both.at home and in the Allied countries.
3.
From its very beginnings the "Maffia" sent
abroad valuable reports on political, economic and
military affairs in Austria-Hungary, which often
proved of service to the Allies in military opera
tions, in political action, and in economic or finan
cial measures.
This served our cause by enabling us
to gain the sympathies of various Allied official
circles, and thus the "Maffia" had a great practical
significance.12

11Masaryk, Making of a S t a t e . pp. 27-29*
12BeneM, op. p i t ... pp. 7^-751 C f ., Robert J. Kerner,
"Winning Czechoslovak Independence," Foreign A f f a i r s . VII
(January, 1929), 313*

Following a meeting in Prague of this secret organi
zev

zation in 1915 $ ®r* Karel Kramar,

outspoken foe of the

government and leader of the Young Czech party, was arrest
ed by the Austrian police*
On May 1 of that year, Professor Ernest Denis, a
staunch supporter of the Czechs in academic circles in
France, where he was a prominent educator, began publish
ing a fortnightly paper, under the title of La Nation
\

which carried news of Interest about the libera

tion movement obtained from its supporters in Prague and
elsewhere*

It became a medium through which word of the

movement could be spread to an ever increasing audience,
especially in the West, and served as a forerunner of
later companion propaganda news sheets in Bussia, England
and the United States*

Systematic and regular contribu

tions were obtained by secret couriers, from Prague *^-3
Masaryk stated?;
Our first and most urgent task was to organize "sub*
terranean" work, the sending of messengers to and from
Prague*
It went well, for we all worked with a will**.
To some extent we communicated with Prague "legally,"
by post*
In the early days, at least, non-political
letters got t h r o u g h . ^
Bene&,

too, began to travel, and,

on returning from

a trip to Geneva, brought back several copies of La Nation

13Thomas Capek, Jr*, Origins of the Czechoslovak
State ([New York ]i Revell Press, 192o), p* 39; Bene§
o n * c i t * * p*
l^Masaryk, Making of a S t a t e * pp. ^8-^9

1?
Tch^que so that the underground workers in Prague could see
the results obtained from their efforts at provision of news
materials for outside publication.

One of the copies was

given to K r a m a r , after the "Maffia" meeting mentioned above,
with the following results
Kram^y had looked in at the office of Narodni List!
[chief Prague daily newspaper 1 and then proceeded to bis
villa.
Just as he was about to enter he was arrested*
Among other things the copy of La Nation Tch^que was
taken from him and proved to be. ♦ .evidence against him.-*-5
Arrests became common after the Austrian War Govern
ment , operating under the authority of the "Dictatorship
Paragraph"

(Paragraph 1^) of the Constitution, began to

issue emergency decrees having the force of law.

"There

were 181 such Imperial decrees from March 16, 193A to May 30,
1 9 1 ? . . Yet the government, while possessing the neces
sary legal authority to support its rather regular use of
arbitrary arrests, was not always assured of the unanimous
support of such a program by its own leaders.
occasions,

On several

key civilian members of the Government tried to

get the Emperor Pranz Joseph to temper the harsh actions
stemming from the demands of the military group, as one
historian has noted s

l-SBenel, ©jo. c i t ., p. 66.
l^David F. Strong, Austria (October 1918-March 191'
Transition from Empire to Republic (L o ndon 1 P* S* Kind &
Son, Ltd., 1939), p. 38.

When the Supreme Command * without consulting the
Prime Minister, arrested Dr. Karel Kramarz JTslcTj. a de 
puty, and the most respected leader of the Czech nation
at that time, Count Stuergkb went to the aged Emperor
in person and complained in the most bitter terms of the
evils and dangers caused by the practical dictatorship,
without success, however.
Even in political matters, the
authority of the army must not be interfered with or
diminished 1
That little real consideration was given to requests
for more temperate action is borne out by the fact that
Dr. Kram^y remained a prisoner from the time of his arrest in
May, 1915, until after the general political amnesty pro
claimed by the new Emperor, Charles I, in July, 1918.

This

is further attested to by statements from reliable witnesses
which Indicate that an “estimated 20,000 Czech civilians
were Interned as "political suspects,1 and that close on
5,000 were sentenced to death by courts-martial,” during the
war-time reign of Franz Joseph.
While diminishing the effectiveness of the Czechoslo
vak leadership at home,

the widespread program of artitrary

arrests provided excellent fuel for the propaganda fires
being lighted beyond the borders of the Dual Monarchy.

The

arrests helped prepare the development of a potent, and fin
ally,

overwhelming propaganda against Austria and Hungary,

based on the need for reform of internal political condi-

l?Joseph Bedlich, Austrian War Government
Yale University Press, 1929), p. 90.
^ H . W. V. Temperley,
Conference of Paris (Londons
ton, 1920-192^), IV, p. 2^9*
Peace Conference)•

(New Havens

(ed.), A History of the Peace
Henry Frowde, Hodder & Stough
(Cited hereafter as Temperley,
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t ion s•
It was an Austrian war government, presenting the ex
ternal appearance of complete detachment from every form
of national or class politics, which, without knowing
what it was doing, tilled the soil in which these enemy
seeds would grow and ripen*
The first impulse and the
chief moral encouragement was given by the emigration
of leading men among the Czechs and South Slavs.
This
was the initial act of pressure that led to the crystal
lization of forces working for the destruction of the
historic union of the various Austrian nationalities
now struggling for independence.3-9
In view of conditions In Prague, and after several
surreptitious trips to Switzerland, during which he was aware
that his actions were under strict surveillance by the Aus
trian police, Eduard Bene¥ decided to flee to the West at a
propitious time.

He escaped to Paris in September,

1915?

where he was to serve as the acknowledged Czech leader under
Masaryk and to work with Milan R. ^tefanik, a colorful Slo
vak astronomer, meteorologist, traveler and officer In the
French air service.

These two men, working happily under

Masaryk®s leadership, made a highly effective team.

"There

were no personal rivalries or political differences between
them.

The authority of Masaryk over the two younger mem

bers of the liberating triumvirate was complete."^®
A division of areas of operation was soon made be 
tween Masaryk, Bene£ and Stef^fnik.
don in April,

Masaryk arrived in Lon

1915? and decided to stay there at least for

^Redlich,

op* c i t »■. p. 98.

20Mamatey,

op. c i t . . p. 3 2 .

a while, as London was the center of Entente political acti
vity $ meanwhile Bene^ and Stefanik were to work in Paris,
even more the military headquarters of the A l l i e s .21
Prior to B e n e X 9 departure from Prague, and while on
one of his clandestine visits to Switzerland to consult with
Masaryk,

the latter pointed out to Benes that he believed

the only people who could ultimately assure the success of
the Czechoslovak movement were the Czechs and Slovaks in the
New World and the freedom loving peoples of America*

Funds

for continuing the struggle were badly needed, and, Masaryk
said,

" 9Somebody would have to be sent there to collect

money from our friends *9

I mentioned my brother Votza-,

Benes," Eduard Benes reports, "and Dr* Masaryk agreed* ***“22
1

Thus, another very influential worker was added to the move
ment and a definite plan to secure support on the western
side of the Atlantic began to take shape*

In this plan,

they were encouraged by the fact that some money from
friends and sympathizers in America already had been made
available to Masaryk, who reported,

"Mr. Charles Crane

fchicago industrialist and Masaryk® s long-time friend]

sent

me personally a considerable sum*"23
Money,

however, was not overly plentiful and a com-

2lMasaryk, Making of a S t a t e ,, p. 71*

22Bene¥, pp. pit., p. 5 2 .
2 3Masaryk, Making of a S t a t e , p* 8 .

mon fund w a s ’(necessary to assure that all aspects of the
work for liberation could be continued*

Following his es

cape from Prague to Paris, even with his considerable per
sonal wealth, Beneis reports that the timely arrival of
money from the United States was necessary to keep his work
going forwar d i
Towards the end of 1915 Professor Masaryk received
the first funds from the American collections, so that
he was able to let me keep about 20,000 francs which I
had brought with me when I escaped from home.
This en
abled me to live from my own resources and remain inde
pendent in a financial sense . ^
The Czech people have always been known for their
industriousness and thrift, and it is interesting to note
that the leaders of the liberation movement proved them
selves true members of the Czech Nation.

Masaryk states:

...in Europe we inverted the Czech proverb, "Little
money, little music," and got plenty of music for our
little mo ney...I doubt whether revolutionary propaganda
abroad has ever been so cheaply carried on; nor does
modesty prevent me from saying that few political cam
paigns have been so well thought out as ours was.
Here
is an account of the money I received from America for
the causes
1914-1915................................. .#37, 8?1
191 6
............ ... 71,185
1917 (up to the end of April)............. 82,391
1918 (from May onwards)................... .4 8 ? .4?8

$<574,885
While I was in Russia in 1917-^1918 Dr. Bene& receiv
ed about $ 300 ,000 , so that the whole work cost less

than $ 1 ,000 ,000 . The subscriptions from America did not
increase notably until after the United States had en
tered the war.
Almost all of them came from Czechs.
During the war the Slovaks gave little, though they sent
$200,000, including some amounts from my American
acquaintances, after I had become president.2 *
The first full year of the war,

1915* was an active

one for the emigrd' Czechoslovak leaders, marked by the open
ing salvos fired against the Dual Monarchy from their propa
ganda guns.

Masaryk spoke on John Hus, the Fifteenth Century

religious martyr and symbol of Czechoslovak toleration, be
fore an assembled crowd of Czechs at Zurich on July 4, 1915•
...and on July 6, the fifth centenary of his martyr
dom, Professor Denis and I held a meeting in the Hall
of the Reformation at Geneva....Even in Austria the
Geneva celebration of 1915 hit the mark, the "Neue Freie
Presse" denounced it as "the first Czech declaration of
war against Austria*11
In England,

later in the year, Masaryk continued his

revolutionary propaganda,

supported by the indispensable

assistance of Wickham Steed and Seton-Watson.

Their friend

ship was instrumental in obtaining for him a professorship
at the University of London.

Here, Masaryk took advantage

of the excellent opportunity to present the merits of the
Czechoslovak cause before an influential audience on the oc
casion of his Inaugural Lecture at the School of Slavonic
Studies, King® s College,

on October 19, 1915*

Thus the

25Masaryk, Making of a S t a t e . p. 85.
2 6 lb ld. . pp. 58 -59 I C f ., Robert Joseph Kerner, (ed.),
Czechoslovakia t Twenty Years of Independence (Berkeley and
Los Angeles i University of California Press, 194(3), p. 5 3 .
(Cited hereafter as Kerner, Czechoslovakia).
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propaganda campaign which Masaryk had gone to London to wage,
received an auspicious start, under ideal sponsorship.

Lord

Robert Cecil, member of the British ministry, presided at
the lecture,

in the absence of the Prime Minister,

Mr. Her

bert Henry Asquith, who was prevented, because of Illness
and not because of any lack of sympathy, from attending in
person.

The gaining of the interest and good will of Asquith

and Cecil,

two pillars in British politics, was a diplomatic

triumph and of great value to the Czechoslovak cause, and
did much to assure M a s a r y k 8s acceptance in the West as the
acknowledged leader of the liberation movement.

Cecil read

a letter from Asquith to the assembled audience, which said
in part i
First and foremost we are fighting for the liberty
of small Nations in order that they may be liberated
from the oppression of their more powerful neighbors
and in the future be permitted to develop their own
national life and institutions
,8Masaryk® s lecture,

8The Problem of the Small Nation in the

European Crisi s ,8 was a sensation, and strenghthened the
logical foundation of the movement in the British m i n d •M
We soon produced an impression on Western Europe, not
only because we were well informed politically, and sup
plied accurate diagnoses of Central Europe, but also be
cause Masaryk was able to explain from the philosophy of
history the significance of the World War, and how It

2?Joseph S. Roucek, "President Masaryk of Czechoslo
vakia, " Current Hist ory . XXI (March, 1930)* 1110-1111.
28Thomson>

.03c). c i t .. p. 249; C f ., Bene¥,

p. 87.

±19421

o jd .

cit,.-.

should be regarded by Western Europe.2^
While these activities were being carried on, the
Czech and Slovak leaders had many other "irons in the fire,"
as they waged an all-out campaign against Austria and Hun
gary.

It was necessary to establish relations with the poli

ticians,

statesmen and Governments of the Allied nations,

to

organize united action among Czech and Slovak people in the
various Allied countries and,

"above all to create an army

from among Czech prisoners-of-war...Indeed, the idea of form
ing an army abroad was so natural that Czechs outside Aus
tria began everywhere to act spontaneously upon it,"30
Masaryk stated.
The time had come to take public action against A u s 
tria.
All Czech colonies abroad expected and demanded
it*
In Russia a Czech Military Unit, or "Druzlna,"
had been formed in the Autumn of 191&.
In France our
fellows had joined the army.
In all Allied countries
our people were vigorously opposing Austria and Ger
many.. .We made this widely known with good effect.31
The largest Czech and Slovak groups abroad were in
the United States and Russia, with Chicago,

in America, pro

perly described as the “largest Czech city" outside of B o 
hemia*

Within the United States,

several Czech and Slovak

organizations quickly sprang into being to promote the
Czechoslovak cause,

including:

the National Alliance of Bo

2 ^Bene^, op. cit. , p. 8 ?.
3°Masaryk, Making of a S t a t e ,, p. 33.
31ibld., p. 58.

hemian Catholics,

the Slovak League of America,

the Slovak

Catholic Alliance, and the Bohemian National Alliance#
was soon clear that the Czechs and Slovaks

It

in America must

finance the movement if it was to be successful#

In fact,

the chief fvole of all the groups mentioned above came to be
the financing of the campaign for Czechoslovak Independence
and the influencing of public opinion in America in favor
of it #32

The important results of the attempt to raise

money in America have already been alluded to*
on the other hand,

In Russia,

It was hoped to raise a Czechoslovak

army that would fight in the field against the Dual Mon
archy and, thus, gain recognition and prestige for the
aspiring new nation that was being dreamed of by so many
patriots#
In R u s s i a ,1 however,

the Czechoslovak cause experi

enced some of its greatest difficulties#

The R-usslan atti

tude, while generally pan-Slav, was often hesitant to sup
port the liberation movement against Imperial Germany and
the Dual Monarchy,

especially as the political arrangements

of the Central Powers were more like those of Czarlst Rus
sia, and because M a s a r y k ”s open, and frequent criticism of
Russian political Institutions made him persona non grata

32jaroslav F# Smetanka, "Bohemians and Slovaks--Now
Czecho-Slovaks," The Annals # American Academy of Political
and Social S ci en ce . XCIII (January, 1 9 2 1 5, lft-9-1531
Masaryk, Making of a S t a t e # p# 218#

at the Romanov Cour t*33

Added to this was an open political

rift between Czech conservatives and radicals living within
Russia#

Russian politicians,

complicated the issue by sup

porting a Czech exile, Josef Durich, a former Agrarian de 
puty in the ?A us t rian .Re ich srat . who had been sent abroad by
the Czech "Maffia 88 to coordinate activities with the Rus
sians*
1916,

Soon after his arrival in Russia,

in the summer of

however, Durich had allied himself with the conserva

tive Czechoslovak elements there and "became involved in the
intrigues of the ®dark forces*

in the Russian capital and

[jhufiTJ soon discredited himself even in the eyes of many
Czech and Slovak exiles in Russia.*3^
• ..before long old Mr* Durych [jicT) was superseded by
the Czech National Council*
He had been endeavoring, It
seemed to take the conduct of negotiations out of Mas
aryk* s hands and to entrust the fortunes of the Czechs
to the Russian Ministers for Foreign and Internal A f 
fairs ...many of his countrymen complained that he was
far too much identified with the Russian Conserva
tives #35
After the fall of the Romanovs in 191?, Du'rich experienced
a loss of influence and political oblivion followed.
unity of the Czechoslovak movement in Russia,

The

thereafter,

was not seriously threatened, although minor disagreements
among the "exiles" were noticeable occasionally.

It should

33Mamatey, .op. c i t . » p. 32*
3^ l b i d .. pp. 3 2 - 3 3 1 £L» > Masaryk, Making of a S t a t e ,
p. 76.
and

3 5 Henry Baerlein, .The March of the Seventy Thous
(Londons
Leonard Parsons, Ltd., 192§), P* 5^*

be recorded, however,
in Russia,

that many friendly forces were active

counteracting,

in part at least,

the difficulties

raised by Durich and his coterie, even while the Russian Em
pire was still in

existence.36

These,

of course, gained in

strength after the 1917 Revolutions.
Meanwhile, Masaryk and his followers decided to take
definite action and make an '"official" declaration of war
upon the Habsburg Empire*
ber 1^, 1915,

This was: done on S u n d a y , Novem

in conjunction^with a demand of the "Czech

Foreign Committee" for the establishment of an independent
Czechoslovak State within the historical boundaries of the
two p e o ples*3?
The proclamation, aligning the Czechs and Slovaks
with the Entente Powers, had been coordinated with and a p 
proved by the Czech leaders in Prague and was signed by re
presentatives of the Czechs and Slovaks residing in France,
Russia, Great Britain and the United States*3® Mamatey
points out the dilemna which faced the Czechoslovaks until
the fall of the Romanovss
...The declaration said nothing of the future form of
the Czechoslovak government, but it was a foregone con
clusion that it would.be a monarchy under a Romanov
prince.
Even Masaryk reluctantly admitted that the

3 &Thornson, pp.

c i t ., pp. 255^56; Mamatey, pp. pit.,

P. 33*
3?Masaryk, Making of a S t a t e , pp. 78-79! Benes, pp.
c i t ., p. 82; Mamatey, pp. c i t ., p. 3 3 1 Capek, pp. c i t .,
P* 39*
38«rhomson, pp.

c i t . , p.
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Idea was so popular with his countrymen that it was in
evitable.
It was only the fall of the Russian Monarchy
that permitted him to plan for a republic.39
The prospect of a Russian sovereign ruling Bohemia, however,
caused Masaryk great misgivings:
Privately he quipped that a Grand Duke in Prague
would mean 11champagne and French mistresses in the
Hrad&any," the royal castle In Prague.
Such a specta
cle, he feared, would speedily disabuse his countrymen,
a people of solid and sober virtues, of their native
Russophillsm.^°
While Masaryk was establishing connections with influ
ential persons in England and carrying forward the Czechoslo
vak propaganda effort there, Bene^ and Stefanik were not Idle
In France, where the latter was extremely popular with mili
tary and political leaders.

Professor Thomson reports that

Stefanik was successful In arranging countless Interviews
for Masaryk with prominent French politicians,

Including a

first visit with French Premier, Aristide Briand,
ary 3* 1916.

on Febru

The interview was "very sympathetic, and

Briand never thereafter wavered in his open advocacy of
Czechoslovak Independence.
I saw him | B r iandf on February 3 $ and laid before
him a small map of Europe and my view of the w a r —
that the division of Austria into her historical and
natural elements was a condition of the reconstruction
of Europe and of the real enfeeblement of Germany, that
is to say of Frenc.h security♦. .but Briand. . .grasped the

39jdamatey, eg. c i t .. p. 3 3 *

fr8ibia«
^Thomson,
pp. kz-kj.

ojd. cit. . p. 2515 Cf*> Baerlein,

ojo. e l t ..

heart of the matter at once.
Above all, he accepted our
policy and promised to carry it out...My visit to him
was announced in an official communique.*
Benesf, too, achieved considerable success in France.
Early in his work there he gained the support of many influ
ential people for the Czechoslovak cause and R. H* Bruce
Lockhart, writing in the Fortnightly Re view, spoke warmly of
the

great contribution the slight Czech lecturer made there

by to the

Czechoslovak movement:

Once more his indefatigable pen stood him in good
stead--a book appeared which at once aroiased tbe ,keenest attention of the Allied leaders, "Detruises I»*Autrlch el,f— the young Prague lecturer had achieved his
first great su ccess•..The leading statesmen of the West
ern Powers grasped eagerly at this new weapon for de
stroying Germany, and the difficulties of the Czech
leaders disappeared as if by magic.
Theory now gave
place to action.
In France, in Italy and in Russia,
Czech Legions were
formed which took their stand in the
trenches side-by-side with the Allied troops.^3
In 1916, to give formal and permanent character to
the movement,

the Czechoslovak National Council was organis

ed to take over the work of the "Czech Committee Abroad,"
and the "Czech Foreign Committee."

The Council was headed

by Masaryk as president, with B e ne^ named to handle the
duties of the General Secretariat in Paris.

To Stefanik

"fell the task of directing the military activities of the
various contingents of Czechs serving in the Allied armies.

^ 2Masaryk, Making of a S t a t e . p. 96*
H. Bruce Lockhart, "Dr. Edouard Benes," Fort
nightly R e v i e w . CXX (September, 19235» 424.
^ M a l b o n e Watson Graham, Jr., New Governments of Cen
tral Europe (New York*
Holt & Co., 1.924), p. 273*

Following establishment of the National Connell*
Czechoslovak movement gathered greater Impetus•
headquarters of the Council were soon established

the

Branch
In all the

Entente countries* and D e n i s ” La Nation Tcheaue became the
medium through which news of the Czechoslovak cause was dis
seminated to an ever-increasing aud ien ce.

Companion journals

in Russia, Great Britain and the United States were soon es
tablished to carry on the growing work of p r o p a g a n d a # ^
The Entente governments viewed the activities of the
.••Czechoslovak Council with mixed feelings.
On one
hand, they were anxious to encourage these activities
to weaken the Central Powers, but on the other they
were reluctant to accept their ultimate aims the com
plete dismemberment of Austria-Hungary...The Habsburg
Empire had been a part of the European balance-ofpower system for four centuries, and the Entente states
men feared the consequences of its disappearance ©^6
Nevertheless there was still division in feeling be
tween the western and eastern partners of the Entente.

West

ern statesmen tended to fear that a breakup of the Danubian
Monarchy would result in a number of satellite nations with
a Russian orientation#

Czarist statesmen,

on the other hand,

believed that the area might ultimately be filled with w est
ern-oriented democracies.

The Russians seemed afraid of the

possible adverse effects the establishment of such democra
tic states might have on both the minority groups in Russia
and the growing revolutionary movement, which was now giving

^5capek, jop. pit., p# 39#
^ M a m a t e y , _opa c i t . , p. 37*

the statesmen in St. Petersburg reason for great concern#
Contrary to popular opinion, and for a great variety of
reasons,

Imperial Russia did not wish to see the complete

destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire#**'?
In spite of the qualms of many Entente statesmen and
politicians,

the Czechoslovak National Council, now establish

ed, launched a more active program and soon was at work with
Czech and Slovak groups and committees all around the world#
Close liaison and coordination were maintained with the

11Maff ia 11 and other opposition groups at home and, at the
same time, arrangements for financing their work were per
fected.

This close working relationship between the "Maffla"

and the National Council was to continue throughout the long
struggle for independence, despite some minor points of dis
agreement, and attests to the wholehearted support given the
leaders abroad because of the favorable impression their work
made on the leaders and peoples outside the boundaries of
the Czech and Slovak homeland#**'®
Within Bohemia and Moravia, and to a much lesser ex
tent in Slovakia,

separatist propaganda was carried on with

an intensity and efficiency unrealized by the outside world.
That this propaganda was well-directed and well-accepted

Is

probably best demonstrated by the effectiveness of the cam-

**?Ibid.
*^Masaryk, Making of a State, p. 3731 Redlich,
p. 148#

cjjd.

cit.
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paign to recruit members for the Czechoslovak Legions after
Masaryk issued his call for volunteers.

The Slovaks were

more cautious In flaunting the authority of their officers,
even when held prisoner,

than the Czechs, and separate propa

ganda had to be prepared to reach .them effectively.

Dr.

Seton-Watson writes, as follows, of the different propaganda
techniques employed to reach both

roups:

There was the greatest possible difference between
the propaganda among the Czechs and that among the
Slovaks, both In Russia and in the West.
With the for
mer the soil had already been sufficiently prepared at
home, and thus the propaganda bore rapid and ample fruit.
Among the Slovaks there had been no such preparation,
and the propaganda met with many difficulties, both in
ternal and external...for a time, propaganda among the
Slovaks in Russia and the West had to be confined to the
insertion of Slovak articles in the various Czech news
papers and periodicals
i. ■

With the knowledge that they had the necessary sup
port and backing of the Czech people, and the hope of like
support among the Slovaks, Masaryk and the National Council
launched a concerted effort to reap the utmost advantage
from their chief source of favorable propaganda in the
Entente countries— the Czechoslovak Legions.

^9r .
(Londons

w

. Seton-Watson, (ed.5, Slov a kia. Then and Now
George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1931)> P* 103#

CHAPTER I I I

THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEGIONS ?

A MOVE TO THE FRONT

The Czechoslovak leaders, within and without the Em
pire, were working toward a single goal— recognition of their
c o u n t r y ;as an independent_nation--and, if not from the be
ginning,

soon realized that the Legions could be the strong

est force that they could have in the struggle to gain the
recognition which they sought.

After the victory had been

won, BeneK wrote?
In my opinion, it Is often forgotten that our Siber
ian army was our strongest political factor at the end
of the war and during the peace conference.
I made use
of its retention In Siberia to win our peace te rms.1
When Austria declared war on Serbia and,

subsequently,

on Russia, both the Czech and Slovak peoples condemned the
declaration.

Very soon the soldiers drawn from Bohemia and

Moravia, and, perhaps to a lesser extent from Slovakia,
showed their disapproval by deserting and by joining the
Allied armies®

"This movement, and it is necessary to em

phasize this fact, was spontaneous and truly popular,

the

Czech soldier-voters refused obedience to the Habsb urg s,

iDr. Eduard Bene£, My War M e m o i r s , (trans®), Paul Selver (Boston and New Yorks Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928),
p. 3^8.
^Thomas G* Masaryk, The New E u r o p e . the Slav Stand
point (London? Eyre & S p o t t iswoode, Ltd®, 1918), p. ^9.
(Cited hereafter as Masaryk, The New E u r o p e ) 1 C f .. Robert
Joseph Kerner, "Winning Czechoslovak Independence," Foreign
A f f a i r s . VII (January, 1929), 313*

3k
Masaryk has stated.
Many Czech regiments which did not desert were deci 
mated and then finally dissolved, the soldiers being
scattered among German and Magyar regiments.
This only
increased the dislocation and disruption of the Austrian
army, which, within a year was virtually put under the
control of officers from Germany®3
Bitterly opposed to the Habsburg Crown because of Its
long record of past discriminations against them and because
of the continued failure to take into consideration their
national feelings,
enlisted men alike,

Czech and Slovak soldiers,

officers and

early showed a disinclination for the

war against Russia, a nation that they looked upon as a pro
tector and possible future ally in their struggle for free
dom and Czechoslovak independence®
Thousands of Czech and Slovak soldiers deserted the
Austro-Hungarian armies,
token resistance®

or were captured while offering only

"This was at first a perilous operation,

for they had to run the gauntlet between German and Magyar
machine-gunners
frontLater,

in the rear and suspicious Russians in
elaborate surrender patterns were worked

out between the Czech and Slovak soldiers on the one hand

3Robert Joseph Kerner, (ed®), Czechoslovakia % Twenty
Years of Independence (Berkeley and Los Angeles? University
of California Press, 19^0), p. 52; C f *, Ale)S HrdllKka, "Bo
hemia and the Czechs," National Geograp hic «, XXXI, No® 2
(February, 1917), p® 187®
^H* W. V 0 Temperley, (ed.), A History of the Peace
Conference of Paris (London? Henry Frowde, Hodder Sc Stough
ton, 1920-192^} 9 I V t
> P* 2^9®
(Cited hereafter as Temperley,
Peace Conference)®

and the Russian forces on the other.

Before the struggle

was over, all along the Eastern Front, whole companies, and
even regiments of men deserted en m a s s e . almost overnight*
One account reads?

11...our soldiers should make themselves

known to the Russians by singing the song,
which served as a code,
with the Russians.

1He j Sloven e1 ,"5

telling of the arrangements reached

Careful accounts of the war include

statements like the following, detailing the extent of the
desertions:
It has been stated that, of the 70,000 prisoners
taken by Serbia In the winter of 1914, roughly half
were Czechs; at least 300,000 more surrendered volun
tarily to,the Russians, and close upon 30,000 to the
Italians.
In a desperate attempt to stop the wholesale deser
tions, the Austrians were forced to reassign Czech and
Slovak soldiers to Austrian and Hungarian regiments, where
it was hoped that tighter discipline could be maintained.
Later, when German troops were transferred to Austro-Hun
garian sectors to bolster the flagging morale of those
units,

even stricter measures were adopted.

however,

By that time,

the damage had been done— the National Council had

^Dr. Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a S t a t e .
Memories and Observations (New York? Frederick A. Stokes
Company , 1927) . P. 5 1 CfT. Sigmund Munz, "Thomas Garrigue
Masaryk," (trans.), Catherine Phillips, The Fortnightly R e 
v i e w . CXX (August, 1923), 278.
^Temp erl ey, Peace Co nferencea IV,. p. 249; Cf., R. B.
Mowat, A History of European Diplom acy . 1914-192 t
TTLondon?
Edward Arnold Sc Co., 1928), p. 118.
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a large potential force of manpower available,
borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire,

outside the

from which to draw

men for the Legions It desired to gain recognition for the
proposed Czechoslovak State.

It was these Legions and their

exploits that helped the struggling leaders of the national
movement secure the world-wide support needed as the basis
for recognition of these national aspirations.
Through his contacts in England, Masaryk early dis
covered that Lord Kitchener,

(Horatio Herbert Kitchener,

1st Earl), Secretary of State for War, and other Western
military leaders believed the war would last for at least
three years.

This knowledge profoundly influenced his

whole political strategy, especially as he clearly under
stood the value of time as a necessity for laying the
groundwork for complete Czechoslovak independence.

A

shorter period of time might have meant that the Allies
would have been willing to consider only national autonomy
within the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy.?
Following their desertion from the Austro-Hungarian
armies,

or capture by the Russians, many of the prisoners-

of-war quickly volunteered to fight with the Czarist armies,
provided that they would be put into action against the:
hereditary enemies--the Habsburgs.

Although these prisoners-

?R. W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (New York?
The Macmillan Company, 1943), pp. 21, 54-55*
(Cited here
after as Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England).

of-war m a d e - u p ■theiJartterof the Czechs and Slovaks in Russia,
there were■additional sizable ^groups of Czechs andiSlovaks,
residing in Russia that were subjects of the Czar.

"Colon

ies of businessmen, merchants and artisans resided in the
larger cities, while in Volhynia and the Caudusus were large
Q

agricultural settlements which possessed...schools."

Not

all of the members of these groups were of the same politi
cal bent,

however, and, as noted earlier,

sharp differences

of opinion separated the conservatives from the more radical
elements.

The principal centers in which these people lived

were St. Petersburg and Klev.^

But little early use was

made of either the prisoners-of-war or the "residents" as
the pro-German faction within the Russian court thought that
any full-scale force of this sort would ultimately lead to
the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire along
national lines,
cerned.

unwanted,

so far as Imperial Russia was con

The feeling has been expressed as follows?

Naturally, the old Tsarist officials were very much
opposed to the idea of a national Czechoslovak army in
Russia.
Apart from the fact that they had revolted
from the Habsburg Emperor, would they not be setting

^George Stewart, The White Armies of Russia
York? The Macmillan Company, 1 9 3 3 )$ p. 96.
9s. Harrison Thomson, Czechoslovakia in European
History (Princeton? Princeton University Press, 1 9 W ) ,
p. 254 * Temperley, Peace Confer en ce„ IV, p.

an iniquitous example to all other nationalities in Holy
Russia?*^
Most of the internal differences between the Czech and Slo
vak groups were Ironed out after the settlements in Russia
recognized the Czechoslovak National Council,
meeting held in Kiev during April,

1916®^

following a

Actually,

the

Czech and Slovak elements resident in Russia reached an
early decision to fight against the Austro-Hungarians.

On

August 4, 1914, a day before the Austrian declaration of war
against Russia,

they took action looking to the formation of

an army of Russian Czechs and Slovaks, and laid a plan for
a Czechoslovak Legion to accomplish that end before the
Czarist Government •
On August 12th the proposal was accepted by the Minis
try and on August 20th the formation of a Ceskii Dru^lna
(Czech Brigade) was approved of by the Army Co uncil....
On the same day, delegates of the Czech Committee at Mos
cow were given an audience by the Tsar in the Kremlin,
and submitted to the Monarch a memorandum dealing with
the Czechoslovak question.
Reflecting the strongly
Russophil sentiment of the Czechoslovak settlers, the
delegates expressed the loyalty to the Tsar of the Rus
sian Cz echs...^3
By late October,
the feetern Front,

1 9 1 ^ 9 the Dru^ina had departed for

the first contingent of anti-Habsburg

l^Henry Baerlein, The March of the Seventy Thousand
(Londons Leonard Parsons, Ltd., 192^7, p. 47; C f ® , Stewart,
o p . cit., p. 97.
llThomson,

op. c i t . 9 p. 25^; Stewart, pp.

T^Masaryk, Making of a. S t a t e . p. 149.
^ B a e r l e i n , pp.

c i t .» p. 22.

cit.. p. 98.

Czechs to take the field against the Dual Monarchy.

At

the front they were used primarily as spies and agitators
among Czech regiments of the Austrian army.

The success of

the Druzina encouraged Czech leaders in Russia to expand
their activities by seeking to enroll other Czechs and Slo
vaks, who were serving in Russian regiments,

in the Druzina

and through attempts to get permission to allow Czech and
Slovak prisoners-of-war to volunteer for such service
The results,

however, were not very heartening?

Though everything showed that the Government and the
military authorities did not want a 'Czechoslovak army
of any size, a regiment of Czechoslovak Riflemen was
formed out of the Druzina in January, 1916; and in May,
the creation of a brigade was permitted.
It was more
or less a nominal affair, for its strength was small;
but it was a beginning.
Stef^nik was then In Russia
and used his influence to this e n d .^5
Following the audience with the Tsar in mid-August,
191^, at which the Czechoslovak leaders expressed their
loyalty to the Romanovs, a special memorandum,
Dokladnava Z a p l s k a . was circulated
Russian cabinet.

ent itled,

to all the members of the

This memorandum was the first clearly

formulated program of modern Czechoslovak aims, and became
the basis for practically all later negotiations with the
Imperial Russian Government on matters concerning the Czecho*
Slovak question. 0

As the political situation degenerated

l^Stewart, pp. c i t .. p.
•^Masaryk, Making of a S t a t e . p. 150
■^Baerlein, pp. pit.., p. 23*
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with the March and October Revolutions, and as Russia got
out of the war,

this working arrangement was replaced with

agreements designed to meet the exigencies of prevailing
conditions, and no permanent arrangement was ever established
with the Provisional or Bolshevist Governments.
Authority was granted in October,

1916 for the Czecho

slovaks to organize a division within the Russian Army, but
this permission was soon withdrawn as differences of Russian
opinion, and Internal problems among the Czechs and Slovaks
hindered progress along these lines.

Before the end of 1916,

St efanik left Russia and went to the Roumanian Front, where
he was soon at work helping to organize hundreds of prisoners-of-war for service on the Western Front in Fra nc e.1?
Professor Masaryk welcomed the Russian upheavals of
1 9 1 ? . ^he March Revolution saw the barriers lowered which
had kept him from visiting Russia and seemed to remove the
spectre of a Russian Grand Duke taking over the reins of
government at Prague, at the conclusion of the war.

With

the fall of the Romanovs, who had barred Masaryk from enter
ing their realms because of his democratic and liberal views,

^-7r # Ernest Dupuy, Perish by the S w o r d . The Czechoslo
vakian Anabasis and Our Supporting Campaigns in North R u s s i a .
1918- 1920 (Harrisburg? The Military Service Publishing Co.,
1939), p. 29*
^ V i c t o r S. Mamatey, The United States and East Cent
ral E u r o p e . 1914- 1 9 1 8 1 A, Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and
Propaganda (Princeton?
Princeton University Press, 1957^,
P* 99.

he immediately made plans for a trip to Russia, where he ar 
rived from England in May*

He had two principal objectives

— the organization of an independent Czechoslovak army, and
its transport for employment on the Western Front*

By this

time he was firmly convinced that a Czechoslovak Legion in
France would have profound political significance*1^
Speaking of his visit,

he wrote laters

I decided to go to Russia and carry through the
creation of an army among our prisoners-of-war. Upon
Milyukoff fPaveTl as Foreign Minister I counted especial
ly ...we had met in England during the war and he had
agreed upon the chief points of a war and peace pro
gram....! called at once on Milyukoff, whom I found on
the point of resignation— an unpleasant surprise.
How
ever, I established relations little by little with the
other members of the Provisional Go vernment...20
Meanwhile, and with great significance for the Czecho
slovak cause,

the Czech Brigade performed with distinction

at the Battle of Zborov, during the Brusilov offensive in
1917.

As a result the Brigade was officially commended for

its bravery*
The part played by the Czechoslovak B rigade in the
June offensive...as well as the heroic incidents of the
Tarnopol retreat, aroused sympathy, for the Czechoslo
vak movement both in Russia and beyond the frontiers•
Kerensky at once altered his policy towards the move
ment ••.at once gave permission for recruiting to be
carried on among the prisoners on the widest possible
scale.
This, and the reputation it won for the Czeeho-

F. Kennan, Soviet- American R e l a t i o n s . 1917«
The Decision to Intervene (Princeton; Princeton Univer<
(Cited hereafter as Kennan,
sity Press, 1958), II, p.
Soviet-Amerlean Relations)
^°Masaryk, Making of a State, pp. 132-33

hz
Slovaks abroad, was the main success of Zborov.21
Kerensky®s removal of the former r e s t r i c t i o n s ^ sharply in
creased the flow of volunteers into the Czechoslovak B r i 
gade, with approximately 30,000 new recruits quickly en
listed,

enabling it to be raised to the status of an army

corps•
However, Masaryk was not without problems in Russia,
as he sought to work with the Provisional Government of
Alexander F. Kerensky.

The acknowledged antagonism between

the liberal and conservative wings of the Czechoslovak move
ment there, did not make his work any easier, as each of
these elements tended to work closely with the correspond
ing elements of Russian society.

The liberal socialistic

Russian group then in power, as the Provisional Government,
was not overly sympathetic to those conservative Czechs who
still maintained friendly relations with anti-revolutionary
Russian groups.

This conservative tendency on the part of

some of the Czechoslovaks almost cost the anti-Habsburg
movement its Brigade in the Russian army;

save for its per

formance in the Battle of Zborov, which helped bring about
a change in official thinking, permitting the Czechoslovaks
to continue building up their small force.
Masaryk soon realized that the prospect of his suc-

2lBaerlein, pp.
22Mamat ey, pp.

cit.. pp. ?7-?8.
c i t .. p. 99.

cess in Russia did not warrant the time involved, nor would
he, even if finally successful there, achieve the recogni
tion which he desired in the West for Czechoslovakian ambi
tions*

As a result, he sought to complete negotiations with

M. Albert Thomas,

on behalf of the Government of France,

for

the transfer of the first installment of thirty thousand
prisoners-of-war to France; which number was to include
several thousand Southern Slavs as well as Czechs and Slo
vaks*

The group was to include both men for military service

and for industrial work in munitions factories.2^
sian General Staff,

The Ru s

on May 14, 1917, granted the necessary

request for the transfer*

"This Agreement *..was the first

Treaty to be concluded by our National Council with a State;
.••France was the first to recognize our National G 0uncil as
a contracting P o w e r **.*11,2^ Masaryk wrote.
The Agreement worked out by Thomas, who was represent
ing France in its dealings with the Kerensky Government,

so

eagerly sought by Masaryk, was dictated by four considera
tions which he hoped would centralize the direction of all
Czech and Slovak military activity by the National Councils
(a)
To transfer from Russia to France the greatest pos
sible number of prisoners-of-war or other troops*

23Benes, oj>* c l t ■•■* pp* 186, 343, 374; Stewart, o n *
c i t *. p* 99; Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World A f f a i r s . A
History of Relations Between the Soviet Union and the Rest
of the W o r l d • 1917- 1918 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1 9 5 1 )» P* 108*
2^Masaryk, Making of a S t a t e . p* 166.

(b) To concentrate as rapidly as possible all the pris
oners on French soil, together with the prisoners it
might be possible to obtain from the Serbian government*
(c) To undertake an extensive volunteer movement in
America*
(d) To make full use of the new and large resources
which were provided by our numerous prisoners, who in
the meanwhile had been collected in Italy.2 *
Although both the Foreign Office and the General Staff
as agencies of the Russian Government, promised quick action
to get the convoy on its way through the port at Archangel,
Interminable delays were encountered at every turn and the
movement

of the anti-Habsburg force from Russia to France

was held up in the revolution-torn land.
only two small contingents of troops,
thousand,
October,

As a consequence,

totalling about two

four hundred men, were sent to France,

one in

1917, and the other in the spring of 1918.

the Bolshevist uprising,

After

chaotic conditions in Russia made

additional troop movements Impossible.2^
The remainder of this group of thirty thousand Le
gionaries, plus thousands of others who, at that time, were
still prisoners-of-war, or members of the Czechoslovak units
in service with the Provisional Government w e r e , .h b w e v e r , t o
contribute their part to Czechoslovak independence in an en
tirely different theatre of operations,

far removed from the

Western Front as envisioned by Masaryk.

Their contribution

25bene&,

o jd .

clt *. p* 186*
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was to be made in the fields of Russia and along the steel
ribbons of the continent-spanning Trans-Siberian Railroad*
The Czechoslovak Legion, aided by a limited Allied inter
ventionist force, plus a motley array of anti-Red or White
Russian forces, was to harass the armies of Soviet Russia for
a period of many months.
The change of plans was occasioned by the October
Revolution of 1917, and the subsequent desire of the new
Soviet Government to conclude a separate peace with Ger
many and the Central Powers--at any price.

As long as the

Bolsheviks continued the struggle against the enemies of the
Czechs--Germanyand Austria-Hungary— members of the Czecho
slovak Legions in Russia continued to fight at their side
with dedication and distinction*

However, when Soviet sup

port of the Allied cause came to an abrupt halt with the
opening of negotiations for the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on
December 2, 1917, Masaryk decided that all the Czechoslovak
groups should be transferred to the Western Front where they
could best be utilized to further Czechoslovak ambitions*
From the moment that the Bolshevists opened peace
negotiations— they did so formally on December 2, 1917,
by asking for an armistice, the Peace of Brest-Litovsk
being signed on March 3, 1918— It was clear to us that
our army had nothing more to do in Russ ian ^slcT] *
Therefore we began as early as possible to march out of
the Ukraine into Russia on the way to Vladivostok and
France.27
During the period from December,

1917, until the sign-

2 ?Masaryk, Making of a State, p* 184; C f ., Kennan,
Sovlet -American R e l a t i o n s . $.1, “'f>7.137*
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ing of the treaty which took Soviet Russia out of the,war in
March,

1918,

the German Armies advanced deep into the Ukraine,

where they placed the Czechoslovak forces in an untenable
military position*

Falling back with the last of the resist

ing Russian forces,

the Czechoslovaks gained commendations

from the

Soviets for their efforts in a four-day battle

against the Germans at Bachmach, where they lost some 600
men*

As a result of their assistance to the retreating Red

troops,

the Czechoslovaks were given permission to leave

Russia through Siberia as free citizens,28 an(3 Vladimir An
tonov-Ovseenko,

the Soviet Commander in Chief, authorized

the Czechoslovaks to leave the Ukraine in an announcement
dated March 6, 1918, which read as follows:
Our comrades of the Czechoslovak Corps, who have
fought faithfully and valiantly in the region of
Z h i t o m i r *..,' Grebenko and Bachmach, are now leaving
the Ukraine and are returning a part of their arms*
The revolutionary troops will never forget the frater
nal help which the Czechoslovak Corps has rendered the
working people of the Ukraine in their struggle against
the imperialist looters.
The revolutionary troops accept
as a token of friendship, the arms which the Czechoslo
vaks are leaving.
Antonov.29
The sudden collapse of Red Army units under German
pressure,

provided the Czechoslovaks the opportunity to get

desperately needed supplies and materials from former Imperi
al Russian military depots with which to support their long

2 8s te wa r t, o p . c i t *, p. 102; James Bunyan, Interven
t i o n . Civil War and Communism in Russia (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1 9 3 6 ) , p* 76.
29Bunyan,

o p * cit *, p. 80.

retreat across Russia and Siberia to the port of Vladivostok.
"We had to take what we wanted,

for it was out of the ques

tion to make arrangements with the authorities,

so great was

the prevailing uncertainty and so rapidly did the authorltlea
change,"

said Masaryk In a later comment on the?situation.30

There Is much Information to support the claim that,
at least in the beginning,

both Masaryk and Bene¥ opposed

active intervention against the Soviet regime and direct
fighting with the forces of the Red Army.

In the end, how

ever, the Czechoslovaks, were forced to engage in open com
bat against Red Russian units in order to extricate them
selves from Russia and Siberia.

Masaryk says,

...the revolutionary conditions in Russia dictated cate
gorically the principle of non-interference— conditions
the more complicated because districts and towns as well
as races made themselves more or less independent....In
Russia, though not yet in Siberia, the Bolshevists were
beginning to organize an army.. To the East and in Si
beria there were fewer troops, and therefore the Siberian
route was the surest way to France.31
After nearly a year in Russia, negotiating for the
withdrawal of Czechoslovak forces from that war-torn land,
Masaryk took leave of his countrymen on March 6, 1918,

in a

special farewell proclamation which recognized the possibil
ity of many difficulties on the Legion's long journey to
Vladivostok.

"...I was convinced that," he said later,

avoiding interference in Russian affairs,

It would end by

30Masaryk, Making of a S t a t e , p. 16?.

3iibia.. p. 190.

"by
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reaching its transports safely."32
The Czechoslovaks found themselves, at this time,
a position at once favorable and unfavorable*

in

They were the

■t

only large body of troops on the Eastern Front with any re
maining semblance of cohesion, discipline, and loyalty to the
Entente cause,

but,

"the Corps found its position near the

front an exposed and — in view of the overwhelming superior
ity of t h e * *.Central Powers on the other side of the line—
a dangerous one."33
There was, in .the unfolding of events as between the
A l H e s afndRuasia in the summer of 1918, no single factor
that played a more significant role than the unique armed
force known subsequently as the Czechoslovak L e g i o n . 34
While the above events were taking place in Russia,
December,

in

1917, an "Autonomous Czechoslovak Army," composed

of Czechoslovak forces serving with the Western Allies, was
recognized by the Allied powers as a regular Allied mili
tary force,

subordinate to the French High Command.

During

the course of the following winter, arrangements were made to
incorporate the Czechoslovak Legions

in Russia and Siberia as

an integral part of this organization,

"and agreement was

reached with the French Government that the Corps should be

3 2 l b l d .. p. 1 9 7 1 C T *, Kennan,
tions, SI," pi* 139*

Sovlet-American Rela

33Kennan, Soviet-American Relations* II,Ip*.138.
3^ I b i d . . p. 136.

evacuated to Prance as rapidly as possible.“35

Good reason®

for this hoped for speedy transfer of the Czechoslovaks to
the Western Front were clearly apparent to the military
leaders of the Ententes
The Russian collapse meant that perhaps six hundred
thousand Germans would be released for duty on the west
ern front, while it seemed that Allied strength might
fall off...an equal n u m b e r . 36
Prior to leaving Russia and his beleaguered country
men for the long trip, via Vladivostok,

to Washington and a

meeting with President Woodrow Wilson, Dr. Masaryk felt that
he had made satisfactory arrangements with the Soviets for
the Legions to move peacefully over the Trans-Siberian rail
road to Vladivostok and the sea.

Eventually, under his plan,

they would arrive on the Western Front,

to enter actively in

the fighting on the Allied side against the Central Powers.
As he reported later %
On March 26 a treaty was signed with the Bolshevists
guaranteeing our men an unmolested passage to Siberia and
Vladivostok.
True, this had been already agreed upon
with Muravleff 1N. N.. Muraviev, Soviet Administrator in
the Far East I after the Bolshevist troops had reached the
Ukraine; but, to make assurance doubly s u r e , we negotia
ted also with the Moscow S o v i e t . On March 26, indeed the
Moscow Commissar, Stalin, telegraphed to the local Soviets
that the Czechoslovaks were not going through as an armed
unit but as free c i t i z e n s , and that they carried a cer
tain number of weapons as protection against the counter-

3 5 I b i d ., p. 138; C f *, Temperley, Peace Confe ren ee* IV,
pp. 260-61; Stewart, o p . c i t .. p. 102; Bunyan, o p . cit., pp.

75- 76 *
36samuel Flagg B e m i s , (ed.), The American Secretaries
of State and Their Diplomacy (Mew Xorks Alfred A. Knopf,

revolutionaries.
He a d d e d t "The Soviet of the P e o p l e ’s
Commissars wishes every assistance be given to them on
Russian soil."3/
Events which appeared to be moving smoothly when Masaryk
left Russia, were to take a new turn, with the addition of
violence, before long— -and the violence was to continue for
many months in the future.
While the Legions in Russia were preparing to fulfill
their as yet unknown mission,

Czechs and Slovaks in other

lands, were making their contribution to the winning of in
dependence for Czechoslovakia.
the war,

From the very beginning of

Czech Emigres had been enlisting in the French Army

until, by the w a r ’s end,

some twelve thousand were serving

honorably on the Western Front.

Included in this number

were many Czechs and Slovaks resident in London and else
where in G reat Britain, who had enlisted in the British
fo rce s.
It w a s ...Masaryk who realized that by the formation
o.f Legions, that on entering the Allied armies under
their own flag, that by showing a willingness to shed
blood for their country, a most convincing argument
would be presented of the sincerity of the Czechoslovak
claims.38

3?Masaryk, Making of a State, p. 200; Cf., Baerlein,
o p . c i t .. pp. 109 - 1 0 .
38Thomas $apek, Jr., Origins of the Czechoslovak
State ( Hfew YorkTI Revell Press, 192^7, p. 57* ££•> Maibone
Watson Graham, Jr., New Governments of Central Europe (New
Yorks Holt & Co., 1924), p . 2 ? 4 ; Temperley, Peace Conference
IV, p. 259*
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Even if the number of Czechs and Slovaks serving with the
Allies on the Western Front was small,

it made it possible

for the National Council to use the fact of their service in
its propaganda and education campaign,
leaders and people of France.
private

especially among the

By conference, and through

interviews, Bene¥ and his General Secretariat in

Paris were able to support their thesis— that the dissolu
tion of the Habsburg Empire and the liberation of the subject
peoples within the Dual Monarchy, was an absolute require
ment to assure lasting peace after the

war.

39

In an article written in 1918 for The N a t i o n , en
titled,
army,

"The Czecho-Slovak Nation," Masaryk declared,

then fighting on three fronts— in France,

Russia— Is,

"Our

Italy and

on the basis of our historical and natural rights,

a regular a r m y .

.

.

As early as December 16, 1917, the

French Government had recognized the Czechoslovak forces as
an autonomous army,

fighting under its own flag against the

Central Powers, which, while It acknowledged the military
authority of the French High Command, was under the polltical control of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris.
Realizing that every such recognition of Its armies would

39Thomson,

op. c i t .. p. 197; Benes,

e>p. c i t .. p. 276.

^ T h o m a s G. Masaryk, "The Czecho-Slovak Nation," The
N a t i o n . CVII (October, 1918), 387.
^Temperley,
o p . cit. , p. 58.

Peace Co nfer en ce. IV, p. 261; Jfapek,
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help secure greater recognition for the National Council*

the

leaders among the Czechs and Slovaks all over the world bent
every energy toward achieving that end.

The effect of the

French action and the recognition of other nations is pointed
v
out by Thomas Capek, Czech author, "This, and similar d e 
crees,

coming from the other Allied nations, gave them a

special military status which eventually led to a recognition
of belligerency*"**'2
With Czechoslovaks enrolled in the armies of France,
Britain and Russia,

there still existed the large, and vir

tually untapped, numbers of Czechoslovak prisoners-of-war
even in the West that might be drawn upon to build up En
tente forces— especially those prisoners controlled by Italy*
Until the disaster at Caporetto (October 24-November 1, 191?)
Italian leaders were not particularly receptive to repre
sentations made by the National Council, nor did they show
great interest in the possibility of these prisoners-of-war
being formed into a Czechoslovak unit for service with the
Italian Army*

Following that debacle,

however, and after

lengthy preliminary negoti ati ons , Milan Stefanik was instru
mental in concluding a treaty on April 21, 19X8, with Italian
Premier Vittorio Orland o , ^
pendent Czechoslovak Army,

to permit formation of an Inde
commanded by General Andrea

^ 2fiapek, o^* cit * * p*
^Masaryk,

$Q9

Making of a State * p« 215*
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Grazlani, but led by both Italian and Czechoslovak officers.
}

Like the early arrangements with the French, political conI
-

trol was to remain with the Czechoslovak National Council in
Paris *
The Italian treaty was the first concluded by the
National Council which clearly recognized it as a
sovereign political body*
The diplomatic victory was
all the more significant in that an initial prejudice
against the Czechoslovaks had to be o v e r c o m e * ^
Although scarcely noticed

in England,

shortly thereafter,

w hen the Prince of Wales visited Home on May 23, 1918,
guard of honor was formed by Czechoslovaks,
nevertheless,

caused a profound

the

The honor,

sensation throughout Austria

H u n gary*^5
Recognition by Italy came as a fitting reward after
many months of patient labor on the part of all the members
of the Czechoslovak National Council, during which they had
to overcome the strongest resistance to their cause, be 
cause of deep suspicion on the part of the Italian Govern
ment*

This suspicion stemmed from the increasingly bitter

dispute over the Adriatic coast lands between the Italians
and another group of Slav peoples fighting for separation
from the Habsburgs,

the Serbs,

Croats and Slovenes*

The

Czechoslovaks were not concerned with the quarrel between
the South Slavs and

^Thomson,

Italy,

but their cause suffered harm as

op* cit *■« p* 264*

^Temperley,

Peace Confer enc e, IV, p* 261*
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this enmity became more pronounced*

The Czechs,

therefore,

were hampered by the animosity of the Italians for the Yugo
slavs, all the while they were working to create an atmos
phere more favorable to their own cause*

Much was done to

create a favorable climate for Czechoslovak aims in Italy
during 1916 and '1917, as Czechoslovak propaganda began to
give the Italian leaders a better understanding of the
Czechoslovak problem*

As a result,

several prominent poli 

ticians and publicists openly advocated

independence for the

Czechs and Slovaks, and urged that their prisoners-of-war be
used in the Italian armies, and

“In 1917 Benito Mussolini

supported the claims of the Czechs to an independent nation
al existence in his paper, Pooolo d 0Italia.
With the signing of the Italian treaty, which was
soon followed by the organization and participation of
Czechoslovak forces on the Southern Front, news media b e 
gan to point to the accomplishments of the new allies and,
thereby, built for a wider popular acceptance of the Czecho
slovak cause in Italy*

One influential American weekly news

magazine carried the following account:
Many Bohemian troops, according to the London Daily
Mail, have joined the Italian colors against Austria*
The detachments belonged to a Czechoslovak army which
is being formed in many centers from former subjects
to Emperor Charles*
Their defection has caused much
anxiety among the Austro-Hungarian commanders, who

^Thomson,

o p # cit *, p* 247*
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fear the effect on their Slav

troops*^7

As the Czechoslovak soldiers on the Italian battle
fields continued to perform with distinction, bearing out
Masaryk* s statement,

11Our Czech soldiers are good fighters,

brave to the point of he roism,”*1'® Italian acceptance and sup
port of the war aims of the National Council strengthened*
Fortunately,

the Czechoslovak troops that saw action along

with the Italians were seasoned veterans and often were
cited for conspicuous bravery, as in the official Italian
communique of General Armando Diaz,

of September 22, 1918*^9

The Legion was in action on the Piave from late, June until
the end of October,

the battle that marked the last serious

effort of the Austrian armies to mount a successful offen
sive*

Here, as wherever they were utilized in Italy,

Czechoslovaks proved to be excellent soldiers*

the

Again,

It

should be noted that these former prisoners-of-war actually
were in double jeopardy during their front-line duties?
they faced, as all soldiers do, the threat of death in a c 
tual combat, plus the almost assured death if they were
captured by the Austrians, as technically,

they were still

subjects of the D ual Monarchy, and their actions were con-

^ 7 ,lBohemia Ablaze With Revolt ,” The Literary Digest,
LVIII (July 6, 1918), 3 0 *
**®Masaryk, Making of a S t a t e * p* 173*
^Thomson,

cit * * p. 264*
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sidered traitorous by that government*
When the United States entered the war on April 6,
1917, Czechoslovak volunteers enlisted in the American
Expeditionary Force in considerable numbers*

Bene^ points

out the result of this enlistment practice on the enrollment
of volunteers for the army being recruited by the National
Council,

saying:

"...accordingly the recruiting of volun

teers for our own army In France, which had been arranged
in the United States by
limited succe ss."5®

ef^nik, met with comparatively

Nevertheless, about 3$000 Amerlcan-

Czechoslovaks volunteered for service with the Czechoslo
vakian army in France and saw action on the Western Front*
These were the most enthusiastic of the Czechs and Slovaks
residing In the United States, who volunteered for duty out
of a deep love for their old homeland.

Many of them were to

return to Czechoslovakia following the war to assist in form
ing the new nation.

Even greater numbers of American-Czecho-

slovaks, who on immigrating to the United States,

had made a

definite decision to become citizens of the land of their
new residence,

saw action as volunteers and conscripts with

the American Expeditionary Force*

They served with honor

and distinction with this great force,

in the service of

both their new nation and their old interest, as the two
were Interwoven by events*

5®Bene¥,

og. c i t .. p. 101*

Czechoslovaks,
fields— France,

thus, were fighting on three battle-'

Italy and Russia*

The Legions were to add a

fourth "front"*— Siberia— to their distinguished record of
service before the fighting ended*

Circumstances determined

a line of action there not envisioned by even so far seeing^
a man as Dr. Masaryk at the time when actual hostilities
were at an end in most of the theatres of war*

CHAPTER IV
ACTION AT THE FRONT HAS MANX EFFECTS AT HOME
Within the Austro-Hungarian Empire,
nationalists,

particularly the former,

Czech and Slovak

constantly maintained

opposition against the German and Magyar rule throughout the
whole period of the 1914-1918 war.

This internal dissention

provided many anxious moments for the Habsburg leaders In
Vienna and Budapest, and made it necessary for the Dual M o n 
archy to devote a great deal of time, effort, and manpower
to maintain control of the areas of Bohemia, Moravia, and
Slovakia*

This,

the Government could ill afford to do dur

ing such a bitter struggle and, as a result,

the two minor

ity groups seriously embarrassed the Habsburg regime on
numerous occasions*

Situations,

like that of Dr* Kramlr,

already mentioned, were duplicated thousands of times over
and the rebellious Czechoslovak leaders,

especially adamant

in their opposition to the Imperial war aims,

constantly

sought means to prevent the successful conduct of military
operations by the Austro-Hungarian forces*
Czech obstructionism,
of war was considerable*

even prior to the declaration

In the Austrian Relchsrat it vir

tually stopped the conduct of business by that body.

Every

\

possible type of noisemaking equipment was used by opposi
tion Deputies to disrupt Relchsrat sessions?
snare drums,

trumpets,

the slamming of desk tops, stamping of feet

and other means of expressing audible disapproval of the
G o v e r n m e n t s activities were employed*

"The Eelchsrat b e 

came notorious for its forensic— and physical— b a t t l e s ,
carping and singularly unconstructive criticism,

filibuster

ing, and incapacity to act," Mamatey points o u t T h i s

op

position finally lead to the proroguing of the Chamber in
March,

191^,

setting the stage for the subject peoples®

claims that they were not consulted in any <way concerning the
declaration of war against Serbia, and the following broaden
ing of the war subsequent to that initial declaration*^
On the ground that they were not consulted,
and Slovaks declared that,

the Czechs

since they had no part in the d e 

claration of war, their men should not be used in its prose
cution*

This feeling, which was widespread,

resulted in

mass desertions from the Habsburg armies to the Hussians
and the Serbians, as sympathy for the latter people was
strong throughout Bohemia and Slovakia*

Evidence of this

/v

feeling is found in the roles played earlier by Kramar and
Masaryk in exposing Austro-Hungarian tactics in the period
just before the Austro-Hungarian annexation of the Bosnian

■^Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Cen
tral Europe * 19 1^-1918 1 A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and
Propaganda (Princeton? Princeton University Press * 1957T7”
p* 17 •
^David F* Strong, Austria (October 1918-March 1 9 1 9 )
Transit ion from Empire to Republic (London? P* S„ K ind’&
Son, Ltd * , 1939) s> P* 38*

area, during the Balkan Crisis of 1 9 0 8 - 1 9 0 9 Throughout
the war this feeling of friendship for the Serbs was extend
ed to include all the peoples who were to make up the new
Yugoslav State*

the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and was

often evidenced by the actions of the 4 Czechoslovak leaders*
The Czechoslovaks,

for example, worked diligently to create

an understanding between the Yugoslavs and the Italians so
that a united front of the subject peoples could be main
tained against the Habsburgs; and the joint actions taken
by emigr£ leaders of both the Northern and Southern Slays
in many propaganda and education activities in the Entente

h

countries, attest to this close, friendly relationship*^

It has been argued that the Czechoslovaks,as a result, were
Instrumental in the formation of both their own State and
that of the Yugoslavs*^
Despite constant obstructionism, desertions and In-

3 h . W* V, Temperley, (ed«), A History of the Peace
Conference of Paris (Londons Henry Prowde, Hodder & Stough
ton, 1920-192^), IV, p* 2^9*
(Cited hereafter as Temperley,
Peace Conference)*
^Dr. Thomas Qarrigue Masaryk, The Making of a S t a t e „
Memories and Observations (New Yorks Frederick A* Stokes Com
pany, I 9 2 7 ), PP* 120-21*
5 r . W* Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (New Yorks
The Macmillan Company, 19^ 3)a PP« 2^-25; A. J* P* Taylor,
The Habsburg M o n a r c h y * 1809-1 9 1 8 * A History of the Austrian
Empire and Austria- Hungary* New Ed 11 i on (Lond on s Hamish
Hamilton, 1955 K P * 247•
(Cited hereafter as Taylor,
Habsburg E m p i r e )*

ternal difficulties fomented by the Czechoslovaks and their
leaders,

only a few people,

other than the most ardent of

the revolutionaries and extreme pa n-S lavists, however,
sought the complete dissolution of the Monarchy at the beginning of the war*

Most of the minority leaders asked

only for equality within the Empire*

With better leader

ship, Austria-Hungary might have survived the conflict, and
even might have been spared the ordeal had It been willing
to establish a federal state with autonomy for the principal
minority groups within Its boundaries*
Many students of the Austro-Hungarian problem claim
that the autonomy of the several nationalities as mem
bers of a federal empire would be a better solution
than the creation of new independent s t a t e s . °
In any case,

It seems clear that the Czechoslovaks,

destined

to become the bitterest foes of the Habsburgs, were not, at
least early in the war,

fully united on a program of inde

pendence from the Empire*

In fact they appear to have been

the most sincere minority group in the Empire in their de 
sire to achieve federalism*
were negligible,

Separatist movements among them

if not entirely absent,

in 191^» and senti

ment among them was chiefly directed towards the attainment
of equality with the dominant German and Magyar groups *7
For the Czechs, from the first awakening of the demo
cratic national spirit until the dissolution of the mon
archy, were not disinclined to accept the plan that the

^Charles G. Fenwick, '“Notes on International Affairs,
American Political Science Review * XII (November, 1916), 715
^Strong,

op* pit.,- pp. 15-16.

future Bohemia would become a part of a federal state
and they would have willingly participated in a ce n
tral parliament including all the nations of the
monarchy as equal members*°
Men, who were later to become avowed foes of the Dual M o n 
archy,

expressed a desire,

early in the war, to develop an

autonomous system under the Habsburg Crown.

Eduard B e n e s ,

later one of the most ardent anti-Habsburg leaders among the
Czech e m i g r e s . was one of these#
after the war,

Professor K e r n e r , writing

points out this change in Benes® b e l i e f s :

He [Benes] had believed In the possibility of a demo 
cratic federalized uAustria-Hungary ^ but when the World
War began, Eduard Benes was among the first to see that
such a conflagratIon could create much more formidable
forces against the Empire from without than the German
Alliance or any binding forces from within.9
The Austro-Hungarian government,
senile Franz Josef,

under the aged and

however, was not sympathetic to an Em 

pire-wide federal system.

Its strength,

it was thought by

Its leaders, was dependent upon a highly centralized, bureau
cratic organization*
tions,

The Dual Monarchy comprised eleven n a 

speaking ten languages| yet the government demanded

that the administration be conducted through the media of
two legal and official languages,

German and Magyar*

"The actual possessors of power, and the indispensable sup
port of the dynasty, were the bureaucrats, German to a man,"

8 q scar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy
(Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 19295, p * 3^8.
^Robert J. Kerner, "The Winning of Czechoslovak In
dependence, " Foreign A f f a i r s , VII (January, 1929), 310*

Redlich reports of the Austrian half of the Monarchy.10
Hungary,

In

the positions of authority were manned by the Mag-

yars in a similar exclusive fashion*
Of the many Slavic peoples In the Austrian portion of
the Dual Monarchy,

the Poles of Galicia enjoyed preferential

treatment above the others,

having obtained, at least in a

de facto manner, approximately the position of the Magyars,
This resulted from a "tacit understanding that in exchange
for a free hand In Galicia,

the Polish delegation in the

Relchsrat in Vienna would support the Cro wn, 1111

Nothing of

the same sort of arrangement was made for either the neigh
boring Czechs or Slovaks, and the Austrians,

varying their

tactics to meet current situations, managed to maintain their
supremacy In the R e l c h s r a t . until that body was prorogued*
The challenge to the Habsburgs,

coming in the main from the

Czechs, developed as the war advanced.
peoples,

Of all the subject

they alone had growing, and clear,

who was their real enemy,
by the Germanss

understanding of

"The Czechs were threatened only

they had everything to fear from a German

victory and nothing from a German defeat,"

says one of the

most distinguished historians of the period,12

Coupled

with their growing realization that the Germans had no in

luJoseph Redlich, Austrian War Government
Xale University Press, 1929)* p. 8,
Strong,

op. cit,, p. 1 9 1 C f ., Redlich,

p* 78*
Taylor

M on ar c h y , pp. 238-39

(New Havens
o o . cit

terest in assisting in the restoration of Czech independence,
the Czechs soon saw that the Austrian G o v e r n m e n t ’s role was
maintenance of German supremacy.
This*,,gave rise to a sense of despair among the'in
tellectual classes of the non-German peoples, which,
spreading through the population, found expression In
the mass desertion of Slav divisions from the army In
the field, 3
Suppression of opposition movements within the Empire
became Increasingly ruthless as the war advanced, as the men
responsible for A u s t r i a ’s military,

political and administra

tion activities saw little hope of maintaining the Empire and
their positions,
arms.

save through a decisive victory of German

Thus "until the change of regime which followed the

death of Francis Joseph,

the Czechs were as completely mdz1 ij/

zled as

any people in Europe,"

leaders

of the oppressed nation

While the most ardent
slipped over the frontiers

to carry on political and military action against the Habs
burgs,

those who remained at home faced a stern and implacable

foe, determined to use every means of repression
mand to

counteract the flood of

to Inundate the Empire.

at his com

propaganda which threatened

Such repressive measures,

with the hardships encountered at home, created

coupled

"despair and

indignation, with the result that anti-Habsburg propaganda
found fertile soil.

^Redlich,

And,

slgnificantly, this was particu-

op. cit*, p* 98*

^Temperley,

Peace Conference„ IV, p. 251*

larly true of the peasants," reports David F. Strong, an
able historian of the Central-European s c e n e . ^
One of the earliest ma nif e stations, as we have seen,
of opposition to the established regime was the formation of
the strong "Maffla"

organization in Bohemia.

Besides pro

viding Information for the emigres to use with Entente lead
ers, the "Maffla" also served as a rallying point for the men
and women who remained behind.

Close contact was maintained

between Masaryk, Bene? and all the leaders in the Entente
V

countries, and K r a m a r , Dr, P. Samal and their supporters in
Prague— which kept the fires of revolution burning through
out the conflict.

Because of the conditions within the E m 

pire under which the resistance forces had to operate, says
/
/
Strong, it is easy to understand why the emigres seemed to
have the more advanced political ideass
In general it may be said that the Czech National
Council at Paris, working with the tacit encouragement
of the Entente, and later with its benediction, repre
sented the most advanced position, while the Czech
leaders at home followed their leaders in Par is# 1®
Constant pressure was exerted on the Czech leaders
in the Empire by the Austrian War Government, and Czernln
exacted from the Parliamentary clubs of the Czechs, Yugo
slavs and Deputies of other subject nationalities,

^Strong,

0£. cit., p. 72.

l6I b l d . . pp. 75-76.

state-

ments affirming their loyalty to the Empire*1?
the Czech parliamentary association,

For example,

“while upholding the d e 

mands for the Bohemian Staatsrecht * had proclaimed,

8their

attachment to the dynasty and its historic m i s s i o n * In
Austrians were quick to use this statement

1 ft

The

in an effort to

drive a wedge between the Czechoslovak National Council in
Paris and the Czech and Slovak peoples at home.
any,

Little,

if

success attended these efforts, as the Czechoslovaks

in the Dual Empire and Masaryk and the National Council in
the West both realized that the statement was issued under
d u r e s s •^

Considerable Allied credence was given to the

statement, however, and,

for a time at least,

it delayed

recognition and international support of the Council under
Masaryk®s leadership*

It was another hurdle which he and

his devoted followers had to take in stride in their drive
toward independence, as Masaryk points outs
We also had to convince the Americans that we meant
to be free and were fighting for freedom*
Again and
again we were told that the Czech leaders at home were
not in opposition to Austria, and the disavowal which
we had rec eive d•«.was constantly thrown in our teeth*20

^Mamatey,

0£. c i t * * pp. 47-48.

^ R o b e r t A* Kann, The Multinational Empire * National
ism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy * 1848- 191^
(New Yorks Columbia University Press, 1950), II, p. 2^1.
(Cited hereafter as Kann, Multinational E m p i r e )*
■^Mamatey,

ojgu

c i t * * p* 48.

20Masaryk, Making of a S t a t e , p. 2?4*

As the war dragged on into 1917, and as secret peace
negotiations were being conducted behind the scenes by the
Entente and Charles*

Government,21 the subject peoples were

becoming increasingly active In their opposition to the Habs
burg Empire*
Kvapil,

In May, 1917,

on the initiative of Jaroslav

Czech poet and dramatist,

the Manifesto of Czech

Writers was addressed to Bohemian members of the Relchsr at.
"If you cannot carry out all that the nation demands of you
and charges you with, then resign your right to sit and a p 
peal to the highest authority— to your nation," the Manifes
to charged*22

The Czech Deputies responded to this stirring

appeal when the parliamentary assembly reopened later in the
month.

On May 30, Frantesek Stan&k,

Parliamentary Club,

spokesman for the Czech

offered a resolution demanding the trans

formation of Austria-Hungary "into a federal state of free
and equal national states," and the union of the Czechs and
Slovaks "In a single democratic Bohemian State.**2^

Included

21Perhaps the most Interesting peace attempt was the
celebrated "Sixtus Affair," secret discussions carried on by
Emperor Charles and Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, his
brother-in-law, an officer in the Belgian Army.
Discussed
fully In Kann, Multinational Empire * pp* 26?ff*
22Robert Joseph Kerner, (ed*)* Cz echoslovakia i Twenty
Years of Independence (Berkeley and Los Angeless University
of California Press. 1940), p. 53*
(Cited hereafter as Ker
ner, Cz ech oslovakia)♦
v
2^Temperley, Peace C o n ference. IV, p. 255, C f *, Thom
as Capek, Jr., Origins of the Czechoslovak State (TWew YorTcTl
Revell Press, 192o), pp. 77-78. Complete Resolution.

In these demands was recognition of the historic rights of
the Czech Nation and acceptance of the principle of national
self-determination*

Among other things,

this was a direct

challenge to Hungary, as Czechoslovak unityc©oi»ld^hot-'b©
achieved without dissolving the Kingdom of Hungary, as con
stituted under the Ausglelch of 1867*
tion was, thus,

The Czechoslovak ques

the key to the life or death of the Habsburg

Empire, as Mamatey points o u t , r6the threat of complete d i s 
memberment# •.was clearly understood by the statesmen of Vi-

25

enna, and they were terror-stricken.19

■

Another important event, destined to have a powerful
effect on

the future of the Dual Monarchy,

summer of

1917*

1917s

took place in

the

In the Declaration of Corfu of July 20,

the South Slavs made Yugoslavian union an official Ser

bian and South Slav war aim.2^ Partial unification was re
jected, and Southern Slav leaders withi n the Monarchy dis^
carded all thought of further cooperation with either the
Austrians or the Hungarians.

Prom this time for war d, "South

ern Slav Deputies in the Relchsrat conferred frequently with
the Czech

Deputies, and supported the latter in their parlla-

2^Robert J. Kann, The Habsburg E m p i r e . A Study in In
tegration and Disintegration (New Yorks Frederick A. Praeger,
1 9 5 7 )P P« 1 $ 7 * (Cited hereafter as Kann, The Habsburg Emp l r e )*
2^Mamatey,

op. c l t .„ p. ^7.

2 6 I b l d ., p. 114.

mentary opposition and obstruction, [,<crStrong has noted.
Events continued the rapid drift in the direction of
a Czechoslovak plan for complete independence during 1916.
On January 6, all the Czech Deputies in the Reichsrat held a
meeting in Prague with leaders of the literary and business
world, marking the real break of the Czech leadership with
the dynasty.

This Epiphany Day meeting reaffirmed the prin

ciple of self-determination for the Czechoslovak peoples and
strongly protested the Austrian policy in the negotiations
for the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

As a result of his part in

the negotiations,

Count Czernin was accused of forsaking
OQ
true Imperial interests for the benefit of Germany.
Hopes for an intra-empire national compromise, if
they ever existed, vanished completely.
The Czech poli
tical declaration of Epiphany 1918 in Prague, the last
move before the actual outbreak of the revolution, pro
claimed in much stronger terms outright self-determina
tion as the principle goal of the Czech people.
There
could be little doubt now that this was only a thinly
camouflaged advance notice of their goal of complete in
dependence.^
Czernin angrily struck back, attacking "the miserable Masaryk" and those other Masaryks within the Monarchy, who used

2 ?Strong, op. clt., p. 7^*
2®Temp erl ey, Peace Conf e r e n c e . IV, p. 2 5 8 l Taylor,
Habsburg Monar c h y . pp.
l Charles Pergler, America in
the Struggle for Czechoslovak Independence (Philadelphia i
Dorrance and C o m p a n y , 1926), p p . 1P7-X3*
2^Kann, The Habsburg E m p i r e , p. 1^9#

their immunity to encourage the enemy.3P

But the Czechs

were not to be cowed by the Foreign Minister, who had long
since lost their confidence and respect, and some six thou
sand demonstrators assembled in Prague on April 13 to answer
the allegation that the Czechoslovak people did not stand
behind their leaders*

A solemn oath to "hold on till victor

ry" and i n d e p e n d e n c e w h i c h ,

while in no way official,

showed the growing strength that the separatist movement had
with the rank and file in Prague.
Nationalist sentiment reached a fever pitch during
the Jubilee celebration of the Czech National Theatre held
in Prague on May 15.

Held ostensibly in celebration of the

anniversary of the theatre, the Jubilee actually was staged
to serve as a demonstration against the Empire, and was at
tended by representatives of all the Czech and Slovak par
ties and by prominent Polish,
ian figures.

Italian, Yugo-Slav and Ruman

The names of Masaryk and Wilson were repeatedly

acclaimed by the crowd, which,

In a turbulent session, d e 

manded full Independence for Czechoslovakia and the estab
lishment of a democratic government.32

30Temp erl ey, Peace Confere nce„ IV, p* 83.
^ 1 I bid. , p. 258.
32United States Department of State, Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1 The World W a r .
1 9 1 8 , Supplement 1 , (Washingtons Government Printing Office,
1933), I, p. 80 6.
(Series cited hereafter as F o r . R e i s . of
U. S., 1 9 1 8 » M r . 1).

Four days later, Emperor Charles added further fuel
to the fires of anger consuming the Czechoslovaks, when,
a n Imperial Rescript,

in

he declared that the dominantly German

districts of Bohemia would, on January 1, 1919,
from the Czech districts#

he separated

This determined the Czechs to work

harder for complete independence and the defeat of the Cen
tral Powers#

"Henceforth,

it was to be either complete in

dependence or partition for B o h e m i a . T h e

Rescript welded

even closer the bonds between the Czechoslovak leaders at
home and the National Council abroad.

On July 16, 1918,

Vlatismil T u s a r , a militant Czech Deputy, declared

in the

Relcbsrat that "the war must end with the creation of a
Czecho-Slovak State," while the next day, M# Stribrny, a n 
other Czech Deputy,

sang the praises of the Czech troops

fighting for the Entente against the Central P o w e r s #3^
These revolutionary statements were made in the Relchsrat
less than a week after the "Czech Maffia boldly came into
the open and constituted itself as the Czech National Com
mittee of P r a g u e #"35

with Kramar as its president, the com

mittee represented\ all political parties in Bohemia, with
membership based on party strength in the last Austrian elec
tion of 1911.36

. 33strong,

op. c i t #, p. 75.

3 ^ T e m p e r l e y , Peace Conf erence. IV, p. 262#
35Mamatey,
3^Ibid.,

op# c i t .# p. 318.
,

When the Reichsrat reconvened in October,
Max von Hussarek, Austrian Premier,

1918, Baron

told the assembled d e l e 

gates that the introduction of national autonomy must be re
garded as inevitable*

But this concession to the desires of

the subject peoples was too late*

Their representatives had

not come to the Reichsrat to listen to plans designed to
strengthen or save the Empire;

instead they were there to

announce their intention of withdrawing from it*
the first session of the body,

the Czech Deputy,

During
Frantisek

Stanek, speaking for all Czech Deputies, rejected autonomy
under the Habsburgs and declared their solidarity with the
Czechoslovak movement

a b r o a d

*37

n@ Said in part, as quoted

by Temperley:
The Czech Legions, fighting in conjunction with the
Allies, had been called a rabble, but it is just with
them that the Austrian Government will have to discuss
the future of the Czecho-Slovak nation, ,fand that is
why we will not discuss it with you here*1138
Masaryk attributes a similar statement to Dr# Alois Has in, a
prominent Czech leader who remained in the Empire throughout
the war as an active member of the MMaffiarl*

Dr* Basin said

to the gathered deputies in the Reichsrat s
You wished to exclude us from the peace negotiations,
but now, against your will, you will find Czechs taking
part in them, as representatives of the Czechoslovak
brigades*
With them you will have to negotiate upon the
Czech question, not with us; and hence we decline to

3 7 i bld. . p. 323.
38Teaiperley, Peaoe Co nfe rence. IV, p. 9^.

negotiate with you*
This question will be solved else
where than in Austria*
Here there are no factors com
petent to solve i t .39
Following the Austrian
dent Wilson,

Note of October b to Presi

offering to negotiate peace on the basis of the

Fourteen Points, Baron Hussarek admitted to the Reichsrat
that such objectives were incompatible with the existing
structure of the Monarchy*

As soon as the Intention to

negotiate on these terms was made known,

"Magyar public

opinion stampeded for separation” from Austria as a partner
in the Dual M o n a r c h y . ^

The peace note,

tendered by Count

Stephen Burian, a Magyar serving as the Austrian Foreign
Minister, which arrived

in Washington through Swedish dip

lomatic channels on October 7, had offered to
♦.♦His Lordship the President of the United States.*.to
conclude with him and his allies an armistice...and to
enter immediately upon negotiations for a peace for whicl
the fourteen p o i n t s •..should serve as a foundation...^1
In a last desperate effort to save the E mpire, E m 
peror Charles issued his famous Manifesto "To My Loyal Aus
trian Peo p l e s , ” on October 16, 1918, agreeing to the federalization of Austria in a futile attempt to comply with the

sa r y k , Making of a S t a t e , p. 386*
^^Tem p e r l e y , Peace Ctonferenoe. IV, 95 •
^ J a m e s Brown Scott, (ed*), Official Statements of
War Alms and Peace P r o p o s a l s . December 1916 to November
1918 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1 9 2 1 ) j p.

ideas expressed by President Wilson in his declaration of
January,

1918, relating to Austria-Hungary*

By the terms of

the M a n i f e s t o . Austria in the future would be composed of
four national States— German, Czech, Yugo-Slav and Ukranian;
Trieste was to be made a free port, while the Poles of Gali
cia were to be free to unite with Poland if they wished.**2
Under existing conditions, with the Dual Monarchy reeling
under Allied military attacks and subjected to ever-greater
pressures for dismemberment from within,

the Manifesto

pleased no one and was universally accepted as a formal
notification of the death of the Empire.**3

"The boldest

blueprint ever drawn up in the Hofburg to rebuild the Emp i re,M said Gordon Shepherd,

"was used Instead as its demo

lition order. ”****
Just three days later,

the Czech National Committee

in Prague declared that the Czech people could no longer
negotiate with Vienna, and that the Bohemian question was,
in the future, an international question which could be
solved only on the basis of absolute national independence. **5

**2 &apek,

o p . c i t . . pp. 89-90.

Complete text*

*K3Temperley, Peace Co nf er ence . IV, p. 2 6b; Redlich,
o p * c i t ♦» p. 163| Strong, op. cit., pp. 9^-96; Graham, op*
c i t * . pp. 501 -2.
^ G o r d o n Shepherd, The Austrian
Macmillan & Go*, Ltd*, 195717 P * §9•
^Temperley,

Peace Conference,

•Odyssey (Londons
IV, g. 102.

This declaration was based on President W i l s o n ’s reply (de
layed purposely for eleven days) to Count Burian' s peace pro
posal.

In his answer,

the President stated that the situation

had changed since January 8 , when he had announced his Four
teen Points,**^ and for the men In the B a l l p l a t z , as well as
those of both the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris and
the Czechoslovak National Committee in Prague,

this could

mean but one things
an armistice could be obtained only by the official r e 
cognition of the independence, not only of the P o l e s , as
hadJbeen agreed, but also of a Czechoslovak1 State, in
volving a l o s s 'to Atfstria~'of Bohemia and MOraviai and a
loss to Hungary of Slovakia, as well as the complete
separation of the Southern Slav lands of both halves of
the Monarchy, to mention the larger blocs o n l y ....While
the Central Government hesitated to sign its own death
warrant in this manner, the various heirs and executors
were busy establishing their own administrations.^?
The stage was thus set for the final dissolution of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the demise of the Habsburgs,
one of Europe's oldest and most powerful ruling families,
just as the last sounds of the long struggle of the World
War of 191^-1918 were about to recede into history.

^ ^ F o r . R e i s , of U. S., 1 9 1 8 , S u p . 1, I, p. 3 6 8 ; S c o t t ,
o p . c i t .. pp. 428-29.
**?Strong, o p . c i t ., p. 100.

CHAPTER V
ACTION AT THE FRONT AFFECTS
ALLIED DIPLOMACY
When Dr. Masaryk left the capital of his native land
in the winter of 1914, a fugitive from the Austrian police,
because of his nationalistic ideas,

he knew that he faced a

long bitter struggle before he would be able to return to
Prague-— especially if his homecoming was to be tto_the c&pi- tal of a new and independent state.

His role as leader of

the anti-Habsburg elements of the Czech nation was made more
difficult early in the war, whe n the German Empire took over
the conduct of military operations for the Central Powers.
To all intents and purposes,

this was the only reason that

the Austro-Hungarian armies were able to remain in the field.
Nevertheless, Franz Josef and his subjects won a certain d e 
gree of sympathy in some places because of this Germanic
ascendancy and American demands for war with Austria-Hun
gary did not gain much favor until late in the struggle.
The leaders of the subject peoples early had deter
mined that they would have to engage in a long propaganda
battle if their ultimate objectives were to be realized*
For that reason they conducted a strong education and p r o 
paganda campaign during the whole of the war in the United
States and in the Entente countries.

As one of the most

politically knowledgable of the anti- Hab sbu rgs , Masaryk

clearly understood the problems that he faced:
♦..there was little knowledge of, or interest in
these subject r a c e s ; how few knew or cared anything
about the Czechs, let alone the Slovaks, or Slovenians,
or Slovaniansi
It took three years of carefully organi
zed propaganda before the leading members of the British
Government had been won over to the scheme.1
On his arrival in Great Britain from Italy in April,
1915* Masaryk quickly turned to his few, but energetic and
able, friends there in an effort to start the propaganda
battle intended to win supporters for his country's objec
tives.

Wickham Steed, Seton-Watson and others came to his

aid and wrote authoritative articles for influential news
media Informing the British people of the justice of the
Czechoslovak cause and the ultimate benefit which would a c 
crue to Britain from the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy.2
Seton-Watson points out the result of this effort:
...On three successive days in September, The Times
printed letters, written quite independently of each
other, by Sir Valentine Chirol (whom Steed had recently
succeeded as foreign editor), George Trevelyan and my
self, intended to bring home to an uninformed public
some of the main issues involved in the so-called
"Question of Nationalities" in Central Europe.3

1Sir James Hea dla m-M ore ley. "Fall of Austria," Atlan
tic M o n t h l y . CXLIV (October, 1929), 560-61.
2S # Harrison Thomson, Czechoslovakia in European His
tory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 2^9.
3 r . W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (Cambridge:
At the University P r e s s ; New York: The Macmillan Company,
1 9 ^ 3 )» P* 36.
(Cited hereafter as Seton-Watson, Masaryk in
E n g l a n d )•

G. M. Trevelyan \ t h e George Trevelyan mentioned by SetonWatson, above [. one of the great British historians,

in an

article for the influential publication, The Fortnightly R e 
v i e w . earlier had written:
The Empire
dependent for
domination of
Magyars, over

of Vienna and B Uda-Pesth is an anachronism,
support upon the Prussian arms.
It is the
the two races, the Austria-Germans and the
a half-dozen other races.^

Again, Trevelyan carried the cause of the subject peoples
into public print, writing,

"There will be no peace in E u 

rope until the subject populations of Austria-Hungary obtain
liberty in one form or another.

The rule of the sword can

not give permanent p e a c e . "5
Seton-Watson,

in his colorful writing style, gave the

emigre leaders a substantial boost, declaring:
Poland, Bohemia, and Jugoslavia— these three together
form the keystone to the arch of European liberty.
With
out the emancipation of the Southern Slavs and the
Czecho-Slovaks from German aggression, Austrian inertia
and Magyar tyr anny,...there can be no regeneration of
the European commonwealth, no permanent settlement, no
durable peace after the horrors of the Great War
Wickham Steed, not to be outdone by his friends, devoted con
siderable space and writing ability to the Central European
problem, and wrote telling editorials against the Dual Mon-

4 g . M. Trevelyan, "Austria-Hungary and Serbia," The*
Fortnightly R e v i e w . CIII (June, 1915)? 980.
^George M. Trevelyan, "Serbia and Southeastern E u 
rope," The Atlant1c M o n t h l y . CXVI (July, 1915)? 126*
^R. W. Seton-Watson, "Pan-Slavism," The Contemporary
R e v i e w . CX (October, 1916), 429.

archy•

In his program for peace,

published in The Edin

burgh R e v i e w . "the constitution of an independent,
least autonomous, Bohemia,

or at

Including Moravia, and the Slo

vak country of north-western Hungary, "T was a major point.
In another article he blasted away at the "sympathetic"
view of the Austro-Hungarian Empire held by some of his com
patriots,

"no false solicitude,

nice people,

for the welfare of 9those

the A u s t r i a n s , 9 ought...to militate against...

formation of a n Independent Bohemia,

or Czech.o-Slovakia." ®

Popular support for the Czechs and Slovaks built up slowly
in Great Britain and spread throughout the free w o r l d 9s press,
where

it began to gain for them much-needed

sympathy and sup

port, when war aims and peace terms came up for discussion.
With each succeeding article and Introduction to a n 
other politician, Masaryk intensified his campaign to influ
ence opinion, which he realized was entirely uninformed

on

questions relating to the Dual Monarchy and her subject
peoples.

The help of his friends was invaluable to the

Czech leader, and to repay the friendship in part, Masaryk
furnished
in

Information to Allied

Intelligence services both

Europe and the United States, gathered by members of his

?Henry Wickham Steed, "A Programme for Peace," The
Edinburgh R e v i e w . CCXXIII (April, 1916), 381.
^Henry Wickham Steed, "Austria and Europe," The
Edinburgh R e v i e w . CCXXV (January, 1917)> 15*
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Czechoslovak organizat i o n s , who were located

in many key

areas around the world*
Czechoslovak propaganda in the United States had b e 
gun shortly after the outbreak of the war, directed by Eman
uel Victor Voska of the Bohemian National Alliance*

Voska

r

was an influential member of the Czechoslovak counter-espi
onage organization which,

in 1915 $ had turned over informa

tion to the United States Government,
man Army and Naval Attaches,

implicating the Ger

Captains Pranz von Papen and

Karl B o y - E d , in sabotage activ i t i e s ,9 leading to the expul
sion of the two Attaches*

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador

at Washington, Dr. Constantin D u m b a , who had been detected
in some rather bungling attempts to slow munitions manufac
ture for the Entente A r m i e s ,

also was recalled when the

Czechoslovak organization provided information on his a cti
vities*

Such acts gained friends for the Czechoslovaks, but

it took a long period of time before the war aim expressed in
the following article became accepted by the American peoples
Certain nations built up in flagrant denial of the
rights of nationalities— Austria-Hungary, for example—

^Stephen D* Kert e s z , The Fate of East Central E u r o p e .
Hopes and Failures of American Foreign P o l i c y . (Notre Dame,
I n d i a n a : University of Notre Dame Press7~~195o *, pp. 32-33*
3-© A m e r i c a n j o Urnal of International Law, Supplemen t,
Vol. X, Special Number, Diplomatic Correspondence Between the
United States and Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral
Rights and Commerce (New York; Baker. Voorhis & Company,
1916), pp* 36 I- 6 5 I Ernest R. May, T h e 1World War and American
Isolation (Cambridges Harvard University P r e s s , 1959), pp*

164-65.
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can claim no absolute right of existence.
National
boundaries must be completely retraced before inter
national law may be properly invoked in defense of an
alleged right to exist.il
Before the Allied and Associated Powers came to b e 
lieve that Austria-Hungary should be broken up, however,
several years of bloody warfare had to be fought,
speeches had to be made,

countless

news articles written, and personal

contacts completed to create popular support for this radical
departure from the status q u o .
Habsburgs,

Even in the lands held by the

such a deviation from the established order had

not been seriously considered by any sizable segment of the
population,

until the war had been in progress for some time.

It was on autonomous principles that the Entente countries
first based their plans for post-war settlements In Central
Europe.

The breakup of the Dual Monarchy into its component

national parts, was not foreseen until late in the conflict.
Behind this radical change in thinking, by the Entente
leaders and the broad masses of people living both within and
without the Dual Monarchy, was a brilliantly conceived plan
of education and propaganda.
by Masaryk and

The plan was put into effect

Implemented by the National Council,

using

excellent timing and daring diplomatic maneuver— and was, at
all times, backed by the dauntless courage of the Czecho-

liphllip Marshall Brown, "Elements of a Just and Dur
able Peace," The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social S c i e n c e , LXXtl (July"j 1917), 81.

Slovak Legions

in every theatre of the war.

The headlines of the popular press and the thoughtful
articles in the opinion-forming periodicals of the day were
not made available to the Council and its leaders merely for
the asking.

On the world

scene, Austria-Hungary, as a major

force in the balance-of-power politics prevalent in Europe
for centuries,

held a position of extreme importance,

even

to her opponents In the great conflict which had engulfed
the world.

However,

the thought patterns were changed*

En

tente leaders eventually made the decision to dismember the
once-great Empire, and a new Republic,

Czechoslovakia,

emer-

ged from the rubble as a bright contribution to the finally
expressed goal of the Allies to give self-determination to
the subject peoples of the Habsburgs.

The Allied leaders

were guided to their unprecedented decision by a handful of
men,

some of whom fought their battles in the halls of inter

national diplomacy, while the others fought in the trenches
of Prance and Italy,

or on the broad and endless battlefields

of Russia and Siberia*
Czechoslovak leaders had decided that it would be ne
cessary to extend their efforts over a wide portion of the
world

if they were to achieve their aspirations.

Because of

the great exodus of Czech and Slovak peoples from the Dual
Monarchy by emigration to other lands,
to work was available.

such a base upon which

Roucek reports that during the forty

years preceding World War I, "No fewer than 7 9 3 >665 Slovaks

emigrated,

mostly to the United States" .^2

These and other

large settlements of peoples of Czech and Slovak heritage,
resident

In many countries of the world, had drawn closer to

each other in their new homelands*

Because of the common

heritage and similar customs which made them recognize their
kinship in their new homes, many minor difficulties which
sometimes plagued them wit hin the Empire were disregarded.
With the clearer perspective that distance gives,
time rivals within the Empire could

the some

see that they had a com

mon goal and heritage that would lend themselves to a joint
community effort.
than Czech,

"To Masaryk,

himself perhaps more Slovak

such a united effort had been a self evident

necessity from the beginning of the war," Thomson s t a t e s . ^
Czechoslovak National Committees and Congresses sprang up
V

around the w orld— in January of 1915 organizations were
formed

in Switzerland,

and Bulgaria

the United States, Russia, Serbia,

All difference® between the Czechs and Slo

vaks did not disappear,

it must be n o t e $ ,btotot-lflini.fekte'lftfiifeM

States, at the great Congress held at Cleveland,

Ohio,

In

^ J o s e p h S. Roucek and Associates, Central-Eastern
Europe, Crucible of World Wars (New Yorks Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 194(c), p. 82.
13Thomson,

o p . c i t ., p. 252.

l^Dr. Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a S t a t e .
Memories and Observations (New Y o r k i Frederick A. St"okes
C o m p a n y , 192 7 > P* 15* (Cited hereafter as Masaryk, Making of

October,

1915# the majority of the Slovaks supported the

joint Czecho-Slovak cause.

Masaryk writes,

"The Slovaks and

Czechs agreed upon unity and cooperation 5 and the American
Slovak leaders were among the signatories of the first antiAu strian manifesto of November 14, 1915 *11^

The "Czech For

eign Committee", which threw down this gauntlet to the Habsburgs on that memorable day,

soon became the Czechoslovak

National Council and bent every effort toward the creation of
an effective fighting force capable of gaining prestige and
diplomatic stature for the Czechoslovak Nation,
they yearned.

On the basis of Its Legions,

for which

the National

Council hoped to "gain the political recognition of a de
facto and de lure existence of a Czechoslovak Government from
all the Entente p o w e r s ."^
In a n around-about way the Central Powers provided the
means by which tlhe idea of Czechoslovak Independence became
included as one of the Entente war aims.

On December 12, v

1916 , from what they considered a position of great strength,
the Central Powers sent a message to the United States,

of

fering to negotiate peace and asking that the United States
transmit this intelligence to the Entente members.^7

From

^ I b l d . , p. 223 *
^Thomson,

op. cit., p. 253*

^?James Brown Scott (ed.). Official Statements of War
Alms and Peace P r o p o s a l s . December 1916 to November 1918
WT
(Washingtons Carnegie ISndowment for International Peace,
1 92 1 ), pp. 2 - 3 *
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his position of neutrality, and with a natural desire to end
the bloody conflict, President Wilson at the time was w o r k 
ing on a peace program which he had intended to submit to the
warring nations*

The Central Powers'

balance, but he decided

to ask the war aims of the combatants

anyway, and on December 18, 1916,
all American diplomats,

offer caught him off-

instructions were sent to

to representatives accredited to the

belligerent governments, and to all neutral governments for
*1 o

their information*
The President is not proposing peace; he is not even
offering mediation.
He is merely proposing that sound
ings be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral
nations with the belligerents, how near the haven for
peace may be for which all mankind longs with an in
tense and increasing long ing .• .and he confidently hopes
for a response which will bring a new light into the
affairs of the w o r l d . 19
Thus read the dispatch of Robert Lansing, the United States
Secretary of State.

The Central Powers did not send an out

line of their war aims in reply, but suggested a direct ex
change of views between delegates of the warring states at a
meeting to be held on neutral g r o u n d s *20

On the other h a n d ,

the Entente Powers came up with a definite proposal,

includ-

•^United States Department of State, Papers
to the. Foreign Relations of the United S t a t e s «
e l e m e n t . The World War (Washingtons Government Printing
Office, 1929), p. 99.
^ s c o t t , op. c i t .. p. 15 .

20 lbld» . p* 22*

ing this important point,
states,

"a brilliant success,"2 -1* as Masaryk

for the Czechoslovak causes

But the civilized world knows that they PtRe objectives of the w ar | imply in all necessity and in the
first instance, the restoration of Belgium, of Servia,
and of Montene gro .•.the liberation of Italians, of Slavs,
of Roumanians and of Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domina 
tion. . .22
This was an important milestone in the Czechoslovak quest for
recognition, and its inclusion in the war aims of the Allies
ean be attributed in great part,

to the interest of the

French Government in their cause,

fostered by the continuing

efforts of Beiies and the National Council in Paris
And they [ the French 1 added some suggestions of their
own, namely, the inclusion in the Entente program of the
liber4tion of the Czechoslovaks, to Whom no previous
secret or public pledge had been made....With good
French logic, the French leaders concluded that the in
clusion of the Czechoslovaks in the Entente program would
give it greater consistencyi after all, if the Italians,
Yugoslavs, Rumanians and Polet were to be liberated in
the name of President Wilson's principle of National
self-determination rather than under the terms of specific
Entente a g r e e m e n t s , why not also the Czechoslovaks? 24
The exchange of notes did nothing to settle the basic
differences between the belligerents, and was quickly follow

2 ^Masaryk, Making of a S t a t e . p. 124.
■^
^ U n i t e d states Department of State, Papers Relating
to -the Foreign Relations of the United S t a t e s . 1917. S u p . 1?
pp. £ - 9 ; Cjf •, Scott, oj). Cit., p. 3?| J. A. R. M a r r i o t t , The
Eastern Q u e s t i o n . An Historical Study in European D i p l o m a c y .
Fourth Ed it ion (Oxfo rdI At the Clarendon Press, 1940), p. 511*

2 3 M a m a t e y , cp. c i t .. p. 46.
2^ I b i d .» p. 46; Cf,., A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Mon
a r c h y . 1809- 1 9 1 8 . A History of the Austrian Empire and A u s 
tria - Hungary . New E d i t 1 on (L o n d o n i Hamish Hamilton, 1 9 5 5 )$
p. 246.

ed by the Ger man decision to use unrestricted

submarine w a r 

fare to cut off all commerce by sea with the Allied countries
In reply to this German decision, delivered by her Ambassa
dor to the United States,

Count Johann von Bernstorff,

the

United States severed diplomatic relations with the German
Empire, and on April 2, President Wilson addressed a joint
session of Congress, asking for a Declaration of War.

Con

gress answered the President's request by declaring war on
Germany on April 6 , 1917«2^

No action was taken by Congress

at this time, to declare war on the allies of Germany, but
within a few days, diplomatic relations were broken off with
the Dual Monarchy and Turkey.
tral Powers,

Bulgaria, alone of the Cen

thus, was represented in America.2 ^

Although not at war with the Dual Monarchy, the Uni
ted States was thus placed in the opposition camp, fighting
against her allies, and in a position to become more closely
aligned with the anti-Habsburg elements operating within
the United States.

The latter did not delay long in increas

ing their efforts for recognition by the United States.
June 18, 1917, Stefanik,

then Vice President of the National

Council, arrived in the United States,
sions

On

bent on a dual mis

to w i n the sympathy of Americans of all ranks for the

Czechoslovak cause, and to seek permission from the United

2 3scott,

op. c i t .. p. 93*

2 ^Mamatey,

op. c i t ., pp. 70-71.

States Government to recruit soldiers among the Czech and
Slovak immigrants
V

/

Stefanik met with limited success in his recruiting

campaign,

but he was able to draw the Czech and Slovak ele

ments closer together and scored a propaganda success by
promoting a great public meeting held
Hall on September 14, 1917*
ported

in New York's Carnegie

The meeting was prominently re

in the New York press, and shortly thereafter,

the New

York Herald printed a long 11Interview with Stefanik which
appears to have been the first serious discussion of the
Czechoslovak problem in the American pres s.Il2^
When entering the war against Germany in April,

1917,

President Wilson purposely did not call for a declaration of
war on Austria-Hungary,

hoping that the Dual Monarchy would

respond to the separate peace efforts conducted by the Allies.
However, efforts to draw the Emperor Charles into an early
peace failed, and at last,

on December 7, 1917, war was d e 

clared against Austria-Hungary*

In his speech calling for

this action, given on December 4, the President did not call
for dissolution of the Dual Monarchy,

but said?

...we do not wish in any way to impair or rearrange
the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
It is no affair of ours
what they do with their own life...we only desire to

2?Ibia. . p. 129.
28ibid., p. 132-33.

see that their affairs are left in their own hands * in
all matters great and small.29
President W i l s o n 1® speech to Congress caused widespread com
ment in Great Britain,

"the militants approved the will to

v i c t o r y *».and the endorsement of the aspirations of subject
nationalities in Austria-Hungary and Turkey *"3^

The emigre

Czechoslovaks were encouraged by the P r e s i d e n t 1s request for
war against the Dual Monarchy,
ance against di sme mbe rment*"31
e nco ura ge ment , however,
teen Points

"but discouraged by his as sur
They had cause for greater

in President W i l s o n ’s famous Four 

speech of January 8, 1918, which followed close

on the declaration of war*

Although the President did not

call for independence of all subject peoples, a marked
change was noted as he stated in Point Tens

"The peoples of

Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to
see safeguarded and assured,

should be accorded the freest

opportunity of autonomous development*"^2

Further in an ad-

29say Stannard Baker and William E* Dodd, (eds*■■)-+ The
Public Pacers of Woodrow W i l s o n , Vol. Ill, War and P e a c e «
(New York; Harper & Brothers
Publishers, 192?}, I, p. 132;
Scott, c>R* cit *. p. 196*
^ C a r l P. Brand, "The Reaction of British Labor to the
Policies of President Wilson During the World War," The American Historical R e v i e w , XXXVIII (January, 1933)> 277 .
^ M a m a t e y , o p * nit * ,

p* 162*

3 % . S* Department of State, Papers Relating to the
For eign Relations of the United S t a t e s , 1 9 1 8 « Supplement JL,
The World War, Vol. I (Washington? Government Printing Of
fice, 1933T 5 P • .15*
(Series cited hereafter as F o r * R e i s *
I. S., 1 9 1 8 , S u e * 1)*
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dress to Congress on February 11, 1918, he emphasized the
principle that territorial settlements must be made In the
interest of the populations concerned— -saying that "all welldefined national aspirations should be granted the fullest
satisfaction that can be afforded t h e m . .. "33
The Allied leaders,

it appeared, all were approaching

much the same program of peace.

Three days before Wilson

gave his Fourteen Points address, Prime Minister David Lloyd
George made a statement of British war alms, the content of
which was so near to that proposed by Wilson that the latter
very nearly decided not to make his speech.3^

Lloyd George

referred to the December 4, 1917, address of the President
in his speechs
Similarly, though we agree with President Wilson that
the break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war
aims, we feel that unless genuine self-government on true
democratic principles is granted to these Austro-Hungar
ian nationalities who have long desired it, it is im
possible to hope for the removal of these causes of un
rest in that part of Europe which have so long threat
ened its general peac e.35
Fortunately for the subject peoples who needed the support
his speech offered,

the American Chief Executive decided to

3 3 ibld... p. 112; C f . , Scott,
War

o n . c i t .. p. 270.

3^Charles Seymour, American Diplomacy During the World
(Baltimore? The Johns Hopkins Press, 1934), p. 287.

3-5David Lloyd George, The Great C r u s a d e , Extracts from
Speeches Delivered During the War, F* L. Stevenson (arr.),
(New Yorks George H. Doran Company, 1918), p. 260; C f . , Ray
mond James Sontag, European Diplomatic History. 1871-1932
(New Xork: Ap pl eton Century -Crofts, lacT, 'l933'J , T T 2 5 f i
Scott, op. c i t . , pp. 230-31.

continue with his plans to make the address,

even though it

was closely related to that of Lloyd George, and It became a
primary rallying point for emigr^ leaders.
His remarks re\
fleeted a growing conviOtion that the territorial matters of
the Dual Monarchy should be considered carefully before peace
terms were discussed,
cause for hope.

thus giving the Czechoslovaks added

J. A. M. De Sanchez, Director of the Eco

nomic Division of the French Commission in the United States
from 1919 to 1921 , pointed

out the value of the Fourteen

Points speech and the other statements of war aims to the
Allied cause in an article written after the wars,
...the Fourteen Points were as definitive a part of
the military campaign of the last year of the war as
were the operations of the American Army in the St.
Mihiel Sector*
Whether they were intended as such is
not yet perfectly clear; that they became such is
certain.3o
Although the Czechoslovak leaders were somewhat dis
appointed in the Fourteen Points, especially because of the
autonomous development feature,37 the pronouncement gave them
some encouragement and spurred the National Council to renew
ed propaganda activities.38
\
Yet it was almost the summer of 1918 before the Czeoho-

3 6 j # A # M. de Sanchez, "Certain Barriers to a Revi
sion of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s ,,11 The Annals of the Ameri
can Academy of Political and Social Science . CVIII (July,
1923), 24.
37Mamatey,
38strong,

o p . cit., p. 215 .
o p . c i t ., p. 77*

Slovak National Council in Paris, with its American a f 
filiate, the Bohemian National Alliance, was able to ob
serve a change in the American G o vernment’s attitude to
ward the Czechoslovak cause.
The autonomy promised in
the Fourteen Points w a s ,.•.hardly sa ti sfactory.39
Despite the popular appeal and the very strong propaganda
value of the Fourteen Points address, Robert Lansing, W i l 
s o n ’s Secretary of State, was not entirely satisfied with the
speech and wrote a memorandum on i t ;
.*,1 think that the President will have to abandon
this idea and favor the erection of new states out of
the Imperial territory and require the separation of
Austria-Hungary*
This is the only certain means of end
ing German power in Europe.
Convinced of this, I think we should consider the
erection of a Polish State, a Czech State and possibly
a Ruthenian S t a t e . .
Others also saw the coming disintegration of the Austro-Hun
garian Monarchy and more and more propaganda activity was d i 
rected into the effort to obtain political support among the
Great Powers for the eventual recognition of new sovereign
states.
nations

Fenwick, writing on the possible realignment of
in the Balkans,

slovak State,

stated,

w .•*an Independent Czecho

especially if supported by an Independent Jugo

slav State, would be a permanent barrier to the plan of a
Pan-German M i t t e l - E u r o p a . S u c h

an arrangement,

it was

3 9 K e r t e s z , o p . cit,., p.
Yorks

^ R o b e r t Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (New
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 19357$ pp. 261-52.

^Charles
Fenwick, "Notes on International Aff airs,”
American Political Science R e v i e w . XII (November, 1 9 1 8 ) j ?!?.

b e l i e v e d , would be a military advantage for the future, as
well as a present-day recognition for services rendered dur
ing the war.

Late in the conflict;

the popular Magazine,

O u t l o o k , however, questioned the advisability of placing too
much emphasis on parts of the Fourteen Points,

stating:

Professor J* Holland Hose (noted English historian] of
Cambridge, England, distinctly claims that the tide of
events has swept forward with such speed since January 8 ,
1918, that several of the Points are entirely inadequate
and that the Central Powers would not concede nearly
enough even if they gave a bonafide assent to the Points
as form ula ted .^2
Articles in the popular press began to echo the opinions of
Lansing, and other figures in American Government called for
support of the subject nationalities.
Sabath of Illinois,

for example,

Congressman Adolph J.

introduced a resolutions

"That Bohemia be made free and independent and be given a
rightful place among the nations of the w o r l d ,
Early

April,

1918, was a period of great activity

which was to have an important significance
history.

in Czechoslovak

The German Armies launched a massive offensive on

the Western Front and the weakened Allies sought more and
more replacements for the trenches in this great struggle of
•■I1

attrition.

Although coincidental,

the subject peoples chose

^2joseph H, Odell, "The P r e s i d e n t 0s Fourteen Points—
Are They Clear and Final?"
O u t l o o k , CXX (November 6 , 1918),
^ G u i d o Kisch, "Woodrow Wilson and the Independence of
Small Nations in Central Europe," Journal of Modern H i s t o r y <,
XIX (September, 19*7), 235.

at this time to hold a "Congress of Oppressed Nationalities
of Austria-Hungary" at Rome*

The Congress,

therefore,

met

under highly favorable conditions and was able to demonstrate
not only the "anti-Austrian solidarity of the oppressed
peoples but also to convert and firmly commit the Allies...
to a strong anti-Austrian p o l i c y . " ^
Delegates representing the Yugoslavs,

Czechs, Slovaks,

Roumanians and Italians, along with Allied representatives,
met and developed a series of resolutions, under which they
agreed to lay aside their national disputes until after a
victory had been won.

One resolution stated,

"Each of these

people proclaim its right to constitute its own nationality
and state unity or to complete it and to attain full politi
cal and economic independence*"^5

The Congress did not go

unnoticed by the friends of the subject peoples living in
the United States,

or by the American Government.

Secre

tary of State Lansing stated on May 29, that the "national
istic aspirations of the Czechs and Jugoslavs for freedom
have the earnest sympathy of this G o v er n me n t.
following the example set by the United States,
Lloyd George and Orlando,

meeting at Versailles,

declaration concerning the Congress,

On June 3,
Clemenceau,
issued a

expressing their

^ M a m a t e y , op. clt * * p. 244.
^5j. A* R. Marriott,
46p o r , Reis,

o p . c i t ., p. 493*

of U. S.,

1 9 1 8 « S u p . JL, I, p. 112.

"earnest sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations towards
freedom of the Czechoslovak and Yugo-Slav peoples."2*?
on June 28, Lansing issued a new statement,
stronger fashion,
be,

Later,

emphasizing in

the position of the American Government to

11that all branches of the Slav race should be completely

freed from German and Austrian ruley'r

J

This was a "deci

sive advance as compared with President W i l s o n ’s Fourteen
Points which spoke only of the rights of the Austrian nations
to autonomous d e v e l o p m e n t , " ^ an able historian later wrote.
The vaguely defined intention of W i l s o n ’s Point Ten
was now clarified*
The clarification meant recognition
of the independence of smaller n a t i o n s ••*a disruption
of the Dual Monarchy,50
as Guido K i s c h , a modern-day writer,

has pointed out.

Events

favoring Czechoslovak independence moved rapidly thereafter,
in the Entente countries and in the United States.

On

June 7 , the British Government stated that in view of the
formation of

Czechoslovak military units in Italy, France,

and Russia it was prepared to recognize the Czechoslovak Army
"as an organized unit labouring In.the cause of the Allies."5^

^ ? I b l d * * p. 809 *
^ I b i d .» p. 816; Cf •, Francis Whiting Halsey, The Lit
erary Digest History of the World War (New York and Londons
Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1919), Vol. VII, p. 37^*
^ J o s e p h S* Houcek, "President Masaryk of Czechoslo
vakia," Current H i s t o r y . XXXI (March, 1930), 1113.
5°Kisch,

o p . c i t •, p. 237*

5 Ipor. R e i s . M S *

S., 1 9 1 8 * S u p . 1, I, 810*

Equally Important to Masaryk and his co-workers*

His Majes

t y ’s Government was prepared to recognize the National Coun
cil in Paris as the political agency representing the a r m y *52
The Government of Prance followed suit and stated that it
would recognize "publicly and officially the National Coun
cil as the supreme organ of the general interests and policy
of the future Czechoslovak

G o v e r n m e n t

#»53

While these events were taking place,

Masaryk arrived

in Washington on May 9, having left Russia and the Czecho
slovak Legions more than two months earlier*

He had been

greeted royally by the Czech and Slovak residents of the
United States*

Charles Pergler, a member of the Bohemian

National Alliance,

reported,

"At least one hundred thousand

Czechs and Slovaks greeted him*** in that city (Chicago) •
He had been out of touch with the National Council much of
the time while with the Legions

in Russia, and only learned

of the Rome Congress on his arrival in Tokyo, enroute to the
United S t a t e s b u t

he recognized the Importance of the

actions taken there, particularly the agreement upon common
action against the Habs b u r g s .3^

5 %Ibid * t £aipek,
53$apek,

o p * c i t *, pp. 80 - 81 .

o p * cit*, p. 81.

-^Charles Pergler, America in the Struggle for Czecho
slovak Independence TPhiladelphia s DoTrance' arid C o m p any,
192557 p. 47.
^^Masaryk, Making of a State * p. 206.
56lbid., p. 2^ 2 .

On his arrival in A m e r i c a , Masaryk at once addressed
himself to the important task of gaining public favor for the
Cz echoslovaks*

He turned to the press to achieve popular and

widespread p u b l i c i t y , and before long placed

"interviews and

articles in the largest and most influential daily papers,
weeklies and reviews, and

[established]

personal relations

with prominent writers of all opini ons* "^7

Recognizing the

value of this editorial comment and support,
wrote,

"to American journalism in general,

later Masaryk

I owe a debt of

gratitude*
Working with leaders of other subject nationalities
in the United States,

particularly the Xugoslavs,

Masaryk

gained many new friends for the cause of Czechoslovak Indep e n d e n c e , and at the same time helped further the national
aspirations of these subject peoples*

Masaryk®s enthusi

astic reception by the Slovaks, as well as the Czechs,
proved an important factor in the success of his mission in
the United States*

In Pittsburgh, after a mass rally at

which he received a public ovation, Masaryk drew up and
signed with American Czech and Slovak representatives,

the

"Pittsburgh Convention," under which the Slovaks were to be
given a. degree of autonomy within the Czechoslovak S t a t e •
This a g r e e m e n t , signed on May 30, 1918, established Masaryk

57 i b i a ., p. 235
5 8ibia.

in the minds of the American Government as the leader of all
the Czech and Slovak peoples, and "American officials never
questioned his right to speak in the name of the Slovaksi (,*59
Professor Thomson has since written;
The organization of Czechoslovak sentiment and war
effort proceeded harmoniously and enthusiastically
under the guidance of Masaryk from this time on until
independence and union of the two peoples In their
native land were a c h i e v e d *60
Lansing and Masaryk held their first interview four
days after the signing of the Pittsburgh document, and Ma s
aryk pleaded his case for American assistance in transport
ing the Czechoslovak Legions from Russia to France.
time of the interview,

At the

neither knew that the Legions had be

come involved in a conflict with the Bolsheviks, and the
American Secretary of State was non-committal, as the "whole
project seemed to him fantastic"
When the story of the Czechoslovak uprising in Russia
became known,

the situation was altered greatly for Masaryk

and his fellow workers

in the United States.

Doors were

opened to him that hitherto had remained closed*

He has

described the situation as follows;
The effect in America was astonishing and almost in
credible— all at once the Czechs and Czechoslovaks were

5^Mamatey,

o p . c i t ., p. 20^*

6 °Thomson,

o p . cit., p. 273 •

OJ*Mamatey,

op* c i t . * p. 28^#

known to everybody.
Interest in our army in Russia and
Siberia became general and Its advance aroused enthusi
asm. .• .Our control of the railway and our occupation of
Vladivostok had the glamour of a fairy-tale, which
stood out jfcheemore brightly against the dark background
of German successes in F r a n c e .62
The Czechoslovak Legions caught the public fancy, and the
popular press clamored for news of the movements of the a l 
most legendary force.
Until May, 1918, the New York Times index had me ntion
ed Czech and Czechoslovak only under the general heading,
"Austria-Hungary"*
In July and September, two full pages
in the index were given to the Czechoslovak Army and a
half-page to other aspects of the situation*
This de 
monstrates Masaryk* s wisdom in Insisting that it would
be necessary for the Czechoslovaks to have an army b e 
fore they could expect to exert influence on the states
men of the world.
Most Americans recognized the Czechoslovaks as a people a l 
most entirely through the daring exploits of the Legions,
fighting their way toward Vladivostok.

Helping this recogni

tion were many newspaper and magazine articles published dur
ing the closing months of the war*
Then at last came the amazing truth about Vl adivo
stok;
part of the Czechoslovak army had fought its way
six thousand miles across Siberia to the Pacific port;
the remainder of the army was stretched put along sec
tions of the Trans-Siberian R a i l r o a d * . * ^

62fiasaryk> Making of a S t a t e . p* 276.
^ R o b e r t Joseph Kerner, (e d .), Czechoslo vak ia; Twenty
Years of Inde pend enc e. (Berkeley and Los Angeles; University
of California Press, 19^0 ), p. 75*
(Cited hereafter as Kerner, Czechoslov aki a)*

6^George MacAdam, "C ze choslovakia, The Nation Without
a Cou ntry," The W o r l d 9s W o r k . XXXVI (October, 1918), 630*
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Another typical article reads
A report came across the seas that a Czechoslovak
Army of less than one hundred thousand men had practi
cally freed Siberia from the misrule of the Bolshevists
in one of the most dramatic adventures in h i s t o r y . ^ 5
These and many similar newspaper and periodical arti
cles built a ground swell of public approval for the fighting
forces of the Czechoslovaks, and for the independence of the
nation*

As it was recognition that he had sought, and as he

had planned to use the Legions to achieve that recognition,
such public Interest in the Czechoslovak troops was extreme
ly valuable to Masaryk and the others working for Czecho
slovak independence*
After June 19, 1918, when Professor Masaryk, as head
of the Czechoslovak National Committee, met with President
Wilson,

the cause of the Czechoslovaks began to advance even

more rapidly.

It has been said that Masaryk® s presence in

Washing ton at this time, and the Legions In Siberia,

Italy

and France, were most important factors in gaining Czecho
slovak recognition.

One editorial writer summed it up in

the following manner, attesting to Masaryk®s great personal
influence,

"Masaryk in Washington is worth an extra regiment

In France.

^ H e r b e r t Francis Sherwood, "A New Declaration of In
dependence," The O u t l o o k . CXX (November, 1918), 4 0 6 .
^ E d i t o r i a l , "Czechoslovak Independence," The Inde
pendent . XCVI (November 9, 1918), 1^9*
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Great Britain,

on August 14, recognized the Czecho

slovak National Council as the ,fsupreme organ of the Czecho
slovak national.interests, and as the present trustee of the
future Czecho-Slovak government * * *1167

This gave the Govern

ment of the United States further reason for all-out support
of the Czechoslovaks, and on September 3 , a statement was
published recognizing "that a state of belligerency exists
between the Czechoslovaks thus organized and the German and
Austro-Hungarian E m p i r e s *"68

Included in the declaration

was the following s t a t e m e n t :
It also recognizes the Czechoslovak National Council
as a de, facto belligerent government clothed with proper
authority to direct tlpe military and political affairs
of the C z e c h o s l o v a k s * ^
Following quickly on the heels of this recognition
by the

various members of the Allied and Associated P o w e r s ,

a second great meeting was held in New York's Carnegie Hall,
under the motto,
gary* "

"The Will of the Peoples of Austri a-H un

George Creel,

head of the American Committee of Pu b

lic Information, gave his support to the meeting, and all of
the subject peoples were represented by important emigre

6 ?F o r * E e l s * of U* S>*, 1 9 1 8 »

S

u p

*

1,

I,

p. 824*

United States Department of State, Papers Relating
t o the Foreign Relations of the United States * The Lansing
P a p e r s « 1 9 14-1920r rWas'hlngton i Government Printing Office,
19^0), II, p* 1^5•
I b i d . | Cf,., S c o t t , ©e . c i t . . pp. 379-80.
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leadersAn
demonstrated

outstanding propaganda maneuver,

the meeting

the solidarity of the subject peoples, and the

American public applauded a resolution which was adopted
stating,

"we demand the dissolution of the present empire and

the organization of its freed peoples according to their own
w i l l ."71
The stage was thus set for the final act in the events
leading to the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy and the es
tablishment
scenes,

of the new sovereign states*

A look behind the

on the actual fighting fronts, will show how the

Czechoslovak Legions profoundly affected the recognition
sought by Masaryk and his followers.

?0Mamatey,

op* cit *. p. 316*

7lHerbert Adolphus Miller, "The Bulwark of Freedom,"
The S u r v e y » XLI, No. 1, (October 5* 1918), 7*

CHAPTER VI
RETURN TO THE EASTERN FRONT I
THE ALLIES INTERVENE
During the year he remained

in Russia, Masaryk worked

diligently to smooth out differences between the Czechoslovak
Legions and the Soviet Government, and as long as the Red
Armies occupied the trenches opposing the Central Powers,
there was little friction*

After the signing of the Peace

of Brest-Litovsk, which took Russia out of the war, however,
he realized that the safety of his soldiers was endangered,
and that they must leave Russia to go into action on the
Western Front, where they could achieve greater recognition
for Czechoslovak ends.
of Czechoslovak troops

At that time,

the major concentration

in Russia centered near Kiev, where

some forty thousand men opposed the Austro-German armies* ^
By March 1 5 , Czechoslovak leaders had been given approval by
the Soviets to make the overland

journey to Vladivostok,2

with one of the requirements being that the Legions would
hand over part of their weapons to the Soviet Army*

Again,

after some difficulties arose between the Legions and local

r
-^Thomas ^apek, Jr.,
(j|~New Y o rk %1 Revell Press,

Origins of the Czechoslovak State
1926) , p. 35 •

2Dr# Eduard B e n e ¥ « My War M e m o i r s » (Trans.) Paul
Selver (Boston and New Yorks Houghton—Mifflin Company, 1928),
P. 355 o

IQ**
Soviets,

on March 26,

Czechoslovaks

the Soviets approved movement of the

"as a group of free citizens11,3 (this was the

agreement signed by Stalin referred to earlier) and the long
anabasis

to Vladivostok again got underway.

Bene?? has indi

cated the wholehearted desire of the Czechoslovaks to leave
Russia for Frances
From the moment when, in February and in March, 1918,
the transfer of our troops to France had definitely b e 
come the order of the day, no serious-minded person
amongst us reckoned with the possibility of intervention
in Russia.
The one endeavor was to reach France as
rapidly as possible.^
The Czechoslovak agreement to turn over part of their
arms and equipment,

thereby gaining approval to move through

Russia and Siberia, worked satisfactorily for a short time,
but distrust on both sides finally caused the Soviets to
change the conditions of the movement.

The Red Government

ordered that all weapons be surrendered by the Czechoslovaks,
and called for the enlistment of most of the Czechoslovaks in
Red Army units or in labor p o o l s #5

Neither the rank and file

^ I b l d », p. 3 5 5 ®
^Ibld o . pp. 391-92; C f ., Charles Pergler, America in
the Struggle f o r Czechoslovak Independence (Philadelphias
Dorrance and C o m p a n y , 1926) * P P * 52-53; George F. Kennan,
"Soviet Historiography and America's Role in the Interven
tion." The American Historical R e v i e w . LXV, No. 2 (January,
I960), 312.
(Cited hereafter as Kennan, H i s t oriography).
5James Banyan, Intervent i o n . Civi 1 W a r , and Communism
in R u s s i a . Ap ril-December 1 9 1 8 . Documents and Materials
"(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), p. 8 6 ; George F.
Kennan, So vie t-American R e l a t i o n s . 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 2 0 1 The Decision to
Intervene (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 195 8
p” 1 3 7 . ( (Cited hereafter as Kennan, Soviet-Amerlcan R e l a t i o n s ).

nor the officers of the Legions subscribed to these terms as
they wished to get into action against the Germans, and re
lations between the Legions and the Bolsheviks became in
creasingly strained*

Masaryk,

disturbed at this unwarranted

interruption of the movement of his troops,

later writing to

the Soviets concerning their attempts to detain^the Legions,
said;
I would not oppose your demand of disarmament if you
can guarantee us free and unmolested passage to France.
I assure you our soldiers' only wish is.to fight the
common enemy and help, by that, Russia*°
The Bolsheviks continued
in May,

1918,

their demands,

however, and

relations between the Czechoslovaks and the

Soviets finally were stretched

to the breaking point at the

little way station of Chelyabinsk in Siberia, and the Czecho
slovaks determined to fight their way through Russia and S i 
beria,
time,

if necessary,

to reach their homeland.

Prior to this

there was little, if any, antagonism on the part of the

men of the Legions towards the Russians*

Lansing,

in fact

had been In touch with Masaryk in Washington and wired to the
American Ambassador in Russia, David R* Francis,
Czechoslovaks

"are determined

that the

to fight Austro-Germans and not

S. Department of State, P a p e r s -Relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United S t a t e s . 1 9 1 8 . Russia (Wash
ingtons
Government Printing Office, 1931), II, p* 213 *
(Cited hereafter" as F o r . Reis * of, U. J|., 1 9 1 8 , R u s s i a ) *
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fellow Slavs,

except when provoked,

The affair at Chelyabinsk,

In self-def ens e .11?

virtually determined the

trend of future relations between the Legions and the Soviets*
Enroute to Vladivostok,

under terms of the agreement with

Stalin, a train of Czechoslovaks pulled into the station
alongside a train loaded with Hungarian prisoners-of-war
being returned in accord with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
An altercation developed between the two groups,

easily under

standable under existing conditions, and one of the Hungar
ians killed a Czech,

with a heavy piece of iron.

The Czech's friends retaliated by killing the Hungarian, and
were arrested by the local Soviets and taken to the city for
a hearing.

This brought about a full-scale effort on the part

of their fellow Legionaries, and a detachment of Czechoslo
vaks went into the city and secured
pitched battle,

their release.

following this incident,

In a

the Legions were

victorious and returned to their u n i t .®
Although the Chelyabinsk incident in itself was settled
between the conflicting groups a few days later,
had been done.

the damage

On receipt of the news of the Legions' action

at the railroad station,

Leon Trotsky,

Soviet Commissar for

^ F o r . R e i s . of U. <5*, 1 9 1 8 . R u s s i a . I, p. 571*

8john Albert White, The Siberian. Intervention (Prlnceton;
Princeton University Press, 1950), pp. . 2 ^ 7 Kennan,
Soviet-American R e l a t i o n s . II,' pp. 150-51.

War, directed
slovaks

the Siberian Soviets

to detrain all Czecho 

in their regions and to "organize them into labor

artels or draft them into the Soviet Red A r m y 11.9
thousand,

Some eight

four hundred members of M a s a r y k 1s forces were in

Chelyabinsk at the time, attending a "Congress of the
Czechoslovak Revolutionary Army," called to determine the
further course of action to be followed by the Legions.
Chelyabinsk Incident occurring during the Congress,

The

immedi

ately followed by Trotsky's peremptory order, angered the
Czechoslovaks who, defying the directive,

proclaimed their

decision to keep their arms and proceed to Vladivostok.-*-®
Trotsky then telegraphed the local Soviets?
All Soviets are hereby ordered to disarm the Cze ch o
slovaks immediately.
Every armed Czechoslovak found
on the railway is to be shot on the spot; every troop
train in which even one armed man is found shall be un
loaded, and its soldiers shall be interned in a war
prisoner's c a m p . •.•Inform all railway workers that not
a single car of armed Czechoslovaks is to be allowed to
move eastward.
Those who submit to violence and assist
the Czechoslovaks in their movement east will be severely
punished . H
The Legions were determined
stok and from this time on,

to get through to Vl adivo

"a state of open warfare existed

9Kennan, Soviet American R e l a t i o n s . II, p. 151®
10Bunyan,

ojd.

c i t .. p. 89.

1 1 I b l d ... p. 91.

1?
between Red Russia and the C z e c h s •11

This struggle was to

continue until an armistice was signed

(February,

1920), pe r

mitting the last of the Legions to sail from Vladivostok in
September,

1920 , more than two years after the Chelyabinsk

incident *

The Legionaries were convinced that safety lay in

the strength of their arms and they deployed rapidly along
the Trans-Siberian railway until a Soviet official is re
ported to have exclaimeds
with the Czech troops,
h o u r s •" ^3

Control

"France,

through concerted action

has taken Siberia

in twenty-four

of the Trans-Siberian was necessary if the

Czechoslovaks were

to have uninterrupted lines of.communica-

tion, and the Legions accepted this as their first challenge*
The leading spirit

of the Legions in the Chelyabinsk area

was Rudolph Ga j d a ,

strongly anti-Bolshevik, a fire-eater

thirsting for action and the opportunity to attain Czecho
slovak aims,

he had risen rapidly in the ranks of the

LegionsGajaa

was to play am important role in the entire

Siberian operation*
♦••it is easy to see that the Czech Corps, represent
ing at the mo ment— as it did— the strongest compact and
unified armed force in all of Siberia, could hardly fail
to become, willingly or unwillingly, a factor in the

-^George Stewart, The White Armies of R u s s i a « A Chron
icle of teounter-Revolution and Allied Intervention (New Yorks
The Macmillan Company, 1933)V PP* 105-d*

^-3stewart, og* cit *.« p* .
1 07*
l^Kennan, Soviet American R e l a t i o n s . II,pp» 163-6^*

state of smoldering evil conflict that had been brought
into being throughout Siberia by the sudden Communist
seizure of power* ^5
, The Legions,

some seventy-thousand strong,

thus were

destined to aid the cause of Czechoslovak independence in an
entirely different theatre of operations, and become one of
the most important factors

in bringing about an Allied

in

tervention in Russia and Siberia*
The disposition and timing of the Czech revolt, acci
dental though they were, happened to be of the first im
portance to the entire counter-revolutionary movement.
The Czechs who had no real interest in the domestic af 
fairs of Russia and no real wishes other than to com
plete their roundabout itinerary to Europe, now found
themselves by this strangest of fatalities forming a
liaison force and linking together all the aimless,
planless, anti-Bolshevik groups throughout eastern
Russia and Sib eri a*1^
It must be noted that this decision to combat the
Soviets was made by the men attending the Congress at ChelyaV

v

blnsk and their leaders, G a j d a , Cecek and Voitsekhovsky, were
given the task of carrying out the d e c i s i o n *1''7

There was no

contact on a regular basis with the National Council,

except

through Allied channels, and events were happening too rapidly to depend on this slow means of communication*
tegral part of the French Army

As an in

(since December of the pre-

^ I b l d . . p. 165 .
l°Frank P. Chambers, Christina Phelps Harris, and
Charles C. B a g l e y , This Age of C o n f l i c t , a Contemporary
World H i s t o r y » 1914 to the Present (New Yorks H a r c o u r t ,
Brace and Co*, 1950)> P* 262*

110

vious year)
assigned

the Legions had regular French Army officers

in a liaison capacity*

The two French officers,

Major Alphonse Guinet and Captain Pascal attending the
Chelyabinsk Congress, were unable to stay the decision of the
i

Legions, and the French desire to move the Czechoslovaks out
of Russia and Siberia with the least possible delay,
they could embark for the Western Front, was pushed
background *

so that
into the

Because of other diplomatic maneuvers being

carried on by the Entente,

however,

the delay of this well-

trained military organization in the East was not unwelcome
to many British and French politicians*
Major Guinet,

in fact, was instructed to tell Czecho

slovaks a short time later %
The French Ambassador makes known to Commander Guinet
that he can thank the Czechoslovaks for their actions,
this in the name of the Allies*
They, the Allies, have
decided to intervene the last of June and the Czechoslo
vak Army and the French Mission form the advance guard
of the Allied A r m y *19
The statement, at least as far as the United States was con
cerned,

was without authority, and its acceptance by the

Czechoslovaks led them to believe that an Allied

interven

tionist force would soon come to their aid in Western Siberia.
Behind ,this apparently unauthorized message was a long-stand-

■^Kennan, Soviet "•American Relations * II, p* 155 J F o r *
Reis * of U* S * , 1 9 1 8 * R u s s i a . II, p* 158*

19stewart, op* cit», p. 114; Cf *, Bunyan, o p * cit * ,
p. 106*

Ill
ing effort on the part of certain Entente leaders to effect
an intervention of Siberia and Russia, with the intent of
opening an Eastern Front and thus relieving the ever increas
ing pressure of the Germans on beleagured French and British
forces in the West*
Entente military and political leaders,

for the most

part, had hailed the Russian Revolution as a release of the
Russians from an autocratic regime and a step in the direc
tion of democracy*

With the signing of the ignominious

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and withdrawal of the Russians from
the war, however,

they recognized that more than twelve

million troops were lost to the Allies, and more than seven
ty German divisions,

previously tied down on the Eastern

Front, were made available for duty on other battlefields
Other considerations of the Russian "defection" were pointed
out by Lloyd George in his War M e m o i r s :
•..the fact that there was at Vladivostok a big acc umu 
lation of military stores intended for use by our R u s 
sian allies against the Central Powers*
We did not
want these to be used by the hostile Bolsheviks for ex
terminating those non-Bolshevik movements in Russia
which were still opposing the Germans; still less did
we want them to be seized by Austro-German forces in
Russia, or surrendered by the Bolsheviks to the enemy
as a condition of peace.
In the second place, Vladi 
vostok remained our one channel of communication with
the Anti-German forces operating in Russia— the Cos
sacks of the Don and the Kuban, the non-Bolshevik
governments of the Caucasus*
Thirdly, it was impera
tive to prevent the Germans from penetrating into

20S t e w a r t , c>£. cit * * p. 82.
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Siberia and securing a hold upon it and
resources *21

its great natural

Early Entente attempts to interest the United States
in a Russian intervention had failed and, in December,

1917*

Clemenceau and Alfred Lord Milner, British Secretary of State
for War,

signed a convention in Paris,

calling for joint

action and creation of spheres of interest in Rumania and
southern Russia,

including the Ukraine..

As part of the a r 

rangements made with Stef'einik and Benes", recognition was given
to the Czechoslovak army as a co-belligerent,

serving under

the French Government for military m a t t e r s .22

Masaryk did

not hear of this agreement until early in January and caused
great embarrassment to his colleagues in Paris and disple a
sure to the French by refusing to commit the Legions to this
use.

The Ukrainians,

however,

had other ideas, and aligned

themselves with the Central Powers against the Soviets,
thereby calling a halt to immediate British and French plans
in that ar ea.2 -^

The Allied decision,

referred to earlier,

was then made to transport the Legions to France,
port at Vladivostok.

using the

In an enclosure to a letter to Seton-

2 ^David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd
G e o r g e « 1 9 1 8 . (Bostons
Little, Brown and Company, 1937),
VI, p. 1 6 2 .
22Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Cen
tral E u r o p e » 1914- 1 9 1 8 . A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and
Propaganda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957),
p. 170; Kennan, Historio g r a p h y , p. 309*
2 3Mamatey,

o p . c i t ,« pp. 219r2275*

Watson,

dated March 31,

1918, Masaryk indicated the impor

tance of a Czechoslovak force in France, and that the French
themselves understood the political implications of such an
army i
The significance of having a whole Czech army In
France Is obyious; and I must acknowledge that France
understood the political meaning of the matter from the
b e g i n n i n g . ...In present circumstances, 100,000- -na y,
even 5 0 s000 - - trained soldiers may count a great deal.2^
Unforeseen at that time, however, were other factors which
were to change this French and British decision.

Masaryk

was not to get his one hundred thousand, nor even fifty
thousand trained soldiers to the front in Fran ce— one a uth
ority has written, that at the end of the war, Czechoslovak
forces numbered approximately one hundred eighty-two thou
sand men,

of which,

only some twelve thousand were serving

on the Western Front.

The balance of the Legions were di 

vided, with seventy-eight thousand men fighting in Italy and
some ninety-two thousand under arms in Itussia and Siberia.25
Late in 1917, C l e menceau, at an inter-Allied confer
ence in Paris discussed with Colonel Edward M. House
States representative to the Supreme War Council)

p It

(United

the possi-

f

^ R . W. Seton-Watson. Masaryk in England (Mew Yorks
The ffecmillan Company, 1943), p. 11. T c i t e d hereafter as
Seton-Watson, Masaryk in E n g l a n d ).
2^Robert Joseph Kerner, (ed.), Czech osl ova kia i
Twenty Years of Independence (Berkeley and Los Angeles i
University of California Press, 1940), pp. 350-51.
(Cited
hereafter as Kerner, Cz ech oslovakia).
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bility of sending a Japanese expeditionary force to R u s s i a •
House was adamant

in refusing to consider such a course as

!
one entirely in opposition to the principles of his govern**
rnent*

"Any effort at intervention except at the request of

the Russian government would be a mistake,"

he was convin

ced *2^
During January and February of 1913, almost constant
pressure was put on President Wilson and his advisors,
that he approve Japanese intervention*

All such counsel was

declined, but the arguments mounting one on another,
to have an effect on the President*

urging

began

The Entente requests,

coupled with similar appeals from his own diplomatic staff
abroad,built

a strong ease for intervention, which b e 

came increasingly difficult for him to resist*

In late Feb

ruary, Arthur J* Balfour, British Secretary of State for For
eign Affairs, again appealed to the President and this re
quest was backed up by the French Embassy stating that Japan
agreed to meet all Allied demands concerning her actions in
Siberia*

Wilson decided to accept the proposal and drafted

a declaration of policy stating that although
the United States has not thought it wise to loin the
governments of the Entente in asking the Japanese

^ B e t t y Miller Unterberger, A m e r i c a 0s Siberian Exped it i o n , 1918- 1 9 2 0 s A Study of National Policy (Durham, N* C* j
Duke University Press, 195^5» P* 19*
J 7 l b i d . * p® 2.1*

Government to act in Siberia, "it would not object to
such a request being made by the other Allies"*
Hardly had he sent the statement to the State Department for
information of the Allied ambassadors, when he received other
intelligence from some of his personal advisors which caused
him to reconsider his decision and recall the note that was
to have been sent to Jap an *29

The time was not yet right for

the President to want the Japanese to enter on a n interven
tionist course alone in Russia,

nor was he then inclined to

ward United States participation in a joint e ndeavor*3°
Among his advisors,
intervention®

the military,

Newton D, Baker,

particularly,

did not favor

the Secretary of War,

con

sistently resisted all proposals for intervention in Russia,
and was vehement in his opposition to the suggestion that
American troops be diverted from Prance to other fronts*3l
General Peyton fc. March, American Chief of Staff, also con
sidered

intervention impracticable saying that it would not

divert a single German division from the Western Front, while
General John J* Pershing,
Expeditionary Force,

Commander in Chief of the American

refused to authorize transfer of any

troops from his command

in

F r a n c e . ® 3 2

with such divergent

28 I b i d * , p. 3 0 *
2 9 l b i d ® . p® 31*
3%unyan,

up*

3 1Mamatey, pp*

cit » * p* 60*

cit*, p* 74*

3 2William Appleman Williams, American-Rus sian Relations *
1 781 - 194? (New Yorks Rinehart & Co®, Inc®, 19521, p® 151*
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counsel offered by key diplomatic and military advisors*
coupled with almost

incessant appeals from the French and

British for Japanese intervention,

President Wi lso n was

faced with a most difficult decision,
he was

85sweating b l o o d ,(l over it*

informing House that

3 3

Intervention was brought closer, however, w h e n the
Japanese landed a force at Vladivostok on April 5 > citing
the murder of three Japanese nationals as the basis for the
action.*^

The British also sent a small detachment of M a 

rines to guard the Embassy in the face of possible internal
disorder,
Behind

but the United States declined to participate*

the British move was an effort to insure that any

action taken wpuld be a n Allied one, not an independent Ja35
panese venture.
The Soviets reacted quickly to the J a 
panese landing at Vladivostok, and George V* Chicherin, Act
ing Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, decried the use of
force in a situation in which the local Soviet had not even
bee n given an opportunity to investigate, and "instructing
the Soviets

in Siberia to oppose any forcible invasion of

Russian terri tory .n^6

Later in the month,

on April 28,

3 3 u n t e r b e r g e r , op. c i t . , p. 21.

3^F o r . R e i s . of U. S., 1 9 1 8 . R u s s i a . XI, pp. 100^01.
35Lloyd George,
Policy

op* cit., VI, p. 16?.

3^Jane Degras, (e d ), Soviet Documents on Foreign
(Londons Oxford University Press, 195lT7 pp. 67-68.
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Lansing and Viscount Kikujiro Ishil, Japanese Ambassador to
the United States, discussed a proposed Japanese intervention
in Siberia, at which time the Ambassador indicated that his
Government would welcome Allied participation in an expedition to Siberia*-^

Outlining the participation of Nipponese

troops, Viscount Ishli implied that J a p a n 0s sphere of interest would extend only to Irkutsk in Siberia--covering only
about half the territory that the British thought they would
be able to bring under control*

On learning of this self-

imposed limitation, American diplomats again lost interest,
seeing in J a p a n ’s proposals only self-interest,

rather than

a sincere desire to reopen an E a s t e r n F r o n t , so that they
could come into direct contact with the Central P o w e r s *^8
Events followed

in rapid

successions

the Czechoslovak Legions toward Vladivostok,
incident, and

the start of
the Chelyabinsk

the L e g i o n s 0 break with the Soviet— all began

to call for definite action on the part of the Allies, as
tension mounted

in the Russian Far East*

The Entente leaders moved desperately to obtain A m e r 
ican approval of intervention*
Supreme War Council,

At the seventh session of the

held at Abbeville on July 2, the Allies

prepared a note which was submitted to President Wil so n on

^Unterberger,
38ibia.

e>p* cit * * p. M k
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the following day*
an Allied

Lord Reading pointed out the reasons

intervention in Siberia was an imperative necess-

(l)the action of the Czechoslovaks had transformed
"the Siberian eclipse" and presented an opportunity to
seize control of this important area which might never
return; (2)the Allies were under moral obligation to
"save" the Czech o s l o v a k s , and failure to do so would
alienate the Slavs of Austria and the Balkans; (3)the
Allies were also under moral obligation to help the
"liberal and democratic" elements in Russia against
the Bolsheviks, whose power was crumbling anyhow, as
well as against the reactionaries, who hoped with Ger
man support to restore the Tsar; (4)Allied interven
tion would be a step towards restoration of the Eas t
ern Front, which was indispensable if the Allies
hoped to win the war in 1 9 1 9 1 and (5)the Japanese were
prepared to intervene if only the United States would
assent *39
The skillful interjection of the "moral oblig a t i o n " 'to^sa^e
the Czechoslovaks

in the Allied proposal finally moved the

President into accepting intervention by the Allies*
July 5»

1918,

On

President Wilson consented to American parti

cipation in a limited Allied action in Siberia for the pur
pose of supporting the withdrawal of the Czechs * ^
lowing day at a White House Conference,

The fol

called to discuss

the Russian situation, Lansing made the following memorandums
• ••That'the present situation of the Czechoslovaks
requires this Government and other Governments to make
an effort to aid those at Vladivostok in forming a junc-

39Mamatey, .op* c i t •* p. 289s quoting from For, R e i s .
of U. S., 1918 . R u s s i a • II, pp* 241-48; C f *, Bunyan, op* c i t •*

P. 10?*
^ O p p r * R e i s • of U 0 S * •■ 1 9 1 8 , R u s s i a « II, pp* 241-43;
Stewart, qq* c i t * * p* 114*'
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tlon with their compatriots in Western Siberia; and that
this Government on sentimental grounds and because of
the effect upon the friendly Slavs everywhere would be
subject to criticism if it did not make this effort and
would doubtless be held responsible if they were def eat 
ed by lack of such sup port .^1
The memorandum continued that because the United
States would be unable to provide any considerable number of
troops within a short time,

that the Japanese should furnish

small arms and ammunition to the Czechoslovaks,

with the

United States to share expenses and supplement the supplies
as soon as p o s s i b l e *^2

Those attending the conference which

established the program of the joint intervention wereiPresl*
dent Wilson;

Secretary of State Lansing; Newton D. Baker,

Secretary of W a r; Josephus Daniels,
General March,

Secretary of the Navy;

Chief of Staff, and Admiral William S* B e n 

son, dhief of Naval Operations*

Although this group was not

in complete accord concerning the a d v e n t u r e , ^

the United

States was committed to participate*
The American proposal for a joint expedition to
Siberia for the purpose of assisting the eastward movement
of the Czechoslovak Legions was formally submitted to the
Terauchi Cabinet of Japan for deliberation on July 12*

The

Japanese decided not only to accept the American proposal,

^ ^ F o r , R e i s « of U* S .t 1 9 1 8 . R u s s i a . II, p. 263*

^Ibld.
^3unterberger, op. cit., p. 70.
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but also to dispatch an 11independent expedition"
initiative*^

on its own

This was the Invitation that Japan had been

awaiting, as military elements of the Island Empire had made
expansion one of the primary objectives of Japanese go vern
ment and society*

John Albert White sums up the situation

well in the following statements
Ja pan wanted to Intervene at the time of the Chinese
Revolution in 1911, stating that the continuation of
hostilities in China might make it necessary for her to
intervene*
Finding the Powers unreceptive to a sole
Intervention, however, she next proposed a joint inter
vention, first with Great Britain and then jointly
with Great Britain and the United States*
The inter
vention as proposed did not, of course, take place*
But it is interesting to notice that within a mere six
years, these almost Identical conditions prevailed and
would be followed by the same proposals from Japan*
On this- occasion, however, the revolution occurred in
Russia and the fact that the world was at war made it
possible for Japan to obtain consent to the interven
tion she desired*^?
The basic Ame ri can position in regard to the inter
vention was outlined

in an Aide M e m o i r e * dispatched to the

Allied Governments on July 17, and given to General William
S * Graves,

the American Commander of the expeditionary

forces to

Siberia*

volved around
1.

Briefly,

the United States policy re

the following points?

Military ac tion is admissable in Russia, as the

^ T a t u s u j i Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese
Empire (Garden City?
Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc*,
1 9 3 5 ) 9 P« 2 0 5 | Chitoshi Y a n a g a , Japan Since P e r r y . (New Yorks
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc*, 1949), pp« 364-56*
^5white, qq* cit • *. p. 67#
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Government of the United States sees the circumstance*©;*;,
only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces
and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic
kinsmen*
2*
To steady any efforts at self-government or selfdefense in which the Russians themselves may be willing
to accept assistance*

3 * To guard military stores which may subsequently
be needed by Russian forces in the organization of their
own self-defense*
4*
This policy is not Intended as a criticism of
the activities in which any other government might see
fit to engage*
5*
Solemn assurance is given to Russia that It was
not contemplated that the intervention should involve
"any interference of any kind with the political
sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal
affairs, gr any impairment of her territorial integ
rity* , * "^6
It was in the matter of assignment of troops that the
basic differences between the American and Japanese Gov ern 
ments came to light.

Originally the joint agreement had been

to send seven thousand troops from each nation to assist the
Czechoslovak Legions*
ted States,

The Japanese soon stated that the Un i

in sending its seven thousand men, plus two

thousand additional non- c o m b a t a n t s , had violated the a g r e e 
ment, and immediately rushed great numbers of men into the
Siberian area,

establishing a force of some seventy-two

thousand combat e f f ectives*^7

By October 18, General Graves

4 6 p o r a Reis * of U, S *, 1918 * Russia * II, pp* 287-90*
^ C h a r l e s Seymour, (arr,), The Intimate Papers of •
Colonel House (Bostons Houghton-Mifflin C o m p a n y ) , I I I , p*
416>; Russell H. Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the Far East
(New York? Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952), p* To5*

reported to the War Department that,

"Japan had at least

sixty thousand troops in Siberia and it was disclosed
that I had underest imat ed. .*by twelve thousand*

later,

There was no

military situation demanding this increase..

Wilson®s

belief that this Japanese move violated an agreement on the
number of troops to be sent to Siberia alienated him further
from that c o u n t r y .^9

Further difficulties associated with

relations between the United States,
Russians,

the Allies, and the

led him to the decision that he should disassoci

ate the United States from activities in Russia at the
earliest possible moment*

On September 2 6 , messages were

sent to the Allied Governments notifying them "with the
deepest of regret"

that the United States found it impos

sible to give them further assistance
E a s t *50

in Russia and the Far

This notification of termination of American sup

port for the intervention was dispatched
after the first American troops,
in Siberia from Manila*

just one month

the 2?th Infantry, arrived

Although anything other than nor

mal reinforcements were not to be sent to Siberia,

the Am

erican detachments were to remain in the Far East until

^ W i l l i a m S, Graves, America °s Siberian A d v e n t u r e .
1918-1920 (New Yorks Peter Smith, 1931)$ P* 6^*
^9Roy Watson Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern
P o l i c y , 1913- 1921 (New Yorks
Bookman Associates, 1957)$
p* 24B*
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April 1, 1920o
vague

Through

strict compliance with the rather

instructions of the Aide M e m o i r e „ they were to act as

a steadying force in the maelstrom, which was Siberia.
Mo other foreign representatives in Siberia were held
to such definite instructions as were the American forces.
From the standpoint of active intervention in Russian a f 
fairs in which the mood and enthusiasm of the moment car
ried the French, the British and the Japanese a long way,
General Graves' instructions were a handicap and won for
him and the American military mi I little unpo pul ari ty.51
To the Japanese,

the British and the French,

the "Aide

Memoire was but a scrap of paper containing an idealist's
dream,

to be torn and scattered to the four w i n d s * "5 2

American military author later wrote,

As an

this was not to be

done:
But in Siberia this flouted paper was bound in a
steel frame*
Major General William S. Graves, U. S.
Military Academy, '89» who first saw service on the
western plains * . .was not a man to be h o o d w i n k e d .53
Graves was determined not to become involved

in Russia's in

ternal affairs and relationships between the United States
and Japan could not be easy under these conditions.
dition,

the fact that the Japanese had incurred

In ad 

the dis

pleasure of the American President did not deter them from

51 Stewart,

oj). c i t .. p. .138 j C f . , Kennan,

Historic^

5 2 R. Ernest Dupuy, Perish by the Sword * The Czechoslo
vaki an Anabasis and Our Supporting Campaigns in North Bu ss i a . 1918- 192Q (Harrisburg, P a . 5 The Military Service P u b 
lishing Co., 1939), p. 213.
5 3 i b i a .. p. 2 U w

following their established policy*

The Bolshevik Revolu

tion with the consequent civil war and chaos offered them a
chance to establish a Japanese sphere of influence over the
Maritime Province, Siberia,

For the Bolsheviks,

North Manchuria and all of Mon-

intervention was another imperi

alist venture and the Soviet did not wish any part of it.
In response to earlier Allied landings at Murmansk and Arch 
angel in North Russia, 55 Vladimir Lenin (President of the
Soviet of People's Commissars) and Trotsky stated the
Bolshevik position clearly and bluntly:
English landings must be considered an inimical act
against the Republic.
Their direct aim is to unite
with the Czechoslovaks and, in the case of success,
with the Japanese, in order to overthrow the power of
the workers and peasants and to establish a dictator
ship of bourgeoisie.
We have ordered the dispatch of
troops necessary for the defense of the Murmansk rail
way against the vio lators« ...All assistance, direct or
indirect, to the Intervening violators will be re
garded as state treason and will be punished accord 
ing to military l a w *56
Following the Allied landings at Vladivostok, Trotsky,
on August 23 s again blasted at the Intervent ion,
an interview translated from Izvestla

saying in

(one of the leading

5 ^ A l l e n S. Wh it in g, Soviet Po l i c i e s in China, 19171924 (New York: C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 5 4 ) , p. 133*
55L e o n i d I* S t r a k b o v s k y , The Origins of A m e r i c a n In
t e r v e n t i o n in North R u ss ia (1 9 1 8 ). (Princeton: P r i n c e t o n
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 193?)•
Full ac c o u n t of this ex pe dition*

5 6 i b i d . *■ p. 5 8 .

Bolshevik newspapers)
According to the American statement
the Aide Mem
oirs |, the intervention of the Allies is for the purpogeHof assisting the Czechoslovaks against the Ger
man and Austro-Hungarian war prisoners who are at
tacking them*
The participation of these prisoners in
the struggle against the Czechoslovaks is the most
monstrous invention, as is the Japanese statement
about the threat to the Siberian road from the
Germans *57
Adding to the confusion in Russia and Siberia were
the White Russian forces and the other ant1-Reds, not neces
sarily favorable to the Czar and the Imperial cause,.
relationships which developed between these groups,

The
the Al

lied interve nti oni sts , and the Legions created a fluid situ
ation,

constantly changing as the tides of war ebbed and

flowed•
The Legions,

meanwhile,

the center of this great

power struggle, were almost totally disregarded as the major
Powers attempted to push through their particular projects.
On June 25®

shortly before the American decision to call for

a joint intervention,

Czechoslovak commanders in Vladivostok

made a momentous decision,
the conflict*

casting the Legions directly into

About fourteen thousand Czechoslovaks had

made the journey overland to Vladivostok and were waiting
transportation to take them to France.

On learning that the

Bolsheviks had cut their lines of communication along the
Trans-Siberian Railway,

they decided to move westward to ef-

feet a juncture with their comrades, now ringed about by the
Bolsheviks.3®
Representatives of the Legions in Vladivostok ap**
proached Admiral Austin M. Knight, Flag officer of the U,S®.S
B r o o k l y n . based at the Siberian port, and the Admiral states
that the following was among the questions they asked?
If they
Czechs
remain in Russia to fight on a new
Eastern Front they ask to be informed minimum [whether!
this force will be accepted by the Allies as the equi
valent of fighting on the Western Front and as entitling
them to same consideration when terms of peace are fin
ally agreed upon, as if they had proceeded to the W e s t 
ern Front in accordance with their original agreement
with the French g o v e r n m e n t .59
The decision of the Czechoslovaks on the spot was to
remain and try to liberate their countrymen from the depths
of European Hussia and Western Siberia®

The Czechoslovak

National Council and Masaryk in the United States,

out of

direct touch with the Legions, were forced to agree, albeit
reluctantly,
trol*
goal,

to conditions over which they had little con

With Independence of Czechoslovakia as their primary
J'they were compelled to abstain from any adverse

criticism of the use that the Great Powers contemplated for
their eastern a r m y .11^

The die was east, and the Czechoslo-

ey, o p . cit., p. 288.
59 f o t . Eels,

of U. S., 1 9 1 8 . B u s s l a . II, p. 230.

•I

6 °Felix John Vondracek, The Foreign Policy of Czecho<
S l o v a k i a . 1918- 19 3<> (New Yorks Columbia University Press,

v a k s , remaining in Russia and Siberia, were deeply involved
in action there, as Stewart points outs
Eager to win favor with France, England and America,
the L e g i o n s ••.remained, a provocation to the Reds and
an Irritation to many Whites.
Their presence was the
cause of much .suffering on their own part.- and no little
blood-shed during the winter of 1918-19*

^ S t e w a r t , .o]D. c i t . * p. 1 1 5

CHAPTER VII
THE ANABASIS TO VLADIVOSTOK S

ON THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

Following the Congress at Chelyabinsk,

the Czechoslo

vak leaders returned to their units on May 2^, agreed among
themselves to 11shoot their way throu gh” to Vladivostok,
should

such a course become necessary.

The Legions were to

begin their push toward the Far Eastern port immediately and
were to prepare for any eventua lity.^

At this time the

Legions were spread all the way from Penza, a city west of
the Volga in European Russia,
ern coast of Siberia*

to Vladivostok,

on the east

General Mikhail Dietrichs

mer C z ^ r 1 st and Provisional armies

of the for

(be had been Chief of

Staff to General Nikolai Dukbonin, acting Russian CommanderIn-Chief in 1917) led the first echelons of about twelve
thousand men from Penza to Vladivostok, arriving there in
early May,

1918*

There they waited for the balance of the

force to join them,

fully expecting that the Entente Powers

would provide the shipping necessary to transport them to
the Western F r o n t .
On May 2 5 , Leon Trotsky,

Soviet Commissar for War,

is-

■^George F* Kennan, Soviet-American Relations * 19171920 (Princeton University Press, 19585, II, p. 152.
(Cited
hereafter as Kennan, Soviet-American R elat i o n s ); George
Stewart, (The White Armies of R u s s i a „ A Chronicle of CounterRevolution andAllied Intervention (New York 1 The Macmillan
C o m p a n y , 1933)? P* 1-Q^#
’
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sued an order requiring the disarming of the Legions, brin g
ing about the first serious clash between the Bolsheviks and
Czechoslovaks on the same day, at the little railway town of
M a r i a n o v k a , west of Omsk.

The Reds were defeated and from

this time on the Legions deployed along the railway line, be 
gan to take matters into their own hands,
great success.

initially with

Kennan r e p o r t s i

• •■♦in' the course of the fortnight following Sunday,
May 2 6 , the greater portion of the stretch of the rail
way from a point west of Samara, on the Volga, to one
somewhat west of Irkutsk— a distance of about 2,500
m ile s— was wrested from Bolshevik hands either by Czech
forces strung out along the railway or by anti-c omm un
ist Russian groups who took advantage of the Czech action
to seize points independently and to set up a new civil
a u t h o r i t y .2
The success of the Czechoslovaks along the T r a n s - S i 
berian reads like a railroad time schedules
binsk o c c u p i e d ;

May 2 7, Chelya

May 29, Penza occupied 3 May 31, Tomsk; June

6-7, Omsk; June 8 , Samara; June 19, Krasnoyarsk.3
the line, and a number of its branches,
wrested

All along

the Czechoslovaks

control of the area from the Soviets in Siberia and

the Volga region.
The American Consul General at Irkutsk, Ernest L.
Harris,

innocently was the cause of one of the greatest

stumbling blocks for the Legions in their drive along the

2 Kennan, Soviet-American R e l a t i o n s . II, p . .277#
3Dr. Eduard B e n e s , My War M e m o i r s , (Trans.), Paul
Selver (Boston and New Yorks
Hougbton-Mifflin Company,
1926 ), pp. 366 - 68 .

Trans-Siberian.

Harris bad arrived at Irkutsk on May 23 and

was just getting settled

into his new position (he had been

manager of the Petrograd

office of the National City Bank of

New York) when the uprising began, and he was unaware of the
scope of the activity connected with the Czechoslovak u p r i s 
ing.

While at the Irkutsk station on May 26, he watched a

detachment of the local Red Guards attempt to stop and dis
ar m a train taking Czechoslovaks to Vladivostok.

The Sov

iet attack was brushed aside by the Legionaries and the
train continued toward its destination.

The next day, a n 

other Soviet-Le gio n incident developed west of the city,
and Harris, assisted by the French Consul General, M. Bourgois, and Deputy Agent Geitzman,
for Foreign Affairs at Irkutsk,

of the Moscow Commissariat
mediated with the conflict

ing groups and persuaded

the Czechoslovaks to continue their

trip to the e a s t T h e s e

two trains of Legionaries had been

designated as the units to capture Irkutsk in the Czechoslo
vak plan to gain control of the Trans-Siberian Railway which
represented the only means by which they could move through
to the ports of the Far East.

When he heard the details of

the incident at Irkutsk, Gajda,
...was f u r i o u s .*.told Americans if ever he caught up
with the officers of these first trains he would have

^Kennan, Soviet-American Relations« II, pp. 283~34.
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them court-martialed for accepting the mediation and
consenting to p r o c e e d .3
Because these Legionaries had moved from the area, by-p ass 
ing their objective,

the Soviets were able to control Irkutsk

until July 11, and only surrendered the city after undergo
ing a prolonged attack begun on June 21.

Even Colonel George

H. Emerson, an American railroad specialist making a tour of
inspection of the railway and

its facilities,

entered into

negotiations to compose Czechoslovak-Soviet differences,
ceeding in several instances.

suc

Emerson helped ward off a

major engagement at Marinsk at the time of the uprising,

by

talking the Czechoslovaks into proceeding eastward to Vladi
vostok. ^

By June 8 , however,

Consul General Harris dete r

mined that the Czech uprising had developed

into a civil war,

and that he and other Americans would have to drop efforts at
their mediation, as he now considered them a definite inter
ference in Russian internal affairs,? and he returned to his
post at Irkutsk.
The large Czechoslovak contingent

in Vladivostok

5 Ibid., p. 286; C f •, William S. Graves, A m e r i c a 1
1s Si
berian Adventure, 1918- 1920 (New Yorks Jonathan Cape & Har
rison Smith, 1931)? P* W .
^Graves, pp. pit., pp. 37 -^ 0 ; Betty Miller UnterbergA m e r i c a 1s Siberian E x p e d i t i o n . 1918-1920 3 A Study of
National Policy (Durham, N, C .t Duke University Press, 1956 ),
pp. 58-59*
7iCennan, Soviet-American Relations . II, p. 290.

(some fourteen thousand men) was not
early stages of the uprising.

involved during the

On June 25? however,

the com

manders of the Legions there reached a decision to retrace
their steps along the railway line in an effort to help 11 V

v

berate the eight thousand Czechoslovaks under General Cecek
in the Volga area.

On June 29? after a three-hour conflict

with local Soviet troops,

the Legions took control of V l adi

vostok® in order to assure protection of their base and, a
few days later,

the movement back to the west was begun.

Within hours of the Legions®

uprising in Vladivostok,

Allied powers. Great Britain, Japan,
States

the

China and the United

landed detachments of troops and the occupation was

given official sanction.^
return westward,

At the time of the decision to

General <5ec£ek and his forces had gained

complete possession of the railway centers in the Volga re 
gion.

Simultaneously,

General Gajda had captured Ekaterln-

berg to the northeast, and had swept down another line of
the railway toward Omsk.

The Red Guards,

Legions, were ex-soldiers,

® U n t e rberger, pp.

opposing the

for the most part, with some units

c i t .. p. 57*

^Department of State, Papers R e l a t Ins to the Foreign
Relations of the United S t a t e s . 1 9 1 8 « Supplement I I « Russia
(Washingtons Government Printing office, 1931), I, p. 235.
(Cited Hereafter as For. R e i s . of TJ. S,. ,■ 1 9 1 8 . R u s s i a ).
l°Henry Baerlein, The March of the Seventy Thousand
(Londons Leonard Parsons, Ltd., 1926T, p. 136 +
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"entirely composed of German and Magyar volunteers,

the G e r 

man officers in command being a n x i o u s ...to hinder the Czechs
from setting out for the front in F r a n c e " •

The success of

the Czechoslovak offensive threatened the existence of the
Soviet Government by loosening its control on the Volga,

the

Urals and all of Siberia, and these areas became the centers
of various White or anti-Bolshevik mo vem e n t s #^2

One writer

reportsi
.• .everywhere the anti-Bolshevik elements of the
pop ulation rallied to the Czechs and began to establish
democratic governments.
The Siberian atmosphere was
wholly different from that of European Russia, and the
anti-Bolsheviks were very far from being in sympathy
with the old Tsarist regime.13
Among the many anti-Communist political groups opposing the
Soviets

in Russia and Siberia,

the Czechoslovaks were most

closely associated with the Social Revolutionary Party*
litically,

Po

this group was formed of people very similar to

the Czechoslovaks themselves,

representing the farmers coop

eratives and the middle-class elements of Siberian society.
Centers of the Social Revolutionary activity were at Samara
on the Volga,

in Russia proper, and in the Omsk-Novo-Niko-

layevsk area of Siberia, where the Social Revolutionaries

11 I b i d .. p. 147.
^ F e l i x John Vondraeek, The Foreign Policy of CzeohoS l o v a k i a . 1918- 1935 (New Yorks Columbia University Press,
193?), PP. 119-20.
•*-3Baerleln» o p . cit,.,. p. 162.

had laid plans for revolt long before the actual uprising of
the L e g i o n s A s

Novo-Nikolayevsk was Ga j d a 's headquarters,

he at once coordinated his operations with those of the local
underground officers®
ity and,

group to overthrow the Soviet au thor

In a matter of days,

control of the entire area from

Omsk through Novo-Nikolayevsk to Krasnoyarsk,

passed

into

their h a n d s .15
Captain Gajda seized Novonlkilajevsk Qfovo-Nikolayevslcj, thereby changing the war from a purely defen
sive journey out of the country to an active offensiveoccupation and the holding of the region against the
Bolsheviks.
In this manner, this hitherto unknown cap
tain, on his own responsibility, caused international
complications of a serious n a t u r e ...Gajda played into
the hands of Great Britain and France, with the result
that the Czechoslovak authorities at Paris were forced
into acceptance of a situation entirely beyond their
control•
General Graves refers to a statement made on July 2?,
1918, by a member of the branch of the Czechoslovak National
Council at Washington,
some of the Legions®

pointing out the trend of thinking of

commanders

1

A week ago (July 20 th), Professor Masaryk received a
lengthy cable report from the leader of the Czecho-Slovak forces in which the following words are found, indi
cative of the present desires of these men; *® In my opin
ion, it is most desirable and also possible to recon
struct a Russia-Germany front in the East.
We ask for
Instructions as to whether we should leave for France or
whether we should stay here to fight in Russia by the

^Kennan,

Sovi et-American Re la t i on s . II, pp. 161-62.

15 x b i d ., p. I 6 3 .
°Vondracek,

op. c i t .» p. 119*

side of the Allies, and of R u s s i a ”. Professor Masaryk
has since then instructed the forces in Siberia to re
main there for the p r e s e n t •^7
The decision to remain in Siberia was a bitter disap
pointment for many of the Czechoslovaks, but they willingly
obeyed the instructions of Masaryk,
the Allies.

made at the request of

The Legions established

recruiting stations in

every community under their control and a general mobiliza
tion of Czechoslovaks in the region was ordered.-*-®
slovaks throughout Siberia were rallied,
drifted

"Czecho

thousands more

into the ranks as prisoner-of-war camps fell into

the D r u z i n a 11^ f Legions*?"] hands."-*-9

The total strength of

the Legions soon was brought to approximately one hundred
thousand men, which represented a sizeable force that could
be of great value to the Entente.

Benes,

commenting on an

interview In which he participated in May noted,

"Mr. B a l 

four, who, as an Englishman, appreciated plain facts, was
particularly impressed by my reference to the hundred thou
sand volunteers fighting on the three Allied front s."20

The

^ G r a v e s , o p . c i t . . pp. 333-3iH C f ., R. B. M o w a t , A
of European D i p l o m a c y . 191^- 1925 (Londons Edward
Arnold & Co. , 19285, p. 121.
-*-®Stewart, o p . c i t .. p. 113*
^ 9 r 0 Ernest Dupuy, Perish by the S w o r d . The Czechoslo
vakian Anabasis and Our Supporting Campaigns in North R u s s i a ,
1918-1920 (H a r r i s b u r g . P a .i The M l 1itary Service Publishing
Co., 1939), P« 82.
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British and the French were to appreciate even more the
greatly enlarged Czechoslovak force which developed

in Si

beria .
Late summer and autu mn of 1918 found the Legionaries
moving on through the Urals and westward, with the months of
June, July and August devoted, primarily to uniting the scat
tered elements of the Legions.

While the Czechoslovaks were

gathering and preparing to make their supreme effort at the
request of their friends,

the Allies threw the weight of

he

their diplomatic support Into the balance against the Sov
iets.
powers,

On June 4, diplomatic representatives of the major
in a joint d e m a r c h e , confronted Georgi V. Chicherin,

Soviet Commissar for foreign Affairs,

in Moscow,

declaring

that "as the Czechoslovaks were to be regarded as a consti
tuent part of the Allied Army, any attempt to disarm them
would be treated as a hostile act against

the Allies.

Most of the Allied diplomatic contingent wanted to retain
the Czechoslovak forces in Russia and Siberia and
Paul S* Reinsch,

on June 13,

the United States Minister in China, cabled

from Peking?
It is the general opinion of Allied representatives
here, in which I concur, that it would be a serious
mistake to remove the Czecho-Slovak troops from Siberia.
With only slight countenance and support they could con
trol all of Siberia against the Germans.
They are sym

2 1 l b l d .. p. 369; C f ., Kennan, Soviet- Amerlean Rela
tions o II, pp. 306-8.

pathetic to the Russian population,
sories to the Allied c ause *.*22

eager to be a c ces

General Gajda and his units of the Legions pressed
westward,

early in August occupying the important town of

Kazan on the Volga.*

When the city fell, the Czechoslovaks

found that they also had captured the gold reserve of the
State Bank of Russia*

Later the treasure, worth millions of

rubles,, was turned over to the White Government at 0msk.23
The victory at Kazan marked the high point of the Czecho
slovak advance in the Volga region,

however, as the Reds

launched a counterattack on the city on September 5 ? with
the result that Kazan had to be evacuated five days later*
Simbirsk was lost by the Czechoslovaks
on October 8 , eight thousand weary,

on September 15, and

discouraged Legionaries

were driven out of Samara by twenty-five thousand So viets*2^
Although the Czechoslovak forces were meeting with serious
reverses in European Russia,

their position was much better

in Siberia, where their principal task, until the Armistice,
was to protect themselves and guard the railway line as their
one means of communication*
An interesting facet of Czechoslovak life during this
period was that many Legionaries lived on trains while pa-

22 F o r . Reis, ot U* S., 1 9 1 8 . R u s s i a , II, pp. 206-7*
2 ^ S t e w a r t , o p . c i t ., p. 116 ; D u p u y , o p . c i t ., p. 194.
2^ D u p u y , op. c i t ., pp. 194-95*

trolling the Trans-Siberian Bailway*
of the trains were the broneviki
by the Czechs and

Among the ears in each

(armored cars), first used

later by all the combatants.

nest Dupuy, a military student

Major B* E r 

in the United States Army, has

given a concise description of such an armored train?
This offensive vehicle, in Its original state, con
sisted of any kind of car, preferably of the gondola
type, which was re-enforced by wooden baulks and iron
plating.
Buttressed by sandbags banked along its sides
and bristling with machine guns peering through embrass u r e s , it presented a formidable, moving fortress.
Sometimes a field-piece, anchored on a concrete base,
peered from above the sides.
Ahead rolled a flat-car
loaded with rails.
Behind the broneviki came the loco
motive, and in rear of it rolled the box-ears of the
crew.
The Czechs began to use the broneviki from the
time they left Bachmach
j J u n e , 19lfi . Most famous of
the Druzina® s broneviki was the "Orlik," or "Little
Eagle," a victor of many encounters, whose name struck
terror into the hearts of Red commanders*25
The Czechoslovaks did not try to achieve their ends by
force of arms alone, as they carried with them a strong d e 
sire to inform their men of events happening within the Dual
Monarchy,

so that they could understand the reason behind

the bitter struggle in Siberia,

thousands of miles from home*

Propaganda and education had been important parts of the
Czechoslovak movement from its inception, and the Siberian
branch of the Legions, did not slight this practice*

A spe

cial unit of the Legions published the ^eskoslovensky Denik
(Czechoslovak Daily)
places.

First Issued

on board trains in a hundred different
in Kiev In 1918, the newspaper was

2 3 lb id . , pp. 197-98.

printed wherever its train happened
trol*

to be on its roving pa

Special editions were printed in Magyar and German so

that prisoners-of-war whose homes were in the confines of the
new state might be acquainted with conditions

there

The Czech press also printed paper money for Admiral
K o l c h a k ’s government.
The Kolchak administration dumped
bundles of old Kerensky rubles over the Red lines with
. a statement printed across their face, ’’You can have
these for notb i ngi” The Reds did likewise, turning out
bushels of forged notes which were sold by the pound. 2 ?
The turn of the fortunes of war on the Western Front
in Europe

in favor of the Allies,

the recognition of the

National Council in Paris as a government,
signing of the Armistice,
Legions

in Siberia,

followed by the

proved very heartening to the

but they still were asked to remain as a

buttress against the Communists.
The anti-Communist elements,
(Alexander) Kolchak, announced

led by Admiral Aleksandr

the formation of a Siberian

Government at Omsk, a week after the Armistice.
same titular Supreme Ruler of the country,
agement

from the French,

slovak Legions.

Kolchak be-

receiving enc ou r

the British and part of the Czecho

The latter,

headed by Gajda, represented

only a small portion of the Legions, as the majority did not
wish to support Kolchak because of his extreme reactionary
m e a s u r e s

.2®

Because of this conflict with the majority of

2 ^ S t e w a r t , o p . c i t ., p. 120.
2 7 l bid.
2®Baerlein,

ojd. c i t .. p. 222.

Ik®
his countrymen,

Gajda lost much of his following and

influ

ence in Czechoslovak actions from that time forward.2^
Kolchak was the strongest anti-Communist force in
Western Siberia, and although he called himself "Dictator *1
over all of Siberia,
well-established.

his Influence in the Far East was never

Indeed,

in no area of the vast country did

he have the full .support of the Russian peoples
treme reactionaries,

he was a liberal;

he seemed too reactionary*

to the ex

to the middle classes

The peasants and poorer classes

did not enter into his consideration at a ll.30

Lieutenant

General Dmitri L* Horvath was Kolchak's deputy in the Far
East and called himself the 11supreme representative of the
Kolchak Government,"

indicating the nature of his concept of

the government required to establish order in Siberia.
vath had chosen as his military commander,

Hor

Major General

Pavel Pavlovic Iva no v-Ri nov , an extreme reactionary, who
terrorized and pillaged villages throughout Eastern Siberia.
Although nominally under General Horvath as Kolchak's repre
sentative,

Ivanov-Rinov actually acknowledged no superior,

and conducted his rapacious actions at will.

Further compli

cating the anti-Bolshevik cause in the Far East were two
other unsavory,

completely undisciplined characters, Ataman

(Cossack Chief) Gregorii Semenov and Ataman Ivan K a l m i k o v ,

29Q raves,

ojd.

3°Unterberger,

c i t . * pp.

1 1 3 -1 6 .

o p . c i t .* pp. 118-19.

14-1
wh o used the unsettled conditions of the time to their own
advantage*

Both were supported

by the Japanese who acknow

ledged no responsibility for their actions,
less and disruptive they might be*3^

however merci

General Graves,

the

highly disciplined graduate of the United States Military
Academy and commander of America's Siberian forces,
many conflicts with these unprincipled

"leaders"

had

in the d i s 

charge of his duties and aptly described them as follows;
"Kalmikoff murdered with his own hands, where Semeonoff or
dered others to k i l l * A l t h o u g h

supposedly accepting the

leadership of Kolchak, Semenov did his utmost to disrupt any
stabilizing tendencies which the Omsk Government might have*
Prom the beginning,

the intentions of the Japanese,

as represented by their support
Chiefs,

of the lawless Cossack

seemed clear to General Graves and his staff:

• ••■their leaders intrigued for political influence in
the c o u n t r y , and the lesser ranks meddled in local a f 
fairs* •*treated the local population with a high-hand
edness and even with a brutality explainable only by
the assumption that they smarted with resentment at the
attitude of superiority which the Russians had formerly
assumed towards t h e m * •*33
In the pay of the Ja pa nese— who were not at all de
sirous of having the Si berian situation clear up, unless it

31Ibld.
^^Graves,

0£. c i t . . p. 9 1 .

3 3 "The Situation In the Far East," Foreign A f f a i r s . I
(June 15, 1925), 23.

was to their advantage--Semenov conducted

independent oper a

tions in the Par East, as often against the Omsk Government
as against the Bolsheviks*

"The Red Terror in Russia was met

by a White Terror of equal brutality in Siberia," Stewart
points out,

saying that the "deeds of the two White chief

tains, Atamans Semyonov and Kalmykof, would have done credit
to Genghis Khan*"-^

Semenov was by far the more powerful of

the two, and was able to increase the strength of his army
from a handful of the worst dregs of humanity,

until at one

time he commanded more than sixty-thousand men*

While out

wardly declaring that they were on the side of the Czecho
slovaks, Semenov and his Cossacks did everything possible to
cause friction within the Legions, and occasionally the
Czechoslovaks had to fight them as well as the Bolsheviks to
continue their normal duties of guarding sections of the
railway *35
In Western Siberia where he had his seat of govern
ment at Omsk, Kolchak surrounded

himself with a staff, most

of whom were of the "worst class of ruthless,

corrupt and

self-centered ex-Czarists coming from both soldiers and
bureaucrats,"

Dupuy s t a t e s * ^

^Stewart,
35saerlein,
pp* 30 ^- 5 *
3^Dupuy,

"* *.His actions and those of

ojd. cit * * p* 125 *
o p * c i t .* pp* 1 7 7 - 7 8 ; Graves,

o&* c i t *, p* 207 *

o p . cit**

his staff alienated

the C z e c h s •...The Kolchak government in

addition alienated the entire Siberian p e o p l e ." 37

Kolchak

perhaps believed that with the help of the Allies he could
hold off the Bolsheviks

in the Trans-Baikal region,

"But

the Czechs were demoralized, anxious to get home, and com
pletely disillusioned about the character of the Admiral's

9C a u s e '* "38
Despite this many problems associated with American
participation in Siberia,

the intervention received

"consi

derable public support in the United States,"^9 and during
the summer the newspapers carried many stories of the p r o 
gress of the Czechoslovak Legion's across Siberia*
Legions

The

"became a symbol of both the romantic and the heroic*

In fact for most Americans the -Czechoslovaks as a people ex
isted only through the army in Siberia*

Kerner points

out that "Many Americans could not pronounce their name nor
visualize a location for them,

it!

yet the popular press

3 7I b l d .
3 ®Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World A f f a i r s . A History of Relations Between the Soviet Union and the Rest of
the World, 1917-1929 ( P r i n c e t o m Princeton University Press,
1 9 5 1 ) > p7 212*
39<phomas A* Bailey, America Paces R u s s i a , Russian-American Relations from Earl.y~l£imes to Our Day (Ithaca* New
Yorks Cornell University Press, 1 9 5 0 ) s P*
^ R o b e r t Joseph Kerner (ed*), Czechoslovakia 1 Twenty
Years of Independence (Berkeley and Los Angeles s University
of California P r e s s , 19^0), p* 80*
^Ibld.

called for added support for the Legions, as advocated
this article,

in

typical of the times:

The first thing that must be done is to reach the
Czechoslovak forces which have been so ably fighting
the Teutonic-Bolshevik regime for the past several
m o n t h s * ..Here is a strong force with which we can co
operate, so that to reach it must be our first s t e p *^2
Despite the fact that he had been sent to Siberia "to
help the Czecho-Slovaks" and "steady efforts at self-govern
ment or self-defense in which the Russians may be willing to
accept assistance," General Graves had very little opportun
ity to achieve either goal, bound as he was by the Aide Memo i r e . and thoroughly disgruntled with the activities of all
the forces at work in Siberia*

Bailey has expressed the

reaction of the various factions to this apparent disassociation of the Americans from the problem at h a n d , as follows:
The Reds were angry because we were indirectly help
ing their e n e m i e s ; the Whites were bitter because we did
not help enough; the Allies were displeased because we
had such limited objectives; and the Japanese were sus
picious because we so obviously were trying to hamper
their a m b i t i o n s . Actually by opposing Japanese designs
we were promoting the territorial integrity of Russia* 3
Following the signing of the Versailles Treaty in J u n e , 1919,
the intervent ion seemed to make little sense to the American
military forces and to the American public at l a r g e . ^

How-

• B* Gardiner, "Our Military Problem in Russia,"
The W o r l d 1s W o r k , XXXVI (October, 1918), 603 *
^Bailey,

o p . c l t *, p. 2 ^ 5 •

^ P a u l i n e T o m p k i n s , Amer ica n-Russian Relations in. the
Far East (New York: The Macmillan Company, 19^9), p. 137*

ever, political and diplomatic reasons kept American troops
there until an, official American note was sent to the J a p a n 
ese Government on January 9, 1920 , giving the United S t a t e s 1
decision to evacuate Siberia.^5

After months of almost

ceaseless bickering with the Kolchak Government and
Allies,
docks

the

the last American contingent pulled away from the

of Vladivostok on April 1 , 1920

band, played the popular tune,
MoreMeanwhile,

w hiie a Japanese

"Hard ^imes c ome Again Mo

the Czechoslovaks, also caught

in the

middle of the power squeeze, had concluded the Treaty of
Kujtun, |"~February 7, 1920 ~| with the Soviets,

under which the

Legions were to be permitted free passage from Siberia.
On the day the Treaty was signed, Admiral Kolchak,

lift

the

"Supreme R u l e r " , was tried by a Revolutionary Tribunal and
shot

The abortive Omsk Government,

to the demands of the times, was ended.

not able to face up
Nearly all of the

Czechoslovaks were repatriated between April and November,
1920, mainly in Japanese ships,

many of which they chartered

^ D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United S t a t e s . 1920 (Washingtons Govern
ment Printing Office, 1 9 3 6 5 , II, pp. 2 0 6 - 7 .
^Graves,

0£. c l t .■. p. 3 2 6 .

^?Roy Watson Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern
P o l i c y . 1913- 1 9 2 1 . (New Xorks Bookman Associates, 1947),
p. 2 4 7 .
Vondracek,

oj>. c i t .. p. 136*

1^6
and paid for themselves,

and in others which were chartered

through the American Red Cross.

”One of the last transports

was carried to Europe on board the first Czechoslovak ship
L e g i e . bought by the Legionaries* Bank in Vladivo sto k.’'5°
No body of troops in the Russian Civil War had shown
such resolution and unity as the legionnaires.
A hun
ger for independence which had been frustrated since
the battle of Biia Hora in 1620 buoyed them up many
times when events threatened to drown them in the morass
of politics and blood-shed*
The knowledge that they
were creating a sentiment which would determine the atti
tude of powerful nations toward their new state laid
upon them a sense of responsibility unshared by many
thousands in other a r m i e s .51
With the sailing of the Americans,

many of the Czecho

slovaks, and the other Allied forces, the field was left to
Japan.

As early as March 31,

the Japanese Government,

claiming any ambitions in Russia, noted
to withdraw its forces,

dis

that it was unable

stating that?

As soon as the political conditions in the territor
ies adjacent to our country settle down, as soon as the
menace to Manchuria and Chosen has been removed, the
safety of the lives and property of communications guar
anteed , we hereby reaffirm our pledge that the Empire
will evacuate Siberia, provided the Czecho-Slovaks have
been completely withdrawn.52
As noted above,

the last of the Legions sailed from

Vladivostok in November,

1920, yet Japanese expansionists,

following their desire to increase their industrial and ter-

5°Baerlein, pp. c i t ., pp. 275-79*
5 1 s t e w a r t , op. c i t . , pp. 12^ - 2 5 •
52£or.

B e l s . .of TJ. S.,, 1 9 2 0 . Ill, p. 5 0 5 ,

ritorial empire,

continued the intervention until October

1922 , when their withdrawal was arranged as part of the
agreements stemming from the Washington Conferenee.53

53curry, pp. .cit., p. 2^7.

CHAPTER VIII
FREEDOM AT LAST:

A NEW NATION IS CREATED

As the Czechoslovak Legions gained world-wide acclaim
for their successful exploits in Russia and Siberia,
Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated rapidly,

the

reeling under

the military blows of the advancing Entente forces, and
feeling more and more the pressure put upon it by national
istic elements at home.

The Dual Monarchy,

likewise,

con

tinued to fare badly on the diplomatic front and suffered a
telling blow when the United States Government

recognized

the Czechoslovak Nation officially in early September,
For the first time the term,

1918 .

11“actual G o v e r n m e n t 1 was unre-

I

servedly applied to the National Council in a solemn com
mitment by a state so important as A m e r i c a , ” Ben e¥ points
out•

The recognition accorded by the United States was

of a unique character in the history of international rela
tions,

Fenwick reported

R e v i e w » later that year.

in the American Political Science
His concise resume’ of the practi

cal politics of recognition,of particular interest to stu-

^ r . Eduard Benel, My War M e m o i r s . (Trans.), Paul
Selver (Boston and New Yorks Hougbton-Mifflin Company, 1928),
p. 4l7l.Cf., Thomas Capek, Jr., Origins of the Czechoslovak
State (tTTew Yor£T] The Revell Press, 192^7, pp. 83-84; De«=
partment of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United S t a t e s . 1 9 1 8 « Russia W a s h i n g t o n ? Government
Printing Office, 1931)» T> pp. 824-25, (cited hereafter as
F o r . R e i s . of U. S . , 1 9 1 8 » R u s s i a ).

dents of this period,

follows,

in part:

The traditional rule of international law has been
that a new nation will be recognized by the existing
members of the family of nations only when, after suc
cessful revolution against the state of which it fo r
merly was a part, it has given evidence of its ability
to maintain itself.
In most cases the new community is
recognized as a de facto belligerent before its final
recognition as a (2® jure state is accorded.
In every
instance the claimant for international recognition
must have obtained possession of definite territory and
must have organized a government capable of giving ex
pression to the will of its people.
But in the case of
recognition of the Czechoslovak Nation, these conditions
have not been fulfilled.
In the first place, recogni
tion has been accorded, not to a government established
in the territory inhabited by the Czechoslovak people,
but to a N a t i o n a l Council with headquarters in Washington [jicu . Moreover, the new state can hardly be said
to have at; present a de, facto existence.
Its active
supporters are to be found among the groups of Czecho
slovaks in Siberia and in the states of the Entente
A l l i e s .. ..The National Council is therefore, an absentee
government in command of a number of distinct armies
fighting against the nation of which their territory is
still a de, facto part and to which their brethern in
Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia are still rendering a for
mal a l l e g i a n c e .2
The American recognition,

thus, went further than

that ; accorded by the other Allied Governments. And the Am
erican people,

"whose interest

in the Siberian adventure had

given the impetus to the adoption of this measure, approved
it whol eheartedly," Mamatey s t a t e s .3

^Charles G. Fenwick, "Notes on International Affairs,"
American Political Science B e v l e w . XII (November, 1918),
pp • 715 -l£>.
3victor S. M a m a t e y , The United States and East Cen
tral E u r o p e . 191 ^ - 1 9 1 8 1 A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and
Propaganda (Princeton: P'rinceton University P r e s s , 19 kb ],
p • 3T O «

Believing that the end was near for the Dual Monarchy
and fearing that a successful Austro-Hungarian peace offer
might rob them of their hard-earned
vak National Council in Paris,

successes,

the Czechoslo

on October 14, announced the

formation of the Czechoslovak Provisional Government, with
Dr. Masaryk as President; Eduard B e n e s , Minister of Foreign
Affairs, and Milan Stefanik, Minister of War

The National

Council based its action on the successive recognitions by
the Governments of the United States, France and

Italy, and

on the statement made by Deputy FrantiHek Stanek in the
Relchsrat on October 2, in which the National Council was
given a mandate to speak for the Czechoslovak peoples at
h o m e , as well as on the Czech withdrawal from the Reichsrat
on October 9*3

While Benes was announcing the formation of

the Provisional G o v e r n m e n t , Dr. Masaryk was busy in Washing
ton, drafting the Declaration of Czechoslovak Independence,
with the assistance of a group of American friends.^

Copies

t

were sent to President Wilson,

to the State Department and

to Benes in P a r i s , where it was issued over the signatures

v
Capek,

^F o r . R e i s . of U. S., 1 9 1 8 . S u p . JE, I, p. 846; C f .
op. c i t ., pp. 8^-85.
5Mamatey, pp. c i t . , pp* .330-31*

6 Ibia., p. 332.
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of Masaryk, Benes and Stefanik on October 18*7
On the same day that the Declaration was released in
P a r i s , President Wilson, addressing his reply to the Habsburg politicians

in Vienna,

Points had been promulgated,

stated that since his Fourteen
the situation had changed, and

that he no longer could answer for the Czechoslovak leaders,
on matters pertaining to the Czechoslovak lands and peoples*
This change in official position of the President

of the

United States was warmly welcomed by the emigre leaders and
caused consternation in the Dual Empire*
on record

his admiration for the

"Masaryk has put

’manly and h o n o u r a b l e ’ way

in which Wilson revised his original views,

especially with

regard to Austria-Hungary...", Seton-Watson has written*®
Masaryk also noted the effect of the P r e s i d e n t ’s position on
the leaders of the Dual Monarchy:
German and Austrian writers, military as well as poli
tical, agree that President W i l s o n ’s answer on October 18,
to A u s t r i a ’s offer of peace, sealed her fate and settled
likewise the question of our freedom.
Both personally
and as the representative of the United States, Wilson
had become a great moral and political figure in Europe.°

?Capek, op. c i t . *■ pp. 9 1 - 9 5 1 F o r . R e i s . of U. S.,
S u p . I, I, 847-¥8; Hon*Charles Pergler, "An Experiment in
Progressive Government, the Czechoslovak Republic,," The Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
LXXXIV (July, 1919), "58-33*
®R. W* Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (New Yorks
The Macmillan Company, 19^+3) *
H3»
(Cited hereafter as
Masaryk in E n g l a n d )«
^Dr. Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a S t a t e .
Memories B and Observations (New York: Frederick A. Stokes
Company, 192?)* p. 293«
Ccited hereafter as Masaryk, Making
of a S t a t e )•

The carefully planned propaganda campaign,

conducted

by Masaryk and the National Council, received another "spec
tacular"

boost on October 26, when Professor Masaryk read

the joint declaration of the "Mid-European Democratic Union"
at Independence Hall in Philadelphia.

The Union represented

most of the oppressed peoples of Austria-Hungary, and while
not In agreement on all matters of policy,

their united

stand at this time produced very favorable public response.
Masaryk read the declaration,

"while the Bell of Independ

ence was rung in accordance with historical precedent*
proceedings were thoroughly

The

®American®," Masaryk later wrote,

"but they were sincerely meant and were s u c c e s s f u l . T h a t
the proceedings were thoroughly "American",
this account published

is borne out by

in a popular periodical of the days

Following the signing, Professor Masaryk read the
declaration to thousands of persons gathered in Inde
pendence Square*
As he finished, a second Liberty Bell,
cast in the model of the first and paid for by children
of the oppressed nationalities in this country, rang
out its twentieth century defiance to the autocracy of
Austria-Hungary
O k ’ this same day, a number of delegates,

representing the

Czech National Committee at Prague,

gathered in Geneva to

meet with Benes and Stephen Osusky,

representing the Czecho

slovak Provisional Government at Paris,

recognized by the

IQ l b i d . * p. 255 *
H " T h e New Declaration of Independence Under the Old
Liberty Cupola," The Survey * XLI, No. k (November 2, 1918),
115.
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Allies.

Among those making the trip to Switzerland were

Dr. Kramar, Vaclav Klofac, Frantisek £>tanek and others, mem
bers of the "Mafffla" and similar resistance groups, who had
served as connecting links between the people with in the E m 
pire and the Czechoslovak National Council abroad.

There

was full agreement between the two groups, and while the his
toric meeting was in progress, a bloodless revolution took
place in Prague, with the remaining members of the National
Committee,

there, proclaiming the deposition of Emperor

Charles as King of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia,
and the establishment of a free and United Republic of
Czechoslovakia.^
V,

/

The revolutionaries at home,

v

y

led by Alois
V

/

/

Has i n , Antonin S v e h l a , Frantisek Soukup and Mgr. Strlbrny,
took over the government

in Prague, and

"itianoeuvered the

Austrian military authorities into a capitulation on Octo
ber 30 th...
The Slovakian leaders added their contribution to the
Czechoslovak cause late in the war and

on October 30, at

Turciansky Sv. Martin, agreed to form part of the new state.
The proclamation issued at that time severed all connections

12H. W. V. Temperley, (ed.), A History of the Peace
Conference of Paris (Londons Henry Frowde, Hodder & Stough
ton, 1920-192^5, IV, pp. II 2 -II 3;; Felix John Vondracek, The
Foreign Policy of Czechosl o v a k i a . 1918-1 9 3 5 « (New Yorks C o — Oumbaa University Press, 193 7)? PP* 15-16.
^ E l i z a b e t h Wiskemann, Czechs and G e r m a n s , A Study
of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and
Moravia ( N e w Y o r k s Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 80.
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with the Hungarian Grown and firmly allied the Slovaks with
their Czech and Moravian brothers.

It read in parts

The delegates of all the Slovak political parties,
assembled on October 30, 1918, at Turciansky Sv. Martin,
and organized into a Slovak National Council as members
of the great Czechoslovak nation, affirm the right of
self“determination, a right admitted by the entire world.
The National Council declares that it alone is aut ho ri 
zed to speak and act in the name of the Czechoslovak
nation living within the limits of Hungary®
« o o » • « • o . « o « a . o * o e

a o » o o . « o o «

• * * •

• » * o « • » • . « a . * * * * . . . . . .

In view of this principle, we approve the new legal in
ternational situation formulated October 18th by Presi
dent Wilson and recognized October 2 ?th by the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Aus tri a-Hungary.^
On October 31> the National Committee at Prague and
the Provisional Government at Paris merged into a single
active organization and issued the Declaration of Geneva.
Dr. Kramer headed the signers of the Declaration which
stated t
. o.we approve entirely the policy and all the military
and diplomatic action of the Czechoslovak National
Council, transformed into the Provisional Government
of the Czechoslovak Countries, now sitting in Paris,
as well as all the engagements undertaken by it, in
the name of our nation, toward the Allied and Asso cia 
ted S t a t e s . 1*
The Armistice,

ending hostilities of the Great War,

was signed on November 11, and of the new States,

Czech oslo 

vakia alone participated In the negotiations leading up to
this long-awaited event*

Bene¥ states that the selection of

the Czechoslovak State to this signal honor was founded

•^({apek, op. c i t . ® pp. 99-101.
^ I b i d ., pp. 102-4.

Complete text.
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the basis of our juridical recognition and the treaties with
the Allies which were signed before the collapse of the E m 
pire." ^

Also,

on November II, Emperor Charles announced his

withdrawal from "every participation in the administration
of the St at e , h1 7 ending the rule of the House of Habsburg,
which had been a power in Europe for more than six hundred
years.
Following the dissolution of the Empire,

Hungarian

politicians made a last unsuccessful attempt to salvage the
remains of the Magyar Kingdom, declaring themselves no
longer connected with the once-proud Dual Empire.
opinion,

Allied

however, did not approve when?

The Magyar G o v e r n m e n t , headed by Count Karolyi,
made a vain and very belated plea that the geographi
cal frontiers of Hungary should be preserved, that the
Magyars were ready to grant the complete autonomy to
Serbs, Slovaks and Rumanians comprised in those
boundaries
Ten days after the Empire was dissolved, a military conven
tion was signed between the victorious A m e s
alone.

This purely military document

and Hungary

spelled out the lines

l 6Benes, pp. pit., p. 463.
mes Brown Scott (ed»), Official Statements of
War Alms and Peace P r o p o s a l s . December 1916 to November 1918
(Washington? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1921 ), p. 4?2.
R. Savic, "A Danubian Confederation of the
F u t u r e , ” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social S c i e n c e , LXXXIV TTuly, 1919), 74-75.

behind which the Magyars were to retire until more permanent
frontiers could be determined*

"Hungary had indeed become

an independent state, but she had collapsed completely b e 
fore her conquerors and had to accept any terms which they
im pose d*"*^9

The Magyars were destined to lose their Slovak

ian holdings, along with the great

influence they once pos

sessed in Central Europe*
Within three days of the Armistice the Czechoslovak
Revolutionary National Assembly met in Prague,

in accordance

with the Geneva Agreement, and elected Masaryk President
Czechoslovakia by acclamation*

of

/v
Dr* Karel Kramar headed the

first cabinet as Premier; Dr* Eduard Bene^ was named F o r 
eign Minister, and Dr* Alois Ha^in was chosen as Minister
of Finance
One of the new P r e s i d e n t ’s first official acts,
corded in the following statement,

re

shows his concern with

keeping the Czechoslovak troops, who had done so much toward
achieving

independence for the new state,

informed co ncern

ing the political situation;
As soon as the Republic had been proclaimed at Prague
and I had been elected President on November 14, I sent
an Army Order to our troops in France, Italy, Russia and
Serbia, Informing them of the establishment of our State
and defining the task of the army*
It announced that

Drawn,"

^ H a r o l d T e m p e r l e y , "How the Hungarian Frontiers Were
Foreign A f f a i r s „ VI (April, 1928), 433*
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the Legions in Prance and Italy would shortly return
h o m e , and commanded those In Russia and Siberia to
stand by the A l l i e s .21
The first small contingents of the Legions from France
and I t a l y , as a matter of f a c t , arrived
November 1 4 ,^

In Czechoslovakia on

and were accorded a tumultuous w e l c o m e ; but

it was to be almost two years longer before the last of the
members of the war-weary Legions from Siberia were to a r 
rive in Prague, Gratz, Pilsen and elsewhere in Czechoslo
vakia to take their places in the new State and help build
the nation for which they had struggled so long.

^Masaryk

of a S t a t e « pp. 3 H - 1 2 .
o p . c i t .. p. 1 6 .

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
Although the Habsburg Empire exhibited signs of both
Internal weakness and loss of stature on the international
scene,

it enjoyed the status of a major Power in the Euro

pean family of nations prior to the outbreak of the World
War.

In the fateful year of 1914, with Franz: Joseph enter

ing the sixty-sixth year of his unprecedented reign over
Austria, and his forty-seventh year as King of Hungary,
about 5 0 ,000,000 persons,

owed him their allegiance and

made up the melange that was Aus tri a-Hungary.

Internal

pressures were beginning to give grave concern to the b u 
reaucrats charged with the responsibility for affairs of
state, and pressures were growing all along the outer per
imeters

of the Empire as Slav and Italian elements sought

to wi n greater independence for their kinsmen living w i t h 
in the borders of the Dual Monarchy,
political tie with them.
in Habsburg affairs

if not to effect a new

Yet, few foresaw any marked change

in the immediate future.

A State that

had endured for more than six hundred years as a European
Power would,

It was confidently believed by most people,

survive the minor problems of the new Twentieth Century.
Franz Joseph,

old-fashioned and anxious to maintain

Habsburg family power,

tended to resist change and supported

those moves of his officials which were designed

to preserve

the status quo and continue German-Magyar supremacy through
out the land.

The Habsburgs had always maintained their

position through adept use of the tactics of balance and
maneuver, and the statesmen were only using old methods
when they pitted one element against another,
external,

internal or

in their attempt to assure the continued

supre

macy of the two favored races that controlled the Habsburg
lands *
In the twilight of his reign,

the aged Emperor grew

increasingly determined in his policy of opposing the Slavs
who made up the major portion of the population of his
domains.

These subject races,

showing growing signs of

nationalism everywhere, groaned

under the autocratic rule

he and his ministers imposed, but were unable to gain a n y 
thing but insignifleant concessions from the Ballplatz.
Irredentism flared
repression,

in many areas of the Dual Monarchy, but

tempered by slight concessions and the constant

shifting of Imperial favor from one race to another, a p 
peared to block major uprisings.
One person,

in a position of potential great power,

did recognize the Slav problem and sought for a solution to
it.

This was Archduke Franz Ferdinand,

the heir-apparent,

who was assassinated at Sarajevo on June 2 8 , 1914.
been reported

that he 11inclined

It has

to the Idea of remodelling

the Dual Monarchy into a number of national states, linked

•1

together by a strong Central Parliament.'*
toward Federalism,

This tendency

in which the Slav peoples of the Dual

Monarchy would achieve the status of the Germans and Magyars
earned him no support from those holders of vested interests
and ran directly counter to the objectives of those Slav
and Italian elements who wanted
burgs.

independence from the Habs-

Franz F e r d i n a n d 8s death ended serious efforts to

obtain a solution to the Slav pr ob lem within the boundaries
of the Empire, and by a strange ironyy gave the Habsburg
Monarchy its last chance to act as a Great Power.

As

A# J. P. Taylor has written;
The murder jolted the dynasty into actions even
Francis Joseph favored war, though he despaired of the
outcome and, for that matter, was relieved that the
death of Francis Ferdinand had vindicated the principles
of dynastic purity which had been Infringed by Francis
F e r d i n a n d ’s m a r r i a g e *2
With the elimination of their one supporter at Court,
and the wrath of the Germans and Magyars turned against the
Serbs,

the Austrian Slavs were faced with a war they did

not wish to support, as well as with the continuation of a
system of government which offered them nothing but secondclass status in public and private affairs.

The declara 

tion of war determined many of their leaders to seek the

•*"R. W. Seton-Watson, Saralevo (London;
Company, Limited, 1925)* pp. 83-84.

Constable and

^A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg M o n a r c h y . 1809- 1918
(Londons Hamish Hamilton, 1948), p. 231«

complete liberation of their peoples from Habsburg misrule.
The movement which resulted in the formation of the Czecho
slovak Republic was one of several nationalistic aspira
tions which arose from the conflict.
Under the capable and dedicated

v

V

/

aryk, Benes and Stefanik,

leadership of Mas-

laboring outside the area of the

Monarchy, and Kramer, &tanek, Ra^in and others who remained
wit hin Austria-Hungarian territory during the war,

the

Czechoslovak cause was the most ably directed national
movement of all those that developed against the Habsburgs.
•Endowed with a foresight apparently not given to the leaders
of the other nationalistic movements,

Masaryk and the Czech©**

Slovaks turned to the Western European nations and, later
to the United States,
national Independence.

for help in recognition of their
The Czechoslovak National Council

established branches in all the Allied and Associated coun
tries, providing a focus for the campaign of education,
diplomacy and active participation of Czechoslovak forces
on the side of the Allies, which Czechoslovak leaders
deemed necessary for a successful bid for independence*
It is possible that the establishment of a Czecho
slovak State could have been achieved without the services
of a substantial armed force, but it Is doubtful.
Czechoslovak Legions,

fighting in France,

The

Italy, Russia and

Siberia, gave Masaryk and the National Council a propaganda
tool with which to direct the attention of the world t© &

hitherto virtually unknown nation,, held deep within the
Austro-Hungarian Empire and sundered by the component parts
of that coalition.

The exploits of the Legionaries in the

Great War far outweighed their actual numbers.

In a

struggle which saw some ten million soldiers of all com
batant nations killed,

the members of the Legions numbered

only approximately two hundred thousand devoted
Yet,

soldiers#

so imbued were they with nationalistic fervor, Czecho

slovakian ambitions could hardly have been better served#
Their achievements helped in the raising of funds for the
necessary education and propaganda campaigns devised by
their political leaders,

they won fame by their valiant

struggles against vastly superior numbers in Russia and
Siberia, and most important of all,

they created a sympa

thetic public opinion which could not have been attained
any other way#

in

It was upon these achievements that their

political leaders based the Czechoslovak program calling for
national recognition on the part of the powerful Allied Gov
ernment s .
Funds from the West,
undaunted

fighting forces

in the East,

opposition to the Monarchy by the people at home,

and shrewd diplomatic maneuvering throughout the world, all
these factors combined

to create a sovereign Czechoslovakia

after three centuries of Habsburg domination#

The Czechoslo*

vak Legions, with their ancient heritage undergirding their
will for independence,

greatly strengthened

the political
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position of the National Council.

They, alone,

could have

played this Important role in Czechoslovak history.
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